Here's a reason for Army to get back to basics: It isn't good at remembering them

By Capt. Michael Carvelli, U.S. Army

Best Defense guest columnist

It is true that the U.S. Army does not follow its
own doctrine, and it continues to do so even at the misfortune of soldiers. The
stark lack of critical tasks degrades even the best of units as they plow
through their deployments. It is not complacency, as most senior officers and
NCOs consistently suggest to their commanders and first sergeants. It is
laziness and the belief that "we are good." Wake up: You are not as good as you
think!

This is my third deployment to Afghanistan, this
time as a company commander. The lessons about being prepared have been taught
to me in school and during my time as a platoon leader. They are hard
remembered lessons, several times taught through my own failures or from an
almost disastrous experience. However, I am determined to continually remember
these experiences and ensure those under my command make every attempt to know
them as well.

At this current point in time, the Army has digressed
into creating a CONOP -- a unique misinterpretation of the Concept of the
Operation paragraph contained within the Operation Order (OPORD). At all
levels, from division down to platoon, leaders believe that a Microsoft
PowerPoint slideshow containing multiple images, sketches, and a verbose
explanation sufficiently replaces an OPORD. In fact, it replaces the entire
planning process itself at the cost of detailed planning, war gaming, and
rehearsing.

I make this request: Please go back to the basics.
Set an operational endstate with respect to enemy, friendly, terrain, and
civilian considerations; conduct pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections; and
conduct rehearsals.

Ask these questions: Why are we here? Do we have
what is needed to conduct the mission? Have we thought through the important
aspects of the mission to ensure we are achieving the endstate and have the
correct tools and equipment to reach it?

We, as a collective organization, have broken all
tenets that are taught in our leadership schools, professional military education
courses, and written in our own doctrine. First, span of control is three to
five. My current battalion operates with nine companies. That is only to conduct
route clearance. We are not even a real maneuver unit. Secondly, the creation
of the Company Intel Support Team has replaced the entire function of the
battalion intelligence section (S2). We create our own named areas of interest,
layer on the various types of intelligence (human, signal, imagery, electronic,
etc.) and attempt to target the enemy without a defined situational template
(SITEMP). Lastly, brigade commanders have withheld the approval authority for platoon
missions. There is even general officer approval for company and battalion
missions. So much for ingenuity, delegation of authority, and confidence in
lower level commanders.

The lack of pre-combat checks (PCCs), pre-combat
inspections (PCIs), and rehearsals in forward deployed units is astounding.
PCCs and PCIs are the first step in assuring that your subordinates are
prepared for their mission. Are their sensitive items tied down? Extra
batteries present? Optics and night vision operational? Weapons clean? Schools
preach these, but I watch the leaders around me fail to apply these lessons.

Rehearsals are sessions in which a unit practices
expected actions to confirm the plan, reveal unidentified coordination
measures, synchronize the overall plan at key points in time and space, and
update all aspects of the plan. Most units show up 20 minutes before their
departure time, make sure everyone is present, tell them what they are doing
today, and leave the base.

My first sergeant and I have "thumped" each of our
platoons for their lack of attention to detail concerning PCCs and PCIs. They
have all had to construct a Platoon Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) for
vehicle load plans and rehearse the reloading of ammunition to the gunner,
conduct rollover and fire drills, and practice every SOP they have developed. Almost
every time, each platoon has changed or enhanced their SOPs solely through
their rehearsals on the base. We are actually achieving progress! Although it
is quite painful and creates more gray hairs than I wish to admit.

I express this frustration in the hope that someone
reads it and realizes that they, too, are not as good as they think. Above all
else, this sobering idea has captured the essence of my company's issues and
has put us on a path to success.

CPT Michael Carvelli is an engineer officer currently deployed in
Afghanistan. He has deployed in conventional and special operations units. This
article represents his own personal views and not those of the Engineer
Regiment, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.