And now, a few words about how to measure the enemy

While Tom Ricks is away from his blog, he has selected a few of his
favorite posts to re-run. We will be posting a few every day until he returns. This originally ran on February 12, 2010

We bring Kilcullenpalooza
to an end with his observations on a few ways of judging the performance of your
local Taliban unit. Significantly, only near the end of the essay does he focus
on the enemy. You listening, S-2s of the world?

So here are some ways to know your enemy:

"High-technology inserts." When you see the enemy using satellite phones,
sniper optics and high-end roadside bombs, those indicate that the group may
have access to external sponsors, and is a mainline Taliban outfit, rather than
just the local minor league team.
"Insurgent medical health." What shape are detainees arriving in? The local
wannabes tend to suffer from afflictions like malnutrition, parasitic diseases,
TB, and such. "Main force units, on the other hand, often have a better general
level of health," especially if based in Pakistan.
"Presence of specialist teams and foreign advisers." If you are facing a
Taliban group with mortar teams, intelligence teams, and more, then you are
facing the major leaguers. Doubly so if they have foreigners with them.
"Insurgent village of origin." Where is the guy from? If he is caught
fighting on his home turf, he may well be a part-timer and more amenable to
switching sides. These are the guys to think about reconciling, especially
because "attempts to destroy local guerrillas outright can backfire by
alienating communities, creating blood feuds that perpetuate the conflict." But
guys from outside the district "should be targeted with maximum lethality." They
can be killed without disrupting local relationships -- indeed, the locals may
feel safer  without the outsiders hanging around.
"First to fire ratio." Which side starts the firefights? That shows who
holds the tactical initiative. And the side holding that is better able to
control both its loss rate and that of its opposition. "If they are losing more
of their casualties in engagements we initiate, then we control their loss rate
and can force them below replenishment level and ultimately destroy the network
in question."
"Price of black market weapons and ammunition." Price fluctuations in common
items, such as AK-47s, or bullets for them, are possible indicators of changes
in the enemy's operating tempo. But price increases also may be signs of greater
demand by the local community, or of more effective interdiction.
"Insurgent kill/capture versus surrender ratio." You can track enemy morale
by following rates of surrender.
"Mid-level insurgent casualties." Pay attention especially to the middle
tiers, the planners, facilitators, specialists, trainers, recruiters, and
low-level operational commanders. This is the guts of an organization, and so a
good indicator of its health. Conversely, you may want to keep alive the rank
and file, who "may be good candidates for reintegration," and the top guys, who
might be convinced over time to give up.

That's it. Again, I think this is a terrific paper, one of the most
insightful things I've read lately, and one of Kilcullen's best essays. I think
it is most significant for the order of its recommendations. It tells you what
not to track, and then emphasizes measuring the people, the government, the
security forces -- and, lastly, the enemy. It is signed, "David Kilcullen/
Kabul, December 2009."