'Blair's Generals' (III): Some other lessons from a British general in southern Iraq

I
also was struck by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Andrew Stewart's summary in British Generals in Blair's Wars of
how he spent his time when the was the British commander in southern Iraq: 15
percent with his British forces, 20 percent with NGOs and other civilian
authorities, 25 percent with Iraqis, and 40 percent with the forces of other
nations: "It took that much effort to be able to understand them, and for them
to understand me."

Stewart
offers up what apparently was a hard-won lesson when commanding multinational
forces that report back to different capitals: "Unless you have an independent
manoeuvre unit that is unconstrained and whose rules of engagement you control,
then you will not attain the rapidity of reaction and the freedom of manoeuvre
you need on operations." In other words, don't fight unless you have a maneuver
unit entirely under your control, along with the rules of engagement governing
its actions.

All
in all, I would say that this is the best new book on military affairs I've
seen this year.

(That's all folks.)