A 2nd Cav officer: Yes, our failures were real, but they reflected larger problems in the Army

During the summer, the Best Defense is in
re-runs. Here are some favorites that ran in late 2012 and in 2013. This item originally
ran on Jan. 16, 2013.

By Capt. Alexander Frank, U.S. Army

Best Defense guest respondent

Thomas
Ricks' recent post in Foreign Policy discussing a report on my
unit's performance during a major training exercise in Germany presents a
scathing critique. From my personal experience and through discussions with my
peers throughout the regiment, the criticisms he offers are largely valid. However,
they are incomplete and utterly meaningless unless viewed in the broader
context of the Army's culture. The points he makes are merely symptoms of
underlying cultural problems within the Army rather than the specific failures
he enumerates.

Valid criticisms

In
his post, Ricks reviews the Center for Army Lessons
Learned reports
on our exercise in October. He calls the conclusions of the reports "hair
raising" and draws out several key points. The reports found "commanders and
command sergeant majors tethered to command posts, rarely visiting subordinate
units." Instead of face-to-face interactions, they stayed in their command
posts and issued a steady stream of fragmentary orders, "not feeling
comfortable to allow subordinates to operate broadly under their intent." In
sum, he paints a picture of commanders micro-managing from the safety of their
headquarters.

On
a personal level, this is consistent with what I saw and my own actions as a
leader during the DATE. As an executive officer for one of the best line
companies in the regiment, I discussed with my commander before the exercise
what my role should be -- mentoring the platoon leaders based on my two years
of experience as a PL, including combat. This would involve moving forward to
their positions to walk through their plans and provide on the spot guidance
during key moments of a firefight, but from there letting them operate broadly
within what we were trying to accomplish.

Despite
agreement from my commander and clear intent during the exercise, I was never
encouraged to move forward of our company command post and did not take the
initiative to do so, despite the opportunity. Leaders at all levels rarely did
so.

Overall,
leaders -- including myself -- were focused on the multitude of tasks
prescribed to them in the institutional framework in which we operate. For me,
that meant taking part in meetings over the radio with various support
personnel, filling out logistics reports, and then running errands in the rear
such as picking up graphics from our intelligence people.

The
Army bureaucracy and culture prizes information flow and reliance on assets and
technology, making personal leadership a secondary priority. For example, reports
--how to send them, what was the best format, and their content were the key
priority prior to the commencement of DATE during our preparations. This
over-emphasis on information flow and technology meant that during the actual
exercise, there was little attempt to actually gain good situational awareness
through battlefield circulations and terrain analysis.

Partial viewpoints on
the nature of warfare

These
are merely symptoms of broader cultural problems and assumptions about the
nature of war in the 21st century that were brilliantly outlined by
T.X. Hammes in The Sling and the Stone. Hammes argues that
during the 1990s and into the first years of the 20th century, DOD developed an
institutional mindset completely centered around technology. The planning and
vision papers put out "see increased technical capabilities of command and
control as the key factor shaping future war." The command and control systems
created would "exceed the capabilities of any opponent and will provide us with
a near-perfect understanding of the battlefield." The enemy becomes "a series
of inanimate targets to be serviced. He who services the most targets the
fastest wins."

This
viewpoint formed the basis for the Future Combat System (FCS) and drove our
training and mindset for much of 1990s. As a retired general told me who played
a key role in the initiation of FCS , "future combat system was hijacked by
people who thought you could completely lift the fog of war." Although FCS was
eventually scrapped, the ideas that underpin it still drive Army culture. "Currently,
DOD has defined the future as technology and is driving all experiments in that
direction."

A
perfect illustration of this a movie I was shown at my Infantry Officer
Training course. It starts with a rather chubby colonel in a perfectly starched
uniform striding into his command post, a comfortable tent with desks, chairs,
and several computers set up. A major informs him that a UAV has picked up an
enemy tank headed toward his lines. "Very well," he says, "put an artillery
target right there, and then fire it on my command." The commander pauses as he
watches the tank on a live feed slowly plodding along and then excitedly yells,
"Fire." The fire mission destroys the tank and everyone in the command tent
gives themselves a pat on the back for enabling their colonel to destroy a lone
tank. The movie focused on FBCB2 -- an excellent tool that allows great
situational awareness on the battlefield. The narrator introduced it claiming, "FBCB2
and integrated technologies will allow unprecedented
low-level initiative and delegation of authority." Not quite what happened in
the video, however, but a good illustration of Army culture and mindset.

The result

The
criticisms listed by Ricks of our unit flow from the cultural problems observed
by T.X. Hammes and others. Hammes discusses how these attitudes have made it
very difficult to effectively fight a complex global insurgency that tends not
to approach the battlefield straight on, in tanks. Even in a fight against a
more conventional enemy, the mindset Hammes describes proved ineffective,
leading to the weaknesses Ricks outlines. Because of the emphasis on
information flow and technology, it's natural for commanders to remain in their
command posts where they can have access to the flow of reports from the front
and UAV feeds from above. In theory, they can access a near-perfect view of the
battlefield and micro-manage their formations thanks to the excellent
communication and sensor technologies at their disposal. In such circumstances,
commanders moving forward behind their lead assault elements aren't necessary
to get a good idea of the battle or drive their subordinates to take action
quickly.

DATE
showed the fallacy of this mindset. The opposing forces we fought did not
afford us the opportunity when they attacked to form a near-perfect view of the
battle. Why? Because they moved so
quickly and concentrated their forces so well that by the time reports and UAV
feeds were processed, the information was already useless. This occurred
because commanders never moved forward to get a good idea of the terrain, and
so our enemy was able to utilize it effectively to bypass all of the obstacles
and areas we planned to kill them in. The result was that our enemy was deep in
our rear before we brought to bear any assets against them. We were unable to
develop coherent action in the face of attack and they managed to engage our
forces piecemeal one after the other. With their firepower and armor advantage,
they were able to beat us in any engagement.

A learning organization

That
being said, Ricks tells only one side of the story and ignores the accurate and
insightful comments he received from Colonel Barclay. The thrashing we took
when we were on the defense served its purpose well. During the next phase of
the operation, when we were on the attack, we embraced a far bolder plan with
commanders out of their command posts right behind their lead elements. My
squadron commander spent the bulk of his time just behind our lead elements
where he was able to better influence the fight.

The
plan developed by headquarters allowed for more subordinate initiative. One of
our platoon leaders noticed a key piece of terrain outside of his area and was
allowed to quickly seize it. From there he was able to flank the enemy and we
achieved complete tactical surprise. My troop was able to infiltrate deep into
the enemy's rear with no resistance and pick off isolated enemy units in front
of us. The enemy was never able to take concerted action against us and instead
continued to maneuver ineffectually in small isolated elements, similar to our
predicament when we were playing defense. A fellow captain's company came up on
the enemies reserve while they were essentially sitting in a parking lot and
destroyed them.

During
the culminating live fire exercise afterwards, my company commander dismounted
from his Stryker and got behind the lead platoons rather than managing the
fight over the radio and FBCB2, as he had been instructed to in the preliminary
briefing. When I saw him afterwards, he was giddy with excitement. "I felt
connected with the men," he said. He was actually in a position to influence
the battle. Although he might not have been as plugged in to the information
flow as well as he could have been further to the rear in his Stryker, he was
able to influence the human side of the operation. His mere presence inspired
the men, motivated the platoon leaders to take the initiative, and when
necessary, quickly make key decisions about individual platoons on the spot. Technology
has its place and provides tremendous advantages, but over-emphasis at the
expense of the human factor leads to failure in our experience.

Over
the past decade, the Army has had to become a learning organization, and my regiment
is no different. The important failures early on in the DATE stemming from
major cultural flaws I described have driven change. The entire point of
exercises such as DATE is to learn those lessons when lives are not at stake,
to lessen the chance they will occur on a real battlefield, a point Ricks does
not accept or acknowledge. [Interruption from Tom: Please don't forget the
second sentence of my original post: "It is worrisome that this unit
appears to have deteriorated so much, yet paradoxically reassuring that the
Army is using its maneuvers to identify shortcomings."]

Bottom
line: After participating in those mistakes,
I have the utmost confidence in the leaders in my regiment. The next
several years will be a key period for us and the Army as a whole as we relearn
how to fight a more combined arms hybrid threat than includes conventional mechanized
and armored formations. The mentality and culture we develop now will likely
determine the character of our institution for decades to come.

CPT Alexander Frank is
an infantry officer with 2nd Cavalry Regiment stationed in beautiful Vilseck,
Germany, where he is enjoying the travel opportunities while not training. He
has a bachelor's degree in physics from Duke University.