Most Will Upload Their Minds If They Can

Professor Susan Schneider has written a timely and important piece in today’s New York Times: The Philosophy of ‘Her.’ I do give her credit for recognizing that uploading should be pursued, and for writing a timely piece about an increasingly important topic. However I find her distinction between whether uploading is a copy or a transfer of consciousness to be trivial.

The primary reason is that when persons consider uploading, if and when its available, they won’t worry about whether they are copying or transferring their consciousness. Whether they can upload into a genetically engineered body, a robotic body or to a virtual reality, most will gladly do so rather than die.

Now the author is right to note there is a difference depending on whether or not the original survives. If the original “you” survives, then there are as many “yous” as there are copies, assuming the copies are perfect. If our consciousness were perfectly copied into 100 robotic or virtual bodies then there are 100 copies of you (plus the original) and each becomes different based on whatever experiences they have from that point forward. Each, including the so-called original, would continue to change going forward, in the same way that you change every moment based on your life experience. The problem of personal identity–how and if we remain identical over time–is one of the great philosophical problems, but it exists independently of uploading technology. That is there is always a problem of explaining how “you” persist through time. In a sense you are not the same you who lived yesterday, and you are  certainly not identical with your 10 year old self.

Of course there is no particular reason other than vanity that you would want 100 copies of yourself. But this issue is much more important than whether we call what happens a transfer or copy. Ideally it would probably be better not to make multiple copies, which is really just multiplying people.

If the original “you”" is destroyed in the uploading process then we have transferred our consciousness into however many bodies we choose to transfer it into, although again there is no imperative to upload into multiple bodies. But there is no important distinction between being copied or transferred, the point is merely semantic. If you want to hold on to essentialism–the idea that humans have an essence–then you could say you didn’t transfer yourself but only copied it. But if you reject an essentialist soul theory of personal identity, then copying yourself will be good enough, especially if you have no other options. Note too the same problem arises for the religious believer who dies and wakes up in heaven. Is the body that wakes up just a copy, or has your soul been transferred to heaven? Note that no one worries that what will wake up in heaven is just a copy–they just want to wake up!

Now suppose you are facing death with a decrepit body. A new technology promises to upload your memories, experiences and all your other psychological characteristics to a robotic body, an AI or a virtual reality.  Suppose further that the technology has been well-tested and many of your friends tell you of the wonders of their uploaded minds which exist in robotic bodies or virtual realities. Should you follow them? You may decide you don’t trust the technology, or you may decide to die and hope that Jesus or Mohammed will save you. But if you opt for the high-tech solution, philosophical concerns about whether this new you is a copy or a transfer will not stop you from uploading. Not if you want to live forever.