Could we learn more about grand strategy from the Frenchies than from the English?

That question had never occurred to me until I was
driving along the Mass Pike yesterday to the Motel 6 in Springfield, and
thinking about Paul Kennedy's analysis of the
strategic positions of France and England in the 17th century.

The British strategic situation was relatively easy to
discern: As an island, it was clear that it had foremost had to be a seapower.
But France had both land and sea to consider. Moreover, like the United States,
it had to weigh how to protect two major non-continuous coasts. The result for
France, writes Kennedy, "was to cause an ambivalence in national strategy for
the next few centuries, for it was never clear to her leaders how much
attention could be devoted to building up sea power as opposed to land power."

Anyone know of a good essay that explores this dilemma in
the context of the French and the Americans? Does the United States need to be
foremost a seapower or a landpower (or an airpower or a cyberpower)? It is like
we have five coasts.