The Best Defense interview: Former Defense Secretary Perry on what to do about North Korea's weapons program

This interview with
former Defense Secretary William Perry was conducted by telephone on June 20, 2013,
and is running today to commemorate the 63rd anniversary of the beginning of
the Korean War.

Best Defense: How close
did we come to military action against North Korea in 1994 ? Did you think it was going to happen?

William
Perry: "First of all, we were never planning initiating an attack against North Korea. They might have
thought we were, but we were not....

"I
was very much concerned that the actions we were taking -- we were about to
take sanctions and make heavy reinforcements in South Korea -- that North Korea
would see it" [as an attack]. "It would have been a war they started, not one
that we started."

BD: So at the time did
you think there would be war?

WP:
"I didn't think so. But even more than now, we knew little about North Korea.
So we were very concerned that we didn't know what was going on there."

In
addition, "We had drawn a very public and very explicit red line, that they
would not process plutonium or that we would take some action." [So there was a
possibility of] "a surgical strike" [against their nuclear facilities. But
before that happened, there were several steps: Perry would have to recommend
the strike to the president, the president would have to approve it, and South
Korea would need to be brought in.] "There were a lot of ifs."

BD: How big would that
strike have been? How many aircraft, how many precision-guided munitions?

WP:
"We were not planning aircraft, we were planning conventional cruise missiles,
and only against the reprocessing facility."

BD: How many cruise
missiles?

WP:
"I don't remember. The accuracy of these missiles is such that I don't believe,
then or now, it would take many."

BD: How have your views
of North Korea changed since then?

WP:
"Well, we've learned a lot about North Korea since then.... It is very clear to
me now what I believed then but wasn't sure about, which is that they didn't
want a war with the United States."

BD: How have you
advised the Obama administration about how to handle North Korea?

WP:
"I don't feel qualified to advise them today.... In 1994, I was in the middle
of it. I am not in that position now.... [So] I am willing to suggest
alternatives to consider, but I will not say, ‘This is what you should do,'
because I am not well-informed enough to do that."

BD: Do you think North
Korea's leadership will ever give up nuclear weapons?

WP:
"I would never say never, but I certainly understand it is more difficult to
give up nuclear weapons than it was in 1994.... I think the turning point was
in 2002, 2003, when they actually reprocessed plutonium. To my mind, that was a
very serious red line. I think it was a whole new ballgame after that."

BD: What should we be
doing now?

WP:
[My preference is the "3 No's" -- that is, no new nuclear weapons, no improved
nuclear weapons, and no export of nuclear weapons.] "Until we get those being
negotiated, then it is feckless to be talking about a policy of eliminating
nuclear weapons.
I don't think we should give up that objective of eliminating North Korean
nuclear weapons. I just don't think it is a viable negotiating position today."

BD: What else should we
be doing? Are there more aggressive steps you'd like to see?

WP:
"I think we should be taking stronger measures to keep them from
developing ICBMs.... We still have that opportunity. They have to test
ICBMs to ensure they are effective. I believe our strategy ought to be to keep
them from developing a successful ICBM."