FoW (13): You think innovation means better drones? Faster jets? Wrong. We've been out-innovated for the last 13 years.

By Paul Lewandowski


Best
Defense future of war entrant

To
the American military, innovation means technology. Innovating on the
battlefield is synonymous with more electronics, bigger robots, and better
fighter jets. To non-state actors, insurgents and terrorists, innovation has
taken on a fundamentally different meaning. Their tactics are moving away from
technological solutions and into realms where technology does not play a role.

In
the realm of military technology, the U.S. Defense Department and its host of
contractors are the ultimate trump card. America's military budget is greater
than the next 10 largest state actors' military spending combined. Any force attempting
to develop technology superior to American forces will eventually be crushed
under the weight of billions of dollars of DARPA contracts, DOD research
grants, and rapid fielding initiatives.

The
Iraq and Afghan insurgencies have struggled valiantly to out-innovate American
tactical forces. From 2001 until recently, these insurgencies believed they
could turn to technological solutions to outpace coalition counter-IED efforts.
The first IEDs were simple -- a detonator, some copper wire, and an old
artillery shell. It didn't take long for U.S. forces to answer. Humvees became
armored, gunners' turrets grew taller and more protected. Soon, the insurgency
evolved. They turned to pressure plates and infrared sensors triggered by an
engine's heat. Again, U.S. technological savvy answered. Cell phone and radio
IED detonators were countered as well. The insurgents' reliance on technology
quickly became a hindrance rather than an advantage. US forces could hunt them
down on their cell numbers, via their purchases, texts, and emails.

And
so the terrorists began to innovate in the other direction. Insurgent
techniques became simpler, low-tech. Military-grade munitions gave way to homemade
explosives. Cell phone detonators regressed back to command wire. Suicide
bombers and insurgents disguised as Afghan army or police proved more efficient
than complex, electronic IEDs or expensive VBIEDs. After nearly 13 years of
war, the terrorists have learned that the best counter to a techno-savvy force
is simplicity.

The
gospel of the simple insurgent hasn't just stayed in Afghanistan. In Kenya's
Westgate Mall, insurgents lightly armed with assault rifles, grenades, and an
active Twitter account were able to make the marginalized al-Shabab a global
name in terror. They were able to instill fear in the citizens of Kenya and
humiliate the Kenyan government as it bungled the response. The whole operation
probably cost less than a used car.

Despite
what defense contractors want to believe, the next war isn't going to be fought
or won with drones, biometric readers, or robot suits. It will be won with
smart, adaptive, culturally aware ground
forces. Non-state actors and peripheral militaries have learned not to fall
into the technological arms-race trap again. The 21st century insurgent won't
have a cell phone to tap. He will have a few trusted associates and a courier.
Emails, texts, and phone calls will give way to written plans, handshakes, and
hard currency.

The
next-generation terror network will look more like a drug cartel: deeply embedded
in the local culture, regional in focus, and urban in operation. The new
insurgent will be so low tech he will be virtually untraceable. Another face in
a sea of faces. No biometric data, no name on a government registry, they will
be known to their associates as just a nickname. A ghost in plain view. They
won't be identified as terrorists until they decide to make their moves. Their
tactics will be crude but lethal, more befitting of medieval warfare than
modern combat: stabbing a policeman in the throat, a bucket of chemicals in the
reservoir, a soldier who suddenly turns on the unit. They'll carry weapons that
are innovative yet simple: The counterinsurgent could see them walking to their
target, weapon in hand, and never register him as a threat. It could be a
bucket of chemicals, a farmer with a sickle, or even a rancher with his disease-infected
cattle. These low-tech, low-cost innovations are the insurgent answer to a
modern, technologically-heavy force.

The
21st-century insurgent will be adaptive. He will seize opportunities as they
break. A power transformer left unguarded, a truck full of food, even a herd of
livestock are all opportunities for him to seize. His reaction time is minutes,
not days. The counterinsurgent will struggle to fight him. Governments, by
their very nature, are bureaucratic institutions. They demand supervision,
approval, review. The counterinsurgent can't tap into the local, informal
network the way the insurgent can. No one talks to the uniformed government
official, but everyone talks to their neighbor. It's why the Autodefensa in Mexico can damage a
cartel more in a week than the Mexican army can in a year. They react at the
speed of the cartel and they glean intelligence straight from the source. They
don't just have their finger on the pulse of the community -- they are swimming
in its bloodstream.

The
only way to fight and win as a state actor in the 21st century is to become as
smart and as culturally sensitive as the insurgent. Forces will have to look at
the herd of cattle and see the same target the insurgent does. The
counterinsurgent will have to understand the culture of the streets the same
way his enemy does. No military can afford to outsource analytical,
in-the-moment thinking. The future counterinsurgent must know the culture and
the enemy so well that he can think one step ahead of him. The future of war
demands predictive abilities that only a living, breathing, thinking soldier
can bring to the fight.

A
drone overhead would have done exactly nothing during the Westgate Mall
attacks. Biometric scanners are useless after a food supply has been poisoned.
An F-35 can't put a bomb on a green-on-blue attack. These tactics cannot be
countered by military technology. Believing that technology will answer our
problems, and that money spent developing robots is better spent than on
developing smarter warriors is a dangerous fallacy. It serves only to play into
the hands of America's enemies.

Paul Lewandowski is a former Army officer
and Operation Enduring Freedom veteran. The views expressed here are his own.