General MacArthur's interesting role in the fall of the Philippines in 1942

By "Tyrtaios"

Best Defense book reviewer

 

Fighting for MacArthur:
The Navy and Marine Corps' Desperate Defense of the Philippines by John Gordon arrived mysteriously at my post office
box in town yesterday

My quick perusal of the book (which I will begin to read next week in
more detail), would be disturbing to anyone had the information it
contains been researched and made available while General Douglas MacArthur was
still alive, to say nothing of the embarrassment to those that allowed
MacArthur to continue to command after such a startling defeat, a road
early-on toward that defeat which essentially
followed the General's flawed plans for the defense of the
Philippines, in view of the changing situation confronting him.

I should note that the author in his zeal, delves into a lot of minute
details that seem to clutter the story he wants to tell, which is primarily
about the Navy and Marines role in support of the Army commanded by MacArthur. However,
the Army is not overlooked, and the over use of details aside, for anyone
interested in historical backdrop surrounding MacArthur, as well as his
performance in the Philippines, I would say the book is an important
contribution toward such.

Although most know that MacArthur along with his chief of staff
Sutherland should have shouldered much of the blame for losing the. What I
found intriguing was MacArthur's early on rosy picture he was painting to
Washington, and then later outright lies in message traffic to Marshall who
seems to have somewhat taken it all in stride, knowing MacArthur as he did,
instead of weighing the evidence provided by a very competent Admiral
Thomas Hart who was also sending his candid assessment of the situation to Washington.

Moving along quickly, the author's research notes that as MacArthur
finally, too late in the game began to accept the
situation, MacArthur started to scapegoat Hart (whom he pretty much forced
into retirement), when in actuality, it was MacArthur that should have
"faded away." I had heard about Admiral Hart only peripherally and
that he had been fired, only accepting the Admiral's firing as the way of
things in the naval service for those in command that lose. Perhaps it is about
time I find out more about this man who seems to have had his finger on the
pulse as events were unfolding in the Asian-South Pacific theater even before
being attacked in the Philippines, and the measures the Admiral was wisely
taking, while the Army was to some degree under MacArthur, not coming to grips
with reality that would contribute to disaster later.

Also of interest to me, as Hart early-on understood the desperate time
line all forces in the Philippines were facing, the Admiral directed
that tunnel construction be sped-up on Corregidor, and began
transferring food stocks there 10-days prior to the Army who only then seem to
have began facing the reality the Japanese were tightening their hold around
the island of Luzon. This action, and other decisions by Hart, along with quick
thinking Navy and Marine leaders, would later see the Navy and Marines better
fed than the Army as a result. But, would lead to resentment by Army personnel
pointing a finger at the Navy as not supporting the effort, not realizing their
command had let them down and the Navy had in fact shared much with them
early-on prior to the evacuation to Corregidor, to include salvaged weapons and
ammunition.

Additionally, the 4th Marine Regiment which had been evacuated from
China a few months earlier, started their men on 2-meals a day early-on,
and Hart followed with direction for all naval forces to do so also several
days later, while the Army continued to chowed-down, which would also
contribute to outright starvation during the siege on Corregidor later . . .
All the while, MacArthur stunningly only visited up front with his troops once!

To be fair, the book does point-out there was a lot of bad luck, poor
equipment in inventory, along with skill training against a war tested Japanese
invading force, as well as that fog of war that contributed to the fall of the
Philippines. However, my quick thumb through of the book revealed some very
facinating messages back to Washington by MacArthur that hindsight aside,
would seem to go to the question of the MacArthur's mental state and his
competence as a senior general officer that history really shouldn't overlook
because I believe it goes to MacArthur's eventual same early attitude toward
the unfolding of the situation in Korea that seems to parallel his
understanding of the situation around him in the Philippines earlier.

"Tyrtaios" was a
professional private who retired from the Corps at the pleasure of the
Commandant as a lieutenant colonel.