The real problem in Iraq is the stalemate behind the current surge in violence there

By Joel Wing

Best Defense officer
of Iraqi statistical analysis

Iraq recently saw a huge increase in the number of attacks
and casualties in April 2013. Iraq Body Count recorded 561 deaths for the
month, the highest since August 2009, while the United Nations reported 712
killed, the most since June 2008. That caused Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki to go on national TV to call
for calm, and warn against the rise of sectarianism and violence. (3) The
cause of the deterioration in security is the combination of an ongoing
offensive by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and retaliatory attacks by other insurgent
groups for the government raiding a protest site in the town of Hawija in
Kirkuk province. The former will eventually end, while the latter could lead to
increased support for militants. Either way, it appears that talk of a renewed
civil war is premature. Yes, militants are becoming more active in the country,
but they are for the most part isolated in certain areas; Shiites are relying
upon the government to respond to them rather than militias, and the majority
of the population is going about their business.

Al Qaeda in Iraq launched its latest
offensive in December 2012. That was marked by increased casualty rates,
high profile, mass casualty attacks, and bombings in southern parts of the
country. On April 29, for instance, two car
bombs went off in central Karbala, two
more detonated in Amarah in Maysan governorate, followed by another
vehicle-based device exploding in Diwaniya the next day. Operations in
southern Iraq are a hallmark of AQI's offensives, and take advanced planning,
intelligence gathering, and the stocking of supplies, because they take place
outside of where the group usually works. Recently, al Qaeda has been able to launch
larger offensives and sustain them for longer, because they have witnessed an
increase in fighters, and a lack of resistance by the Iraqi security forces.
After the U.S. withdrew in 2011, it emptied its prisons leading to many
detainees going right back to fighting. The Iraqi army and police also no
longer carry out counterinsurgency operations after the exit of the Americans,
and are more of a reactive force now carrying out raids and mass arrests, which
cannot prevent attacks, and cause resentment against those areas that are
targeted. This campaign will eventually end, likely in a month or two, as AQI
runs out of supplies and has to restock. That will cause a decrease in deaths,
until it ramps up again in the summer as it has during the last few years. The
media usually misses this ebb and flow in insurgent operations, focusing
instead upon the monthly casualty totals, rather than analyzing the larger
trends.

Another source of increased instability is the reaction to
the government's raid upon a protest site in the town of Hawija. On April 23,
Iraqi security forces moved
into the camp looking for assailants who had attacked a nearby checkpoint,
which killed one soldier and left three wounded. The demonstrators had been
given an ultimatum to turn over the attackers, but did not respond. The
organizers were also connected to the Baathist Naqshibandi Army insurgent group,
providing another impetus for the government to act. Following the raid,
protesters and militants carried out a series of retaliatory strikes across
Anbar, Salahaddin, Diyala, Ninewa, and Tamim provinces, while several activists
said they were giving up peaceful protests and taking up armed opposition to
Baghdad. This is far more dangerous than the al Qaeda in Iraq offensive because
it could mark a sea change in public opinion amongst some Sunnis. Some protest
leaders like Sheikh Abu Risha of the Awakening Movement in Ramadi have called
for moderation since the Hawija incident, but the vast majority is pushing
for arming themselves, at least in self-defense, if not outright opposition to
the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. This could turn many young
Sunni men towards militancy, and give groups like the Naqshibandi and the
Islamic Army of Iraq a new source of support and recruitment. These
organizations have a much broader appeal to Iraqis than al Qaeda, because they
have presented themselves as nationalist groups out to protect Sunnis from the
Shiite government, rather than being part of a global jihad against the West.
If the insurgents are able to make headway with the demonstrators, that could
increase violence over the long-term.

Still, the combination of al Qaeda in Iraq's offensives and
growing support for the wider insurgency does not mean that Iraq is heading
towards a new civil war. First, most
operations by militants are in specific cities, and even then only affect a
small percentage of the population. (10) Even cities like Baghdad,
that have the largest number of deaths, might only have 100-150 per month out
of population of over 7 million. Fallujah and Ramadi in Anbar can see a steady
stream of dead and wounded each month, while Haditha and Rutba hardly have any
throughout the entire year. This localized nature of violence means that the
vast majority of Iraqis are not affected unless they live in certain areas or
neighborhoods. Second, the Iraqi civil war from 2005-2008 was marked by Sunni
insurgents being met by Shiite militias. So far, the Shiite community is
relying upon the government to take care of security rather than taking matters
into their own hands. This is despite constant efforts by al Qaeda in Iraq to
incite them by bombing every religious holiday and event. All together that
means that Iraq is in for a rough immediate future with casualty figures likely
going up, but it is nothing
like the peak of violence when Sunnis and Shiites were at each others'
throats and large swaths of the country were being cleansed. The real problem
in Iraq is not the activities of the insurgency, but rather the political
deadlock in Baghdad. That's likely to take a generation to resolve, and should
get a lot more attention than the daily images of bombings and shootings in the
country.

Joel Wing is an Iraq
analyst at the Musings On Iraq blog.