We should encourage our European allies to go to drones as the next natural move

By
Christopher Whyte

Best
Defense office of unmanned history

The
question of whether or not the increasing deployment of unmanned combat aerial
vehicles (UCAVs) is going to radically alter the
nature of warfare and weapons development in the world has been given a number
of different answers recently.

Noel
Sharkey argued in the Guardian that minimal risk and advancing drone technologies will
lead to a global unmanned arms race. My colleague Joseph Singh countered by pointing out that narrow
focus and still-considerable expense means that drone forces will likely remain
in niche roles, with great powers realizing that peer competitors will probably
be able to deploy effective airspace defenses to counteract unmanned threats.
But regardless of which point of view one subscribes to, the truth is that
drones are quickly becoming a viable option for many countries looking to
expand military capabilities.

To date,
drones have proven to be effective in non-traditional theaters of war like Iraq
and Afghanistan, performing in reconnaissance and strike roles alike to support
anti-militant and other asymmetrical mission profiles. And though there has
also been a clear move towards "navalizing" UCAVs, it is fairly clear that such
platforms won't replace traditional manned combat platforms at sea wholesale
anytime soon. The challenge of both taking such technologies from research to
operational readiness and of replacing existing assets virtually ensures that
any transition en masse to a drone-centric force posture will happen long-term,
and would represent a major paradigmatic shift.

So what
practical impact will drones have on the global military balance in the next
couple of decades? One answer is simple. UCAVs in their present form may, and
should, have most impact in the near-term as a tool for the U.S. to devolve
commitments and to encourage the development of security forces that can
effectively meet a number of challenges.

In
particular, the U.S. should be encouraging allies in Europe and other relatively
stable regions to develop and deploy drone technologies over other conventional
aerial platforms. Poland's recent announcement that its near-obsolete bomber
fleet will be replaced by three squadrons of combat drones in the next few
years shows that such a move can be politically feasible. Moreover, the
strategic incentives to go for drones are fairly clear. With the "pivot" to
Asia underway, America is perceived to be moving both its policy focus and the
bulk of its preponderant military strength from Europe and the Middle East
towards the Pacific. And though Europe does not face threats as great as it did
during the Cold War, there is still a need to maintain the regional capacity to
respond to crises like those in Libya or, potentially, Syria.

The
upshot of Europe's needs and Washington's move to rebalance in the Pacific is,
of course, that the potential political, logistical, and financial steps needed
to support a major operation in any of the theaters surrounding Europe become
increasingly complex over time. Pushing allies to take a greater role in
providing for regional security would largely solve that issue, but financial
constraints and diminished popular backing for increasing military spending has
meant that coordinating such an effort has been difficult.

The
proliferation of drones to fill particular conventional roles in the militaries
of Europe's security stakeholders could change that. UCAVs are significantly
cheaper than conventional manned fighters. Moreover, UCAV effectiveness has
proven to be contextual, with drones from the Predator to the Global Hawk
thriving in environments where airspace is not heavily disputed and missions
draw up short of invasive campaign.

This
profile of capabilities clearly fits the needs of America's European allies,
with the majority of the continent's near-term security challenges likely to
revolve around the need to target asymmetrical threats or to protect civilians
in civil warzones. Indeed, considering the general paucity of instances in
which European military forces have had to engage advanced air defenses in
recent years, it could be said that reliance on expensive manned aerial
platforms for reconnaissance and strike operations is wasteful.

It is
also the case that removing the human element from allies' air force operations
could lead to reduced reliance on American military power and more balanced
partner commitments. Though drone forces would still act in concert with
smaller numbers of conventional manned fighters to penetrate defended airspace,
a greater percentage of the risk involved in militarily intervening would be
taken up by unmanned units.

This
could reduce domestic aversion to involvement in international interventions
amongst alliance partners and increase the action potential of those European
countries that have traditionally played smaller roles in coalition campaigns.

The
proliferation of UCAVs in their present form could even bolster the
effectiveness of Europe's navies. Though the transition towards
entirely-unmanned air wings and the infrastructural move away from manned
combat aircraft is likely years away, the use of select drone platforms like
the Sea Avenger could bring some of these advantages of cost, operational
flexibility and willingness to the naval air forces of countries like Britain,
France and Spain.

Ultimately,
the broad deployment of UCAVs in the militaries of those partners left behind
in the "pivot" makes substantive sense. Policymakers in Washington should
realize that encouraging drone development could be a boon to U.S. security
endeavors, and that unmanned platform could allow alliance partners in Europe
to both maintain operational effectiveness and reduce costs.

Christopher
Whyte is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security .