Reply to William Goode, Contra Sola Scriptura, Part 1 (Definitions and Premises; Ezekiel 3)

  See the Introduction. His words will be in blue. This installment is a response to portions of  The Divine Rule of Faith and Practice , Volume One (1853: second edition: revised and enlarged).
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Note Goode's subtitle: "A Defence of the Catholic Doctrine That Holy Scripture Has Been, Since the Times of the Apostles, the Sole Divine Rule of Faith and Practice to the Church: Against the Dangerous Errors of . . . the Romanists, as, Particularly, That the Rule of Faith is 'Made Up of  Scripture and Tradition Together,' Etc." [my bolding]

It's always good to know exactly what a person proposes to defend (matters of definition). For in-depth definitions of sola Scriptura, right from three Protestant advocates today (White, Geisler, Mathison), see the Introduction to my book, 100 Biblical Arguments Against Sola Scriptura . The idea is that neither the Church nor apostolic tradition can be regarded as infallible. Scripture is, in the Protestant view, the "sole" rule of faith.

But as I will demonstrate for the nth time, Scripture itself teaches no such thing, and I guarantee that Goode won't find it, just as other champions of the false doctrine have failed miserably in their attempt to desperately find something in the Bible to uphold the heart and essence of this man-made tradition. But it's interesting to watch them try, and thus I eagerly look forward to seeing what Goode can come up with, as the supposed "best" defender of sola Scriptura. Can his case withstand the slightest scrutiny? Read on and see!

The great fundamental principles upon which Popery rests arc precisely those here advocated, namely, (1) the interposition of a mediating priest through whose ministrations alone we can hold communion with God, and the consequent denial of the soul's "direct and independent communion" with Him, (2) the denial of the supremacy of "the written word" to the consciences of individuals, and the setting up of another "spiritual authority" in "the teaching and authority of the Church," that is, the clergy, superior to it; and (3) the making the laity of the Church dependent upon the clergy for all spiritual gifts and graces. 

As it respects the first and last of these points, I must content myself here with thus pointing them out to the reader's notice. But as it respects the second, which is intimately connected with the subject of this work, there is one remark which I cannot but offer, and that is, that it is a doctrine which, whatever may be its character in other respects, is at least utterly subversive of the very foundation upon which the Reformed Church of England stands. With the doctrine of the Supremacy of Holy Scripture to the consciences of individuals, and the right of private judgment in contradistinction to "the authority of the Church," she stands or falls. For, her Reformation was effected by comparatively a few individuals acting against the authority of the Church both of the East and West, . . .

The very ground, therefore, upon which our Church stands, is that of the right of private judgment; and the question of the justice of her charge of heterodoxy against so large a portion of Christendom she leaves to the judgment of the great day. When, therefore, her ministers advocate the doctrine of "the authority of the Church" over the consciences of men, they are in fact subverting the very foundations on which their Church is built. (Preface to 1853 edition, pp. xli-xliii)

Note the viewpoint here. Church and Bible are pitted against each other: quite unlike what we find in Holy Scripture. It's the usual Protestant "either/or" dichotomous mindset. The very pillar ("stands or falls" . . . "very ground") of Protestantism is a false and unbiblical dichotomy: "the right of private judgment in contradistinction to 'the authority of the Church'" [my italics]. It's a remarkable display of fallacious tunnel-vision. I will be looking to Goode's supposed biblical proofs for these dangerous man-made innovations of the 16th century.

The word of God, however conveyed to us, binds the conscience to the reception of whatever it may deliver. Every statement that has competent evidence of its divine origin, written or unwritten, demands our faith and obedience. There is no room in such a case for doubt or inquiry. All that we have to consider is, What is delivered? And what is delivered is to be received upon the affirmation of its Divine Author. (p. 1; my bolding)

This allows for some semblance of authoritative oral tradition, which ultimately runs contrary to sola Scriptura. We shall see at length how Goode incorporates this into his opinion. My interest in this Part 1 is to document his own definitions and fundamental principles. Then we'll observe how he attempts to defend them from Scripture, insofar as he does that at all.

Moreover, if God has given us a revelation, and requires of us as individuals a reception of the truths and precepts he has revealed for our everlasting salvation, then does it especially concern us as individuals to look to the evidences of that which comes to us with the profession of being his word, that we may separate the wheat from the chaff, and not be misled in matters affecting our eternal interests. This, I say, it becomes us to do as individuals, because we are to be judged by God individually; and if we have possessed the opportunities of knowledge, it will be no plea in bar of judgment that the church or body to which we belonged taught us error, for even death may be awarded us under such circumstances, though our blood be required of those who have misled us. (See Ezekiel iii. 18, 20, &c.)
This our responsibility to God as individuals, it is most important for us to keep in view, because it shows us the indispensable necessity of ascertaining, to the satisfaction of our own minds, that it is divine testimony upon which we are relying in support of what we hold as the doctrines of Christianity. Then only are we safe, for if our reliance is placed upon anything else, we immediately lay ourselves open to error. He who embraces even a true doctrine on insufficient grounds, exposes himself to the admission of false doctrine on similar grounds. And it is more easy and pleasant to build on a false foundation than the true one, for the former has no certain limits, which the latter has. The whole superstructure of Romanism has been erected on a few false principles admitted as the foundation. And belief grounded upon a false foundation or insufficient grounds is generally but weak and wavering; and if it be shaken, true and false doctrines fall together. (pp. 2-3)
In a typically Protestant manner, Goode only sees individualistic and "private judgment" elements in the notion of authority, and completely disregards the legitimacy of God-ordained ecclesiastical authority. This is seen in his casual treatment of Ezekiel 3:18, 20. Goode thumbs his nose at the authority expressed here. It all comes down to the individual. It's true that individuals are judged in the end. We all stand before God alone, and will have to give account of our lives and actions, done with free will. But there is also authority, and we can't simply reject it out of hand. Here is the larger context of Ezekiel 3 (RSV, as throughout):

Ezekiel 3:1, 7, 11, 16-21, 27 And he said to me, "Son of man, eat what is offered to you; eat this scroll, and go, speak to the house of Israel.". . . [7] But the house of Israel will not listen to you; for they are not willing to listen to me; because all the house of Israel are of a hard forehead and of a stubborn heart.. . . [11] "And go, get you to the exiles, to your people, and say to them, `Thus says the Lord GOD'; whether they hear or refuse to hear.". . . [16] And at the end of seven days, the word of the LORD came to me: [17] "Son of man, I have made you a watchman for the house of Israel; whenever you hear a word from my mouth, you shall give them warning from me. [18] If I say to the wicked, `You shall surely die,' and you give him no warning, nor speak to warn the wicked from his wicked way, in order to save his life, that wicked man shall die in his iniquity; but his blood I will require at your hand. [19] But if you warn the wicked, and he does not turn from his wickedness, or from his wicked way, he shall die in his iniquity; but you will have saved your life. [20] Again, if a righteous man turns from his righteousness and commits iniquity, and I lay a stumbling block before him, he shall die; because you have not warned him, he shall die for his sin, and his righteous deeds which he has done shall not be remembered; but his blood I will require at your hand. [21] Nevertheless if you warn the righteous man not to sin, and he does not sin, he shall surely live, because he took warning; and you will have saved your life.". . . [27] But when I speak with you, I will open your mouth, and you shall say to them, `Thus says the Lord GOD'; he that will hear, let him hear; and he that will refuse to hear, let him refuse; for they are a rebellious house. 

"Ecclesiastical" authority (highlighted in bolded portions) is all over this passage: it's the very essence of it. The prophet is God's messenger. He brings God's words and revelation and teaching. He is to be obeyed, with dire consequences if his advice isn't heeded. He's the "watchman." All of this is quite analogous to Catholic authority, but Goode can only see individualism. He sees only what he wants to see (i.e., what Protestantism has deemed relevant and important).

Nothing in the passage shows some alleged "right" of every atomistic individual to reject authority as he sees fit; to make determinations of the legitimacy of the authority or its teaching. That's all arbitrary Protestant man-made tradition: superimposed onto the Bible. The Bible teaches no such thing.

The individual Israelite is to "listen" to the prophet (3:7), "hear" his words (3:11) and not be "stubborn" (3:7) and hardhearted (3:7) and "rebellious" (3:27) when he delivers the "word of the Lord" (3:11, 16-17, 27) as God's "watchman" (3:17), who gives "warning" (3:17-21). It's the same exact notion if we substitute "bishop" or "pope" for prophet. Thus we observe a remarkable Old Testament instance of proto-Church authority, but Goode only sees individualism, save one passing concession to the blood of the flock being on Ezekiel's head if he doesn't fulfill his prophetic calling of warning them against doom and rebellion.

What does it mean for Ezekiel to be a "watchman" over Israel (Hebrew, tsaphah: Strong's word #6822)? Lutheran scholars C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, in their massively scholarly ten-volume Commentary on the Old Testament, comment on this role of Ezekiel and its ecclesiological implications:

. . . Ezekiel is like one standing upon a watchtower (Hab. 2:1), to watch over the condition of the people, and warn them of the dangers that threaten them (Jer. 6:17; Isa. 56:10). As such, he is responsible for the souls entrusted to his charge. . . . An awfully solemn statement for all ministers of the word. (Vol. IX, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, rep. 1982, p. 59)

Apostles were the successors of the prophets, and bishops of the apostles. Hence St. Paul warned his followers to exercise their grave responsibilities, similarly to what we see in Ezekiel:

Acts 20:28 Take heed to yourselves and to all the flock, in which the Holy Spirit has made you overseers, to care for the church of God which he obtained with the blood of his own Son. 

And belief grounded upon a false foundation or insufficient grounds is generally but weak and wavering . . . (p. 3)

I couldn't agree more!

In matters of faith, therefore, the divine rule is our sole authoritative rule; in matters of practice there maybe added to those which are prescribed by the divine rule, by the authority which Christ has left with his church for the direction of its rites and services, such as are necessary to the maintenance of peace and order. (p. 5)

This is a helpful distinction; showing more nuance than some defenders of sola Scriptura (typical of the wider latitude and freedom of thought of Anglicanism). I would note in passing, however, that this tolerance of practice and ecclesiastical tradition in this sub-doctrinal respect,  is not consistently granted to the Catholic Church. So, for example, little quarter is given to us if we distribute communion in one form only (as traditionally), or require priestly celibacy: both practices and not dogmas.

All of a sudden, wicked "Rome" is not allowed to make those determinations, and in doing so is exercising arbitrary and indefensible raw power; whereas saintly, sanctified, all-wise Canterbury is freely granted this prerogative. The double standard is (no doubt) never even noticed . . . Such is the fruit of prejudice upon consistent rational thought.

Both for the fact that Scripture is the word of God, and for the correctness of the doctrines we deduce from Scripture, we carefully give both the child and the ignorant man all the proofs their condition renders possible; . . . (p. 6)

Excellent! I'll be perusing these "proofs" very carefully to see if they hold water, as to the notion of sola Scriptura.

. . . while the Romanist demands belief on the authority of what he calls the church, that is, on grounds which the past history and present state of the church show to be a nullity.(p. 6)

No!; we ground it on the testimony of Scripture itself on the authority of the Church (an example of which we saw above, in Ezekiel 3 . . . ). If Scripture teaches about the existence an authoritative and infallible Church, then there is such a thing, and we bow and submit to its authority on the testimony of Scripture (and sola Scriptura crumbles). Which church this described scriptural church is, today, is, of course, a separate issue that has to be determined, on historical and rational grounds.

We also ground the notion, additionally, on the universal testimony of the Church fathers, just as Goode unsuccessfully attempts to base the legitimacy and truthfulness of sola Scriptura on their testimony as well. But patristic testimony is beyond our present purview. Both sides appeal to Scripture. The question is which has a better, more consistent, plausible case: taking into account all of Scripture: not just carefully selected "prooftexts." I'm focused like a laser beam on those arguments, in this critique.

We have, then, to determine the limits of the divine revelation we can ascertain to have come down to us from them.

Here, again, it is generally admitted, that the most sacred record of this revelation is to be found in the Holy Scriptures.

But it cannot be denied, that when the apostles were delivering to men that divine revelation with which they were charged, they delivered it by word of mouth as well as in the writings that have come down to us, and that they first delivered it orally, and afterwards penned the writings they have left us. The question, then, for our determination is this, Whether we have any record or witness of their oral teaching, such as can be received by us as a divine revelation supplementary to, and interpretative of, the writings they have left us. (p. 7)
Good presentation of the true issues at stake. All proponents of sola Scriptura have to grapple with the question of the relation of authoritative apostolic oral pronouncements and Scripture. If any of these oral teachings were preserved alongside Scripture, without particular reference in the latter (or at least not explicit reference), then it seems that sola Scriptura, as defined, cannot stand. 
The Protestant defender has to find some way to argue that all such beliefs made their way into Scripture ("inscripturation") and that none whatsoever survived apart from Scripture. That's pretty difficult to do, and I have as yet seen no biblical indication of such an idea. I contend that it is yet another man-made tradition, arbitrarily invented "on the spot" out of the need to bolster the larger man-made tradition of sola Scriptura as a principle of authority.
We hold also that the consent of many of the most able and pious ecclesiastical writers of antiquity (and what is called catholic consent is nothing more than this) in favour of any particular view of divine truth, is an argument of great force in defence of that view, not from the improbable possibility of such consent having been derived from the oral teaching of the apostles, but rather from the probable evidence afforded by such consent, . . . 
Further, we do not deny, that any man who differs from the true catholic church of Christ in fundamental points must be in fatal error, and that the faith of that church in such points must in all ages be the same; we do not deny, that there may have been fuller communications made by the apostles to some of their first followers on some points than we find in the Scriptures they have left us; we do not deny the possibility that interpretations of Scripture brought to us through the Fathers may have originally emanated from the apostles; we do not deny, but on the contrary firmly maintain, that the true orthodox faith, in at least all fundamental points, is to be found in the writings of the primitive Fathers, and therefore that it is very necessary, as a matter of evidence, that in all such points our faith be such as can find some testimony for it in their writings: . . . (p. 19)
Good statement of commonly held elements . . .

Speculative arguments have been adduced on the question on both sides, which, however plausible they may appear to the general reader, are far from being trustworthy. Thus, the advocates for the exclusive authority of the Holy Scriptures have often urged, that the Scriptures being given by God for the instruction of mankind in religion, they must be perfect for the accomplishment of the purpose for which they were given, and therefore must contain all that has been revealed for that purpose. But it does not follow that, because the Scriptures were given for that purpose, they are necessarily all that has been given. (p. 20)

True and helpful qualification . . .

The great object of the following work, then, is to demonstrate, . . . that there is nothing of which we have sufficient evidence that it is Divine or inspired testimony but the Holy Scripture; and consequently that the Holy Scripture is our sole and exclusive Divine Rule of faith and practice. (p. 21)

There is some clever wordplay here and failed attempted parallelism of non-equivalent notions. Goode confuses inspired works (Scripture) with infallible or binding authority, as if the latter is not a present and necessary category, or as if the only authority we can have must be inspired ("God-breathed" or theopneustos). Catholics and Protestants agree that Scripture is inspired. That is not where the dispute lies; therefore all arguments devoted to proving that are entirely beside the point in the debate over the rule of faith.

The problem lies in assuming what one needs to prove. It is illogical and not reasonably demonstrated  that the only authority must be inspired. Therefore, Goode has no basis for moving from stating that Scripture is inspired, to concluding, "consequently that the Holy Scripture is our sole and exclusive Divine Rule of faith and practice." He merely assumes that all carriers of the rule of faith are inspired as well as infallible. But there is also such a thing as an infallible Church or tradition that is not inspired, yet still has binding and (possibly) infallible authority. Goode's task is to disprove the latter categories, and from Scripture; rather than to casually assume -- with no argument or proof -- that they are impermissible aspects of the rule of faith.

We shall see that much of the argumentation in favor of sola Scriptura is simply circular argument or begging the question; assuming what one needs to prove. This is always the case; I've never seen a single exception, in my twenty years of active Catholic apologetics.


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