Not the time to bug out on Colombia

By Major Michael L.
Burgoyne, U.S. Army

Best Defense guest
columnist

In this time of fiscal austerity, continued support for
Colombia is both a necessity to allow Colombia to secure its country and an
investment in a valuable partner.

Given recent positive trends, it is easy for some to
erroneously assume that U.S. support to Colombia is no longer required. On October
18, 2012, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian
government initiated formal peace talks in the hope of ending a five decade
internal conflict. Unlike previous efforts however, the FARC finds itself in a
difficult negotiating position. During the last attempted negotiation, the FARC
boasted
some 20,000 fighters and was threatening the capital. After a decade of
successful security policies, the FARC's numbers have been cut in half and the
group has been reduced to guerrilla activities. Colombia's focus on "democratic
security" has facilitated healthy growth in the Colombian economy and
direct foreign investment. Colombian GDP has averaged 4.45 percent
growth, resulting in an increase of $233 billion over the last decade. In
addition, the government has signed free trade agreements with the United
States, the European Union, and Canada. Perhaps most importantly, virtually
every measure of citizen security has improved: kidnappings have declined 89
percent, homicides have been reduced by 49 percent, and there has been a 66
percent reduction in terrorist attacks.

Since the inception of Plan Colombia in 2000, the United
States has supported Colombia with training, equipment, and security
assistance. To date some $9 billion has been focused on supporting
Colombian counter-drug and internal security efforts. Although this support
seems costly, in fact, it is a very small price tag compared to large-scale
deployments to conduct security force assistance and foreign internal defense
in Iraq and Afghanistan. The consistent support for Colombia, however, is now
beginning to dissipate. The 2013 budget from the White House lays
out a 15 percent reduction in military and narcotics aid to Colombia.

When evaluating security cooperation with Colombia, it is
imperative to remember the following key points:

1. The war is not over. Despite the deserved praise of
Colombian and U.S. efforts, the Colombians are still in the fight. Last year,
243 Colombian soldiers were killed and 821 were wounded. The FARC has been cut
in half but still numbers 8,000 combatants. The FARC is also not the only
threat facing Colombia. The National Liberation Army (ELN),
another insurgent group, maintains some 2,000 guerrillas. Most importantly, the
lucrative cocaine trade will not disappear with the FARC. A dedicated effort to
control the growth of criminal bands (BACRIM) will be necessary to prevent
Zeta-like groups from rising from the ashes of Colombian political insurgency.

2. The Colombians initiated an innovative new counterinsurgency
strategy, creating joint task forces specifically designed to destroy the FARC
system. The design methodology and outcomes of this initiative may prove
critical as an example for other partner nations facing criminal groups. This
is a worthwhile effort that the United States is trying to support, but it is
very challenging given current Colombian resources.

3. The U.S. effort through Plan Colombia and the Colombian
Strategic Development Initiative has not necessarily created lasting
institutions that can sustain organizations once U.S. support is removed. For
decades, the Colombian military has been understandably focused on current
combat operations, often at the expense of building institutions. The Colombian
Army's doctrine and education systems, as well as its personnel and logistics
systems, require substantial improvement to ensure that, when budgets shrink
due to continued success against the FARC, the military will retain its hard-won
institutional knowledge.

4. Colombia has been a reliable and extremely valuable
regional security partner. Most recently, Colombia (for the second time)
participated in the multinational operational exercise PANAMAX as the Combined
Forces Land Component Command. They performed exceptionally well, leading a
joint multinational staff and working with their U.S. counterparts. The
Colombian Army is composed of battle hardened veterans with a strong
understanding of U.S. doctrine and systems. Their leaders and soldiers have an unsurpassed
knowledge of counterinsurgency and transnational organized crime groups. They
are arguably the most capable army in the region. Once the Colombian internal
threat is under control it can be expected that the Colombian role as a
regional and global security exporter will increase.

The United States has made a very wise investment in
Colombia. Continued U.S. support will enable Colombia to consolidate control of
the country in the coming years and allow them to take on a broader regional
security role. If the United States drastically cuts support to Colombian security
efforts, this would be akin to spiking the ball on the one yard line and could
delay Colombian consolidation for several years.

Colombia, in many ways, is a test of the light-footprint,
long-duration approach to counterinsurgency. David Galula warns that in the
final phase of a counterinsurgency "the main difficulty is a psychological one
and it originates in the counterinsurgent's own camp. Responsible people will
question why it is necessary to make such an effort at this stage, when
everything seems to be going so well." It remains to be seen if the United States
can display strategic patience and follow through on its investment in
Colombia.

Major Michael L.
Burgoyne, a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer, currently serves as the Andean
Ridge Desk Officer at U.S. Army South. He holds an M.A. in Security Studies
from Georgetown University and co-authored The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa . The views expressed
in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.