Watching Iraq on the edge, and wondering what the United States will do

By Emma Sky

Best Defense bureau
chief, Iraq

The famous Iraqi sociologist, Ali Wardi, wrote about the
dual personalities of Iraqis. For many of us who served in Iraq, this is something we also seem to
have developed.

I spent the weekend in Texas, staying with American friends
I served with in Iraq. Although we had not seen each other in years,
conversation came easily. Our shared experiences away at war had created
life-long bonds. We reminisced about our time together -- the sense of purpose,
the camaraderie, our small victories. We laughed. We drank. We ate unhealthy
fast food. We gossiped about people we knew. Together, we visited the memorial
at Fort Hood to pay our respects to the 450 soldiers from the 4th Infantry
Division killed in Iraq.

But all weekend I also surfed the Internet for news and
chatted with Iraqi friends. Iraq is spiraling out of control. Following the arrests in December
of the bodyguards of Finance Minister Rafi Issawi, Sunnis took to the streets,
revealing their widespread sense of alienation in the new Iraq and demanding
the end of what they consider a government policy to marginalize them. As with
other protests in the Arab world, they were initially driven by legitimate
grievances. But against the backdrop of provincial elections, little was done
to address the concerns of the protestors -- despite calls to do so from the
top Shia cleric, Ayatollah Sistani. Politicians instead exploited the
demonstrations for electoral gains. President Maliki took the opportunity to
distract attention away from the lack of services and rampant corruption,
presenting himself as the defender of the Shia, in the face of Sunni regional
powers intent on overthrowing Shia regimes -- Syria first, then Iraq. Sunni
politicians, for their part, sought to benefit from the demonstrations to rail
against government oppression to gain support for their own electoral
campaigns.

Last week, the Iraqi Army entered Hawija, near Kirkuk, to arrest people
accused of attacking Iraqi Security Forces. In the ensuing violence, 200 people
were killed. There are reports of desertions from the Iraqi Army. Kurds have
moved peshmerga into positions in the disputed
territories. Tribes are forming militias to protect themselves from the Iraqi Army.
Five Iraqi soldiers were killed in Anbar -- and the province has been put under
curfew. Ten satellite channels, including al-Jazeera, have been banned, accused
of spreading sectarianism. Bombs exploded in Shia towns. The speaker of parliament
called for the government to resign and for early elections.

By seeking to eliminate his Sunni rivals, Maliki has removed
the wedge that the U.S. military drove between Sunni extremists and the Sunni
mainstream during the Surge, at such great cost. There is a growing sense that
the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are merging into one, with Shia regimes, backed
by Iran, battling against Sunnis, including al Qaeda elements. We may be
witnessing the breakdown of the post-WW I settlement and the nation-states
established under the Sykes-Picot agreement.

Many Iraqis still cannot fathom how the United States could lose
interest in Iraq
and simply walk away after so much investment. They explain it in terms of
conspiracy theories: a "secret agreement" between the United States and Iran; a
"deal" between Biden and Maliki to divide up Iraq.

Will our legacy from the Iraq war be a regional power
struggle ignited by the resurgence of Iran, the contagion of sectarianism into
Syria, the horrific violence of jihadist groups? Is this in our national
interest? Can we not do more to make Iraq a more positive influence in its
neighborhood?

As the situation deteriorates, I wonder, will the United States
proactively develop, articulate, and adopt strategies to engender a better balance
of power in the region -- or reactively respond to the inevitable fallout with
tactical measures.

Emma Sky is a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson
Institute. She served in Iraq 2003-2004 as the governorate coordinator of
Kirkuk for the Coalition Provisional Authority, and 2007-2010 as the political
advisor to General Odierno.