Millican, begin again? No thank you, if it's all the same

I reproduce below a long posting from Professor Millican, which some of you may have missed, on the  ‘The Millican Brief’ thread. I shall accept the Professor’s invitation to draw stumps and go home.

Why?  It was not an argument I sought, as I have long believed this sort of disputation to be both futile and tedious. I was only ever interested in getting him to discuss his reasons for believing there to be no God, and, though I have repeatedly made this clear,  he has declined to engage me on this ground, preferring subjective claims of ‘probability’ which simply push the question ‘why?’ further away.  As for there only being two types of universe, a suggestion he airily dismisses, it seems to me that on this question there is indeed such a straight choice and I can see no escape from it .

 

Much of modern materialist thought consists of finding ingenious ways to deny the possibility that something which appears to have been designed, has been designed. Why would that be?

 

I have no doubt that he had a nicer time with Professor Lennox, a much better person than I am, a more learned person than I am or could ever be, and a man interested in theological disputation in a way that I will never be, and one who, being a bit saintly,  does not share my impatience with the arrogance and smugness of many atheists (a charge I did not and do not direct against Professor Millican, who has always been perfectly polite, but which I did direct against his allies in the Oxford debate).

 

My part in this debate is - as I explain in my book, a copy of which I sent to Professor Millican during our exchange – to rebut and trouble that arrogance and smugness. This is darkening counsel by words without knowledge. We do not know. We do not even probably know. Therefore their belief is a choice, and so is mine. Much of the ‘New Atheist’ approach consists of scornful, intemperate and in some cases (see my book) totalitarian dismissal of believers.  It is only by keeping company with such people that Professor Millican came into contact with me, their enemy. If he is not among them, and disapproves of their approach, then he and I have no quarrel, as I strongly believe others should be free to believe what they wish.

 

Comments on this blog are (despite frequent complaints and allegations) not censored, though they are subject to English law, which prevents certain things being published and to some clear rules, well-known and cautiously enforced. I long ago learned to ignore or laugh off many of the hurtful things said about me here by my critics and detractors. I can see that an Oxford academic might find our hurly-burly pretty intolerable, and I regret that he has been exposed to it. Perhaps their authors might consider, in future, the feelings of gentler guests here. As for my own approach to the Professor, I think I have been quite fair, though robust. Of course he is very welcome to reply to this if he wishes. But unless he wants to tell us why he is so anxious for there not to be a God (roughly as that paragon among atheist philosophers, Thomas Nagel, puts the question, as discussed in my book), I think I’ve said all I want to, and will end as I began in Oxford with the words of God, speaking from the whirlwind, in Job, Chapter XXXVIII

 

 ‘Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge? Gird up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer thou me. Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Declare, if thou hast understanding.

 

‘Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? Or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? Or who laid the corner stone thereof?’

 

Professor Millican’s words (which I have divided up a bit, perhaps not as he would have done, for ease of reading) are as follows:

 

 

 'This week has been so busy with teaching, organisation of the admissions process, and other College business (including a genial and informative but frank debate on theism with John Lennox) that this discussion has been completely out of my mind. On reviewing the blog this morning after waking at an unseemly hour, however, I find it rather depressing to see that my silence has been interpreted by some of your bloggers as motivated by weakness in my position, with the same sort of unpleasant confidence that you show in claiming to know the motivations of others better than they do themselves. I have no idea where this confidence comes from (certainly I've seen no serious evidence provided), but fear that Mick (19 Nov, 07:14 PM) may have summed up the situation quite well.

 

Before signing off, and to avoid repeating what has gone before, I shall make some relatively brief (but necessarily numerous) points on your long post: (a) I note that you say that you would continue to believe in God even if the odds against His existence were massive - say 1,000,000 to 1. This, to me, seems almost definitive of a form of irrationality: a person who forms beliefs like this is - obviously - overwhelmingly likely to have a false belief. (b) In saying that "there is no comparable choice" (to that about God), you do seem to me to be making exactly the same mistake as Pascal in his Wager: namely, assuming that there are only two possible theories about the Universe. (c) You insist on a certain hypothesis about my motivation - a *psychological* hypothesis (since motivation is a psychological phenomenon). I call this hypothesis "gratuitous" because you has given no evidence for it. I'm baffled that you seem not to understand this. (d) The following passage could serve as a nice illustration for a class on logical fallacies: "No ‘psychology’ is necessary to divine why someone might choose what is, on the face of it, by far the less attractive of the two options, namely that our lives have no point, purpose or meaning, and that ‘what will survive of us’ is not love, but nothing. If someone doesn’t want justice for himself or anyone else, it really doesn’t take Sherlock Holmes, or Sigmund Freud, to work out why. ... If Professor Millican has other motives for preferring meaningless chaos to purpose and justice, then I am only too willing to hear them."

 

Here you simply take for granted the entire point at issue - namely, that my own belief is indeed based on a choice (i.e. your own psychological hypothesis, which is not supported by anything that I have said). For the avoidance of doubt, I would indeed prefer a just world, as you would, but my beliefs do not simply follow my preferences: I aim to conform them to reality and probable truth rather than fantasy and potential million-to-one-against improbabilities. (e) You say: "There is indeed a great deal of evidence for God’s existence. But it is not of the type which can be ‘confirmed’ or ‘disconfirmed’ (which I assume are synonyms for ‘proved’ and ‘disproved’)" This is a misunderstanding, because when I talk about potential "confirming or disconfirming evidence" I simply mean evidence that would tend to increase or decrease the probability of God's existence (this usage is quite standard in technical discussion). And I have never said or implied that I would accept the existence of God only if it were proved by some manifestation "which can be explained by the existence of God *and in no other way*" (your words). It would be quite enough to lead me to believe if I assessed evidence as making God's existence more probable than not, but sadly I don't think probability tells that way.

 

Moreover you are the one who has said openly that you would believe what you do even if probability were massively against you - so *you* are the dogmatist here, apparently refusing to countenance any objection short of logical demonstration. (f) You say: "Either the Cosmos was designed and created by a rational force with intent (let’s call it ‘God’) or it just happened. If it wasn’t deliberate and planned, then it was an accident." You seem to be using the word "accident" to cover *anything at all* that doesn't involve a cosmic designer. That's a perverse usage. A theory of cosmic evolution, for example, wouldn't imply that the development of the universe was an *accident*, any more than the evolutionary process whereby predator and prey co-evolve to run faster is an accident (even though random factors will presumably have played some part in the precise outcome). It's not an *accident* that prey animals which can run faster are more likely to survive longer and have more offspring - it follows from the logic of the probabilities involved. Some people think that universes can evolve too - I'm not committed to this, but it serves as an illustration of a third way between "design" and "accident". (g) I am not a dogmatic materialist, partly because I think the notion of "material substance" is very unclear and ill-defined. The same problem infects the notion of an "immaterial soul", but in so far as sense can be made of this, it seems to me that ordinary experience casts serious doubt on it. This is not "dogma", but based on evidence (e.g. from drugs, alcohol, brain injury, tiredness, Alzheimer's etc.) that our thought depends on the state of our brain, so it therefore seems unlikely that our thought could survive the death of our brain.

 

 

 (h) The three-sentence argument I gave was entirely logical. You seem to be confused because you apparently take for granted that within a discussion of the existence of God, *any* part of *any* argument presented must have that same focus. In fact, this short argument was not to do with God directly. It simply appealed to the very commonplace fact that human expertise is valued (at least in part) *precisely* because it *cannot* be reduced to formulaic rules. In other words, as I repeat and repeat again: "lack of precise 'objective' measurement is no obstacle to the application of rational judgement; nor to the recognition that some answers are better warranted than others". You say that you agree with this, so what's so difficult about noticing that my little argument was designed precisely to support this proposition, just as I said it was? It should also then be fairly easy to see why this proposition is pertinent to what you had said was an accurate summary of your position on God. If you really can't see this, then I think we'd better give up trying to have any sort of rational engagement. (i)

 

 

Last Monday's debate with John Lennox, with the participation of most of the Hertford College philosophy students, proved by example that "rational engagement between the two sides" is perfectly possible. Rational engagement does become well-nigh impossible, however, when one of the sides insists on an indifference to probabilities and on interpreting all of the opponent's views in terms of wish-fulfilment rather than a genuine attempt to provide rational evidence. (j) The fact that an issue has not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of all reasonable people gives no proof - and barely any evidence - that rational engagement is impossible (would you say the same about political questions, I wonder?). It just indicates that the question is a difficult one, like most of those that philosophers concern themselves with. Incidentally there are cases of ex-theists who have been persuaded by the arguments. I am one. (k) I acknowledge that it's *possible* that the universe could be wonderful in a way that completely transcends our understanding. But this mere possibility is not evidence. We are stuck with the evidence that is accessible to us, and my point was simply that one could reasonably expect this to reflect, at least to some extent, the supposedly supreme wonderfulness of an infinitely perfect Designer. (l) In response to my question: "But are you also denying that there is a rationally significant balance of evidence either way, such as might determine a reasonable person's belief (independently of his or her wishes)?" you say: "Yes. I have always taken this position." But you also say: "I thought, in this passage : ‘Hence it is hard to combine your view that there is no rationally significant evidence for or against theism, with your view that it is vital to make a decision on the matter in line with what we apprehend to be theism's practical consequences.’ that he had substituted the word ‘evidence’ for ‘proof’ and that this was a bit naughty."

 

This is ridiculous! I was interpreting *your* view as claiming a lack of "rationally significant evidence", and you have acknowledged that this interpretation was *correct* (for you "have always taken this position"). Yet in the very passage where I presented this interpretation, you now accuse me of having illicitly introduced the word "evidence" in place of "proof"! *I meant evidence*, and you have acknowledged that in saying this, I got *your* meaning right too! I have set out in this debate to try to represent your views fairly, to ask for your confirmation that I have done so, and then to engage with them rationally. It does not seem to me that you, in return, have been much interested in rational engagement, since you so insist on misrepresenting what I have said, and trying to score points rather than addressing my own with any care or precision. Hence, sadly, I fear that any further discussion will probably be a waste of time. I have found this, in its way, an interesting learning experience, but I doubt whether any more enlightenment is to be had from it. The contrast with my debate with John Lennox - in which points made for and against the existence of God followed a comprehensible logical progression in which both parties had plenty to say (to the great interest of my students, and without a hint of insult or psychological deconstruction on either side) - is rather striking.'