Fivecoat's response in Parameters to me: Look more at causation than correlation

As promised:

Thomas
Ricks's book The Generals did a superb job at gener­ating discussion across the
military on the merits of American generalship since World War II. My article,
"American Landpower and Modern US Generalship" in the Winter-Spring 2013
edition of Parameters, was my attempt to add depth to the dialogue about
the major generals who led division-sized formations in Iraq and Afghanistan
since 9/11.

To be
sure, the article is not all encompassing. Although the post-9/11 group of
major generals is a small data set, it is almost one-third the size of the
World War II cohort and will continue to grow while the U.S. military assists
the Afghan government's coun­terinsurgency operations for the next several
years. Strictly speaking, it might not be significant by the mathematical
definition, but the divi­sion commanders of Iraq and Afghanistan are a notable
group in the historical sense. While I concede the mathematical limitations of
the evidence presented in the article, there is enough hard evidence to allow
us to move beyond questions of correlation and to discuss the matter of
causation, which, in the end, is far more important.

I
acknowledge Mr. Ricks's questioning whether military organiza­tions should
place a premium on reducing disruption. In forming my thoughts on the adverse
outcomes of firings, intellectually I drew upon literature studying similar
experiences in business and professional sports. During a year as a battalion
commander in Afghanistan, I (and I'm sure my higher headquarters) wrestled with
how to improve the performance of subordinate units in an extremely ambiguous
environ­ment. Reliefs rarely seemed the best way forward for my unit or our
counterinsurgency campaign. There is a finer line to be drawn on this measure
than Ricks concedes.

Thanks again for the opportunity to
contribute to the discussion. I hope others are able to expand on and
contribute to the conversation.