FoW (24): The seven key ingredients of highly adaptive (and effective) militaries

By Col. Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army (Ret.)


Best Defense future of war entry

The there are two
great truths about the future of war.

The first is that it
will consist of identifying and killing the enemy and either prevailing or not.
We can surmise all sorts of new bells and whistles and technologies yet
unknown, but, ultimately, it comes down to killing people. It doesn't always
have to happen, but you always have to prepare to make it happen, and have the
other guy know that.

The other great
truth is that whatever we think today regarding the form, type, and location of
our next conflict, will be wrong. Our history demonstrates this with great
clarity.

Well then, how do we
appropriately organize for the next conflict if both these things are true? There
are a number of historical verities that should serve as guides for both our
resourcing and our management. In no particular order, but with the whole in
mind, here are some key points to consider that have proven historically very
valuable in times of war. The historic degree of support for any one or all
within the service structures usually indicated the strengths and shortfalls of
our prior leadership vision, preparation, and battlefield successes or failures
at the time.

TECHNOLOGY. This
should be heavily invested so our military is on the leading, not trailing edge
of warfare and its tools. It is a given that bad people and bad nations look to
new and unknown elements to provide a leading edge. It was only because of
FDR's instincts that we got a nuclear program ahead of the Germans. Conversely,
had they made earlier investments in jets and long-range submarines, we may
never have had a chance to use our newfound technology. Research &
Development is often shorted for budgetary reasons and is largely unseen and unappreciated
until the other guy's R&D work is demonstrated on the battlefield against
our people. Think IED and cyberwarfare.

INTELLIGENCE. There
can never be enough in enough different ways. Enough is never enough in this
area. This is especially true now with so many bright people, bright ways, and
asymmetric environments. Crucial to all this is HUMINT -- often a dirty word
because it involves risk and judgment -- but usually the only really truly
confirming data point a field commander has. The Iran rescue attempt would
probably have had a far different outcome had quality HUMINT been available.

QUALITY PEOPLE. From
the lowest to the highest grade, quality or lack thereof emerges with great
visibility in the opening period of any conflict. Ineffective organizations
from squad to corps and ships and planes are usually the result of a
disinterest in the stocking, training and education of those personnel and
things. In times of peace, military organizations tend to rest, be selective in
the workloads and if pinched for people, lower entrance standards or excuse
poor performance. People, especially quality people with societal options, cost
money. Within our system, cutting personnel and their costs is usually the
quickest way to achieve savings and the least politically dangerous. It is
always a proven false economy when warfare begins.

ECCENTRIC THOUGHT. Military
institutions traditionally abhor the eccentric. But in times of war, it is the
eccentric that shows the light to seemingly insurmountable problems and
provides field elements a priceless edge. Consider the World War II Higgins
Boat and ULTRA programs -- both were the brainchildren of people thought beyond
the pale by the conventional military of the time. All the services have
schools and "future think" programs that could harbor the unusual mind. There
are people within the population that seem to be in another universe and viewed
as distasteful by the system. But they may also hold the only flashlight for a
dark room problem besetting a combat zone. The services should create a small
place in their structure for these people and encourage their play. It has
always paid dividends.

LANGUAGE &
CULTURE. It's more than likely that our next war will be fought in a place we
don't now know where there is a language and culture we may not fully
understand. We will lose people because of that. There is also a distinct
possibility that the nature of that future fight will encompass civilians and
the necessity of convincing them as to our quality. The services need to
encourage and build on an internal knowledge base of great diversity, expertise,
and cultural flexibility. Some small node of that base will be priceless at a
critical moment. The crucial need is always at the cutting edge of human interface
-- a place where this sort of education is historically not taught in favor of
rote tactics. How much money did DOD have to spend to allow small units to
effectively work in our latest wars for translators and cultural support
personnel?

DEPLOYABILITY. The
most effective unit in our inventory is irrelevant if it can't get someplace in
time to make a difference. Historically, this is an area beset with specific service
agendas and is non-glamorous from a funding perspective. Amphibious lift and
air deployability have been traditional tail-end budget items for services
enamored with big ships and fast planes. It is highly likely that wherever our
next conflict is, it won't be in the United States. Getting there will be
important. Consider the heroic and somewhat amusing efforts it took to get land
combat units to Kuwait -- think Liberty Ships. If Saddam had been more
aggressive, our initial elements would have been speed bumps and their members
memorialized. We can do a lot better but it takes visionary discipline and
resources.

LEADERSHIP. Someone
will always be "in charge" at all levels. This is an oft-used phrase within the
military but not often truly defined or nurtured. Whatever the state of quality
our forces have at a moment of conflict, the existing leadership will make the
decisions and we will live with the results. McClellan or Marshall -- you get
what you got with what you developed. Truly defining this quality, determining
how to select quality and educating quality will be crucial. Leadership puts
all the above aspects into qualitative action -- or doesn't. Our success or
lack thereof will be determined by the quality of leadership at all levels at
the moment of commitment. Even without desired resources, future quality
leaders at all levels and tasks can have the vision and mindset to effectively
overcome issues, determine the most effective solutions, and inspire success. This
is the one area, above all, that cannot be neglected. Nor should we be
dependent on a momentary find of a personality that "doesn't fit the mold." Quality
will be demanded at all levels -- especially at the very top and bottom.

Leading in peace has
always been the greatest challenge for the services. The usual lodestones for
success do not exist. Proving the necessity for existence is always a major
budgetary challenge. The senior leadership is constantly trying to find the
Philosopher's Stone that turns a little into a lot. Leadership is further
hampered by both internal service pet rocks as well as congressional
proclivities. History indicates that the successful military Philosopher's
Stone can rarely be identified in the whole, but we do know some of the parts.

Col. (Ret.) Keith Nightingale commanded Airborne and
Ranger/SOF infantry forces from company through brigade. He participated in the
combat spectrum from the Dominican Republic through the Iran rescue attempt to
Afghanistan, as well as in drug interdiction operations in Latin America. He
annually conducts Normandy terrain walks for U.S. military participants in the
anniversary period.

Tom note: Got
your own list o f long-held truths about the future of war?  Consider submitting an essay . The contest ends soon. Try to keep it short -- no more than
750 words, if possible. And please! no footnotes or recycled war college
papers.