The Gates files (VIIth, and last): Why the Pentagon didn't care about fighting wars

Because, under reforms of the 1950s and
then Goldwater-Nichols, winning wars is not its job.

As my friend and mentor Bob Killebrew
puts it:

"I would just add that by taking the chiefs out of the strategy
business, and making them responsible for building the force, they are no
longer responsible for winning wars (or for strategy) but for the maintenance
and support of their institutions. I suspect this is at least partly why Gates
found such a business-as-usual attitude in the Pentagon, and why you see the SecDef
dealing so much with the combatant commanders and so little with the chiefs.
They are effectively neutered." 

Also, just so's youse have it, here's your
last chance to read the review I wrote of Robert Gates's memoir for the New York Times Book Review.

The end.