“Close Guantánamo,” Says Prison’s First Commander, Adds That It “Should Never Have Been Opened”

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“Close Guantánamo,” Says Prison’s First Commander, Adds That It “Should Never Have Been Opened”

[image error]In an important op-ed for the Detroit Free Press, Maj. Gen. Mike Lehnert of the Marines, the first commander of Guantánamo, has called for the closure of the prison. Maj. Gen. Lehnert built the open air cages of Camp X-Ray, the “war on terror” prison’s first incarnation, in just four days prior to the arrival of the first prisoners on January 11, 2002.

As I explained in my book The Guantánamo Files, Lehnert initially bought into the hyperbole and propaganda about the prisoners, stating, soon after the prison opened, “These represent the worst elements of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. We asked for the worst guys first.” However, he soon changed his mind. In early February 2002, he provided an important insight into how, contrary to what senior Bush administration officials were saying in public, the uncomfortable truth was they they had no idea who most of the prisoners were. “A large number claim to be Taliban, a smaller number we have been able to confirm as al-Qaeda, and a rather large number in the middle we have not been able to determine their status,” he said, adding, “Many of the detainees are not forthcoming. Many have been interviewed as many as four times, each time providing a different name and different information.”

Unfortunately, the Bush administration responded not by acknowledging that it had, with a handful of exceptions, bought and rounded up civilians and low-level Taliban conscripts, but by aggressively interrogating the men over many years and, in many cases, introducing a torture program involving prolonged sleep deprivation, isolation, humiliation, the use of loud music and noise, and the exploitation of phobias. This produced copious amounts of information, as was revealed when WikiLeaks released classified military files relating to the prisoners in April 2011, but much of it was fundamentally unreliable.

The torture program mainly took place under Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, who took over as Guantánamo’s commander in November 2002, replacing Maj. Gen. Michael E. Dunlavey (in charge of interrogations) and Brig. Gen. Rick Baccus (in charge of the guard force) who took over from Lehnert in March 2002. In a revelatory article by Greg Miller in the Los Angeles Times in December 2002, sources explained that Dunlavey had “traveled to Afghanistan in the spring to complain that too many ‘Mickey Mouse’ detainees” were being sent to Guantánamo, although he was also involved in the negotiations that led to the introduction of a torture program at Guantánamo for Mohammed al-Qahtani, a Saudi regarded as the intended 20th hijacker for the 9/11 attacks.

Lehnert, on the other hand, recognized the importance of humane treatment for the prisoners from the beginning, and reiterated this in his op-ed, where he described his “insistence on humane treatment,” also writing that, when the guards tried to tell him that “the terrorists wouldn’t treat us this well,” his answer “was always the same: ‘If we treat them as they would treat us, we become them.’”

The author and academic Karen Greenberg explained more about the early days of Guantánamo under Maj. Gen. Lehnert in an article for the Washington Post in 2009 to accompany the publication of her book about Lehnert’s command, The Least Worst Place: Guantánamo’s First 100 Days:

In the absence of new policy guidance about how to treat the detainees, Lehnert told me that he felt he had no choice but to rely on the regulations already in place, ones in which the military was well schooled: the Uniform Code of Military Justice, other US laws and, above all, the Geneva Conventions. The detainees, no matter what their official status, were essentially to be considered enemy prisoners of war, a status that mandated basic standards of humane treatment. One lawyer for the Judge Advocate General Corps, Lt. Col. Tim Miller, told me that he used the enemy-POW guidelines as his “working manual.” A corrections specialist, Staff Sgt. Anthony Gallegos, called Washington’s orders “shady,” which he told me gave his colleagues no choice but to “go with the Geneva Conventions.”

Under Lehnert, the International Committee of the Red Cross was also called in, (by Col. Manuel Supervielle, the head JAG at Southern Command), much to the annoyance of senior Bush administration officials. As Greenberg described it, “It was a pivotal moment in the history of Guantánamo. Once Supervielle’s call had been made, the civilian policymakers around Rumsfeld could not undo what the uniformed military had done — although, according to Supervielle, an irritated team of lawyers, including Pentagon general counsel William J. “Jim” Haynes II, asked the Southern Command lawyer days later whether there was “a way to back out of it now.”

Greenberg added, “The ICRC arrived at Guantánamo on Jan. 17, 2002 — six days after the detainees did. Thus began what amounted to a period of subtle defiance of Washington’s lack of direction.”

In his op-ed, cross-posted below, Maj. Gen. Lehnert explained how he had become aware of the general insignificance of the prisoners. “Even in the earliest days of Guantánamo, I became more and more convinced that many of the detainees should never have been sent in the first place,” he wrote, adding, “They had little intelligence value, and there was insufficient evidence linking them to war crimes. That remains the case today for many, if not most, of the detainees.”

This is indeed true. As Maj. Gen. Lehnert also explained, although “a handful” of the prisoners “should be transferred to the US for prosecution or incarceration,” the majority “have been cleared for transfer by our defense and intelligence agencies.” As Brig. Gen. Mark Martins, the chief prosecutor of Guantánamo’s military commissions, conceded earlier this year, a maximum 13 of the remaining 162 prisoners are likely to face prosecution, and 82 of the remaining prisoners were cleared for release in January 2010 by a high-level, inter-agency task force that President Obama established shortly after taking office.

These 82 men are still held primarily because, for three years, Congress has passed legislation that has placed an onerous burden on the president and his administration — a certification process whereby they would have to promise that any released prisoner would be unable to engage in terrorist activities or take up arms against the US. However, President Obama also played a major role in the deadlock. In January 2010, he unfairly banned the release of any cleared Yemenis (who make up two-thirds of the cleared prisoners) after a failed airline bomb plot hatched in Yemen, and he only lifted that ban in May this year. In addition, although a waiver exists in the legislation that allows him to bypass Congress if he regards it as being “in the national security interests of the United States,” he has chosen not to do so.

Maj. Gen. Lehnert also explained that “the entire detention and interrogation strategy was wrong,” adding that “it validates every negative perception of the United States.” Crucially, he also mentioned the current legislation designed to ease the restrictions on the release of prisoners. These new proposals originated in the Senate Armed Services Committee, under the leadership of Sen. Carl Levin, and were passed by the Senate last month. The House of Representatives, however, had passed a restrictive version of the legislation back in June, and so a compromise had to be thrashed out in committee. As a result, the onerous restrictions on the release of prisoners have been eased, but a ban remains in place on bringing prisoners to the US, even though the administration wants to bring prisoners to the US for trial and for ongoing detention.

Guantánamo can only be closed if this happens, but for now it is essential that the legislation is passed. As Maj. Gen. Lehnert described it, the revised legislation “appears to have compromise language that would give the president some additional flexibility to transfer detainees to their home or third countries, though it maintains an unwise and unnecessary ban on transferring detainees to the United States.” As he pointed out elsewhere, the law preventing transfers to the US “needs to be revisited.”

To my mind the most crucial message in Lehnert’s op-ed is when he tackles those people (primarily in Congress and the right-wing media) who insist that prisoners mustn’t be released because of the fears of recidivism — fears that, as I and other reputable sources have repeatedly pointed out, have been grossly exaggerated. This is what President Obama did when he refused to release cleared Yemenis after a foiled bomb plot, and — whether for cynical reasons or because of genuinely misplaced fears — it also drives lawmakers, but, as Lehnert stated, “The act of releasing a prisoner is about risk management. We cannot promise conclusively that any detainee who is released will not plan an attack against us, just as we cannot promise that any US criminal released back into society will never commit another crime.”

He added, “In determining whether we should release detainees who have no charges brought against them, I would argue that our Constitution and the rule of law conclusively trump any additional risk that selective release of detainees may entail. It is time that the American people and our politicians accepted a level of risk in the defense of our constitutional values, just as our service men and women have gone into harm’s way time after time to defend our constitution. If we make a mockery of our values, it calls us to question what we are really fighting for.”

My thanks to Maj. Gen Lehnert for his powerful words, and his reminder that professed values only mean something if they are upheld with the appropriate actions.

Maj. Gen. Lehnert’s op-ed is below:

Michael Lehnert: Here’s why It’s long past time that we close Guantánamo

Detroit Free Press, December 12, 2013

In 2002, I led the first Joint Task Force to Guantánamo and established the detention facility. Today, I believe it is time to close Guantánamo.

In the coming week, Congress will lay the foundation for whether and to what extent Guantánamo can be closed. The annual defense bill appears to have compromise language that would give the president some additional flexibility to transfer detainees to their home or third countries, though it maintains an unwise and unnecessary ban on transferring detainees to the United States.

Still, this is a step forward toward closing our nation’s most notorious prison — a prison that should never have been opened.

Our nation created Guantánamo because we were legitimately angry and frightened by an unprovoked attack on our soil on Sept. 11, 2001. We thought that the detainees would provide a treasure trove of information and intelligence.

I was ordered to construct the first 100 cells at Guantánamo within 96 hours. The first group of 20 prisoners arrived seven days after the order was given. We were told that the prisoners were the “worst of the worst,” a common refrain for every set of detainees sent to Guantánamo. The U.S. has held 779 men at the detention facility over the past 12 years. There are currently 162 men there, most of them cleared for transfer, but stuck by politics.

Even in the earliest days of Guantánamo, I became more and more convinced that many of the detainees should never have been sent in the first place. They had little intelligence value, and there was insufficient evidence linking them to war crimes. That remains the case today for many, if not most, of the detainees.

In retrospect, the entire detention and interrogation strategy was wrong. We squandered the goodwill of the world after we were attacked by our actions in Guantánamo, both in terms of detention and torture. Our decision to keep Guantánamo open has helped our enemies because it validates every negative perception of the United States.

The majority of the remaining detainees at Guantánamo have been cleared for transfer by our defense and intelligence agencies.

The act of releasing a prisoner is about risk management. We cannot promise conclusively that any detainee who is released will not plan an attack against us, just as we cannot promise that any U.S. criminal released back into society will never commit another crime.

There are a handful of detainees at Guantánamo who should be transferred to the U.S. for prosecution or incarceration. Such transfers remain prohibited under current law, but that law needs to be revisited.

In determining whether we should release detainees who have no charges brought against them, I would argue that our Constitution and the rule of law conclusively trump any additional risk that selective release of detainees may entail. It is time that the American people and our politicians accepted a level of risk in the defense of our constitutional values, just as our service men and women have gone into harm’s way time after time to defend our constitution. If we make a mockery of our values, it calls us to question what we are really fighting for.

When I was the Joint Task Force Commander in Guantánamo, I spent many nights visiting the facility and talking to the guards. I did this because I wanted to be sure that my guidance for humane treatment was being carried out. Many of my young Marines and soldiers were clearly troubled by my insistence on humane treatment, pointing out that “the terrorists wouldn’t treat us this well.” My answer to each of these young service members was always the same: “If we treat them as they would treat us, we become them.”

It is time to close Guantánamo. Our departure from Afghanistan is a perfect point in history to close the facility.

Maj. Gen. Michael Lehnert, USMC (Ret.), was the first commander of the U.S. detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. He lives in Traverse City.

Andy Worthington is a freelance investigative journalist, activist, author, photographer and film-maker. He is the co-founder of the “Close Guantánamo” campaign, and the author of The Guantánamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (published by Pluto Press, distributed by Macmillan in the US, and available from Amazon — click on the following for the US and the UK) and of two other books: Stonehenge: Celebration and Subversion and The Battle of the Beanfield. He is also the co-director (with Polly Nash) of the documentary film, “Outside the Law: Stories from Guantánamo” (available on DVD here – or here for the US).