Am I a Paid Agent of the Kremlin? And Other Questions

A few short additions to earlier debates. First, the Grey Coat School now confirms that it was a grammar school until September 1977. The school  declines to share its language aptitude test with me, or you. It says : ‘The aptitude for languages test is the same each year, so to avoid any applicant having an advantage over another, we do not allow copies in advance.  The test is based on a fictional language which builds from simple words to longer sentences and hence knowledge of a particular foreign language is not necessary.’

 

No, I am not a paid agent of the Russian government, not that such denials would convince anyone daft enough to believe any such thing. I might point out that I appeared on RT on Wednesday (an appearance for which I received no payment, was offered none and requested none, and for which I travelled to and from the studio on my bicycle), and perhaps ( see here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJNnVj8dVfE ) disappointed any who thought I might take a straight Kremlin line. Note the long silence when I say that both sides are guilty of interference.

 

 

I have, as it happened, never ceased to criticise the Putin government for its lawlessness and corruption. I just don’t think that, in these matters, it is notably worse than many other governments with which we are happy to do business, and against which we do not create alliances (eg China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan) . It’s the same problem as one gets with Israel. In both cases the critics attack the country for things that plenty of other countries do (but they don’t criticise those countries as well).  The real reason for the criticism is elsewhere. The disdain for the Putinocracy is a pretext. My interest remains the globalism versus national sovereignty conflict.

 

It might be said that the intervention of Russia in sovereign Ukraine rather knocks this down.  I don’t agree. As I’ve said before, Ukraine’s sovereignty is a pretty nebulous thing, and is a temporary consequence of Russian weakness. If Gorbachev had handled things better in 1991, Ukraine and Belarus would still be run from Moscow and nobody would care very much. Now, of course, the return of Ukraine to direct Moscow rule is more or less unthinkable. But it’s quite possible for Ukraine to return to Russia’s sphere of influence, or even for large parts of the country to be given so much regional autonomy that it is effectively partitioned (a feasible outcome of the current crisis). That would make it much easier for the Western Ukraine to get closer to the EU.

 

 I stress this isn’t a sneer at Ukraine or Ukrainians. I also regard my own country’s sovereignty as more or less non-existent, and what’s left of it fast disappearing. It’s just a statement of fact. The issue only arises because Russia, uniquely,  still more or less has a large population, certainly has oil and gas, and still possesses nuclear weapons and a security council veto, plus a well-educated professional diplomatic corps trained in the pursuit of national self-interest and good intelligence services.  It also has sizeable armed forces, though how these measure up against (say)those of the USA is open to question. Thus it can still function as a medium-sized power, despite the existence of the two superpowers China and the USA.

 

It was this status, of medium-sized power, which Britain and France tried and failed to retain in the Suez episode in 1956. They were obstacles, and they were removed, Russia is not such an easy conquest, not least because its empire was contiguous rather than scattered about the globe.

 

What about thus planned referendum on Crimean independence? Well, Kosovo held one of those and got a 99% yes vote, but nothing happened for years. Then Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, and was recognised by the USA and much of NATO (though not all). Russia refused. This leads to an amusing situation where Russia could claim Kosovo as a precedent for Crimean secession, and the West can point out that, since Russia didn’t recognise Kosovar independence, it can’t consistently recognise Crimean independence either. I do wonder how they will sort this out. This is why I suspect that enhanced autonomy, within Ukraine, may end up as the outcome. There’s no doubt that almost everything about Crimea is an anomaly . A sensible Ukrainian government ( and sensible statesmen from anywhere) would see that it was so, and be willing to discuss special arrangements which saved face.

 

But the arrogant aggression of the Western politicians who supported the destabilisation of the Kiev government wasn’t sensible, and appeared to be driven by pique over the refusal of Viktor Yanukovych  to sign a deal with the EU. Pique, and moralising, are not good bases for foreign policy. Other countries have interests . Unless you are prepared to go to war to overcome those interests, you just have to learn to live with them. And there are lots of different forms of aggression and interference. Russia’s are more obvious and traditional, but that doesn’t necessarily make them worse.