Michael Horowitz's fine study of how and why military innovations are adopted

Over Christmas break I finally read Michael Horowitz's The Diffusion of Military Power, a terrific study
of why some nations are able to innovate militarily, or imitate the innovations
of others, while others are not.

Among his findings:

Quick technological change is hard, but sweeping organizational change
is far harder. The thesis of the book is that "adoption capacity, the
combination of financial intensity and organizational capital possessed by a
state, influences the way states respond to major military innovations."
Horowitz shows that is not just a theory but a brilliant diagnostic tool. You
won't think the same way about Chinese aircraft carriers after reading this
book.  




Hence, "innovations requiring disruptive organizational
transformations but relatively reasonable financial investments, like blitzkrieg
... will spread haltingly."




One danger is for a nation to be the incubator of change, but to fail
to really adopt it. As you might expect, he cites the Royal Navy's failure with
aircraft carriers. Aside from the Taranto raid of 1940, "the British never
really utilized carrier forces for independent strike operations or centered
their naval forces on carriers."




Carrier warfare is especially interesting because it such an extreme
example of high financial costs and major organizational change. Many more
countries have gotten out of the carrier business than are in it now, even
though it is clear that sea control requires control of air over the sea.  




The younger a terrorist organization is, the more likely it is to
adopt the tactic of suicide bombings. This variable appears more important than
whether or not an organization is religious in orientation -- though the odds
are highest when an organization is both young and religiously motivated.

More to come focusing on the warnings this fine book offers to today's
U.S. military.