Hey, the QDR left out PME! How come?

By Nicholas Murray


Best Defense guest columnist

"The only thing that
we can actually guarantee is that in the future we're going to have to have
very well-developed leaders that can lead in very ambiguous situations and very
challenging situations and can really pull a team together to do very difficult
things with maybe not a lot of time to think about it or a lot of guidance
ahead of time." -- Lt. Gen. David Perkins, speaking to a group of
students at the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, June 25, 2013

Lt. Gen. Perkins is spot on. To create the leaders he is talking about
logically requires a first-class military education system. Yet the new QDR hardly mentions it. In times of declining budgets one of the key things
armed forces have done historically to enable continued success or to reform
after failure, has been to focus on the education of their future leaders. This
has proven time and again to be a cost-effective combat multiplier for armed
forces. Indeed, the role of education is prominent in the previous two QDRs
(2010 and 2006), yet it is mentioned only in passing in the current version.

Given all of the arguments of the last few years over the state of
military education, it should continue to feature prominently. Yet this is not
the case. The current QDR does recognize the need to develop service leaders
when it states: "Above all, we will need to invest more in finding and
developing leaders of consequence at every level, men and women of both
competence and character." Clearly, then, the failure to discuss the role of education
in the preparation of service personnel to meet an uncertain future is an
oversight (whether deliberate or not). If it was deliberate, it implies that
education is not considered important to the future preparation of the services.
Alternatively, it was a curious error.

So, what should the services do about this? After all, many senior service
leaders have identified high quality education as a crucial component in the
development of the type of critical-thinking adaptive leaders the services will
almost certainly need. To that end, a thorough review is needed of the quality
and output of the services' education systems, along with an analysis of where
military education fits in with the country's national security strategy over
the longer term.

To facilitate the process, this author has four main suggestions:


1) Clearly identify and describe the purpose of military education writ
large.


2) Create an overarching education policy for the services as a whole,
one that leaves room for the needs of the individual services.


3) Identify what programs are in place right now, or are being
implemented, to address the criticisms of military education regarding its
quality and the development of adaptive strategic-minded critical-thinkers.


4) Have military education monitored by an external committee who report
directly to the OSD (P&R).

Once the above has been accomplished, the services will have a better
grip on what needs to be done to educate its servicemen and -women to meet
requirements (whatever they might be), why it needs to do them, as well as how
well it is actually doing.  

Dr. Nicholas Murray is an associate
professor in the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and
Staff College. He is the current Educator of the Year for History at CGSC, and
recently received the Department of the Army's Commander's Award for Civilian
Service. His book The Rocky Road to the Great War
(Potomac Books) came out last year. He recently published "The Role of Professional Military Education in Mission Command" in Joint Forces
Quarterly. This article represents his own views and unless otherwise stated
does not necessarily represent those of the CGSC, the U.S. Army, or the Defense
Department.