Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster on the big hole in the COIN and security forces manuals

When Maj. Gen. H.R. McMaster offers a
criticism of the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine, you know he's not just
riding intellectual fashion. This is a guy who has done well both in conventional
warfare (see 73 Easting) and counterinsurgency (see Tell Afar).

In a new publication by McKinsey and
Company called McKinsey on
Defense, McMaster tells Andrew Erdmann  that "our doctrine is still catching up" with
how we need to fight. He explains:

We have the counterinsurgency manual,
the stability operations manual, and the security-force assistance manual, but
I don't think we have put the politics at the center of those manuals. So, for
example, we assume in our doctrine that the challenges associated with
developing indigenous security forces are mainly about building capacity, when,
in fact, they're about trying to develop institutions that can survive and that
will operate in a way that is at least congruent with our interests.

McMaster also says that, "We need
leaders who have physical and moral courage on the battlefield, of course, but
also the courage to speak their minds and offer respectful and candid feedback
to their superiors. Our leaders can't feel compelled to tell their bosses what
they want to hear."