Garretson on Lessons for the Air Force
A couple years ago, an Air Force colleague suggested I contact a Really Smart Guy named Lt. Col. Peter Garretson for some career mentoring. Garrison had a successful career as an Air Force pilot, but shifted into jobs where he could put his intellectual gifts to work as a strategist. I called him up and we had a great conversation about the opportunities out there for Air Force officers who want to get paid to think.
Today I noticed that Lt Col Garretson has an essay up on Small Wars Journal about what lessons the Air Force should (and shouldn't) take away from ten years engaged in the Long War. This was timely, as I've been thinking a lot about the subject while preparing my SAASS paper. I really liked his essay and hope it circulates in the Air Force; it runs against the grain of Air Force institutional culture but carries a vital message.
Garretson argues that a military-wide shift to high-end deterrence is underway, but that Security Force Assistance and Partner Capacity Building will be essential to this mission. The Air Force cannot simply jettison these things and exclusively tailor itself to high-tech, high-end warfare. The ideas behind this quote are important (although it takes some disentangling):
Today I noticed that Lt Col Garretson has an essay up on Small Wars Journal about what lessons the Air Force should (and shouldn't) take away from ten years engaged in the Long War. This was timely, as I've been thinking a lot about the subject while preparing my SAASS paper. I really liked his essay and hope it circulates in the Air Force; it runs against the grain of Air Force institutional culture but carries a vital message.
Garretson argues that a military-wide shift to high-end deterrence is underway, but that Security Force Assistance and Partner Capacity Building will be essential to this mission. The Air Force cannot simply jettison these things and exclusively tailor itself to high-tech, high-end warfare. The ideas behind this quote are important (although it takes some disentangling):
In fact, for the USAF to equip the nation to defeat anti-access - area denial (A2AD) adversaries, political access and the ability of partner nations to host US air forces for Air Superiority and Strike, and have the Aerial Port of Delivery (APOD) reception capacity for US surface forces via air mobility are the essential components of USAF geopolitical strategy, and it is through low-end engagement that this is secured.Unfortunately, Garretson argues, the Air Force has some institutional challenges to overcome if it will embrace these missions. These missions are "too cheap" to draw the full attention of an Air Force oriented around expensive major weapons systems. They also rely on skilled human beings more than technology, so the Air Force is "culturally disadvantaged" in knowing how to buy and maintain an effective partnering force. Finally, effectiveness in these missions requires time horizons and a type of planning that is substantially different from the way the Air Force approaches other missions. Here is another important quote:
A key change in mindset is to realize that the effect airmen are trying to accomplish with airpower is not destruction, but the enhancement of legitimacy and influence of the United States in the international system. That different mind-set must also be reflected in planning, where instead of a short 24-hr ATO cycle applied against destroying an enemy’s industrial base, it is a multi-decade plan to create lasting, self-sustaining constructive effects.
Published on October 03, 2012 13:24
No comments have been added yet.


