A few words in defense of Colin S. Gray's essay on COIN and our future strategy

By Adam Elkus

Best Defense COIN respondent

Colin S. Gray's
recent article in Prism, when read in context with his
other works, reveals much about how an inadequate grasp of strategic theory
compromised the counterinsurgency debate. Tom
has graciously provided me space to elaborate on why Gray's corpus
is valuable
for American
defense policy
and strategy.

COIN as Concept Failure

It is pointless to argue, Gray claims, whether or not COIN
has failed or succeeded. This is because COIN is not a concept. Debaters argue for or against COIN, a position as ridiculous as
arguing about whether anti-submarine warfare is inherently good or bad. As Gray
observes, COIN is not an internally coherent set of ideas. It's just a
descriptor for what armies do to counter insurgents. If this sounds a bit
reductive, consider that the enormous losses suffered by the Allies at Cambrai
in 1914 did not constitute proof tank
warfare itself had failed, nor did decisive combined arms tactics in the
Gulf War prove that tank warfare was successful.

The merit or demerit in COIN "cannot sensibly be posed as a
general question." Insurgency has been a constant feature of strategic history,
and will likely continue to
be. Whether or not to intervene in another state's internal politics is a
question best left to historical circumstance and it is impossible to put forth
one policy solution that will hold for any and all cases. In any event, the idea
that one has a choice to engage in COIN is also a matter of context. Domestic
insurgencies always must be countered as a matter of basic political survival.

It is a category error to argue that COIN is inherently more
political than interstate war, as this implicitly uses a war's intensity as the
defining measurement of how much it is dominated by politics. All wars involve
the use of force for political purpose, are shaped by context, and feature two
forces seeking to impose their will on an adversary. In other works,
Gray has sensibly noted that the supposed differences between irregular and
conventional warfare are ultimately cosmetic. Categorizing wars according to
the predominant combat style of one or more of the belligerents leads to
analytical confusion. For example, the idea of "cyberwar" erroneously implies that combat
action will solely be limited to computer hackers volleying computer network
attacks against each other across the digital ether.

Weapons obtain meaning only through the strategic effects
they enable, making it difficult to categorize a war solely through military
technology. In American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, conventional
platforms, skills, and specialties were used against primitive opponents -- and
tactical innovations pioneered there will likely play prominent roles in major
war. The spectacle of Canadian Leonard tanks firing on Taliban guerrillas and
the reverse engineering of counter-IED technology into tools for destruction
of conventional air defenses should be sufficient demonstration of the
arbitrary distinction between conventional and irregular challenges.

One consequence of this categorical confusion is the idea
that that one side's tactics and technologies should be defeated through
deliberate mirroring. Networks should defeat networks, governments and third
parties must out-govern insurgents, and so on. But there is nothing essential
to a given war's policy or strategy that demands a perfectly symmetrical
response. This is obvious when the enemy is a global terrorist organization -- no
one would argue the U.S. should carry out suicide bombings. It is less obvious
when the enemy is a guerrilla organization contesting control with a government
and a third party force. Counterinsurgents do not have to "out-govern"
insurgents simply because the enemy uses shadow governments for strategic effect.
The enemy does have a vote, but that vote should not unnecessarily narrow
counterinsurgent strategy.

COIN and Strategy

Gray's previous works have emphasized that although the
logic of strategy is timeless, strategy in practice defies the American obsession
with definitive principles of war. Context rules all, and principles of war are
in reality only principles of warfare
valid for certain temporal, political, cultural, and material circumstances.
The only principles of war that truly
survive are so general as to be practical
nubs: war is a political act conducted for political purposes, war is a
cultural undertaking, etc.

The COIN debate has essentially been a tireless search for
eternal principles. But this debate, as Gray, David Kilcullen, Sebastian Gorka
have all argued,
rests on a tiny sliver of contemporary military history. Insurgencies differ
radically according to context in strategic history, and dependence on a small
set of cases (Algeria, Vietnam, Malaya) exacerbates the already Sisyphean
search for principles of COIN warfare. A universally "right" way to conduct
COIN does not exist, not least of which because the idea supposes a Platonic
ideal that can be divorced from political and cultural circumstance. Gray argues that the sheer diversity of
phenomena herded under the common moniker of "insurgency" inherently creates a
plurality of strategic methods that can guide COIN tactics.[[BREAK]]

The diversity of strategic approaches to dealing with
insurgency, Gray points out, means that "best practices" can only be realized
on the level of tactics. As Gulliver of Ink Spots observed,
all armies need to know how to shoot, move, and communicate. Even then, the
usefulness of tactics is contingent on how they enable strategic effect
determined by policy. There are tactical best practices for countering
insurgencies utilized by other powers that American policy has determined to be
out of political bounds. Other governments will reject tactics for what may
seem like completely arbitrary reasons to Americans. The dispute between the U.S.
military and the Afghan government over night raids in Afghanistan is a case in
point -- a tactically sound approach that favors an American strategic objective
may not serve Afghan national and personal interests.

Gray echoes Joshua
Foust and other regional analysts of Afghanistan in noting that discussion
of COIN within the context of current operations has really been a provincial
debate over American COIN doctrine. Policy
and strategy, which by necessity are formed by the conversation between
national interest and regional knowledge, sadly emerged only as adjuncts to
theological debates about COIN tactics. Doctrine is important, but even
successful doctrine is too narrow a prism to look through when examining war.

Gaining Strategic Advantage

What does Gray's view of strategy have to say about how
America should understand the business of winning (or losing) wars that feature
COIN? First, a basic truth of strategy is that it deals with, but is not ruled by, warfare. States can
sometimes win war by dominating the warfare, but this is not always the case.
The Israelis arguably won the warfare in 1973, but the strategic shock
inflicted by the Egyptian assault had far-reaching political effects. Likewise, the Chinese performed poorly
in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict but still rattled
the Vietnamese enough to gain the Chinese political object. Finally, as the
United States discovered at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, even victors do not
always gain peacetime objectives they seek. And success always has some kind of
unintended consequence. Above the tactical level, an objective concept of
victory does not exist. Victory and defeat are governed by only by political
context.

All this is also true of counterinsurgency. Strategy is
enabled by tactics, and military defeat of insurgents does not guarantee
strategic defeat because the physical ability to annihilate them requires a
degree of decision that small-scale counterguerrilla operations cannot always
provide. The Chinese communist ability to survive numerous encirclement
operations in the Chinese civil war, coupled with their greater faculty with local
deal-making among powerful elites, enabled them to survive and eventually
outgrow their nationalist enemies. As Lukas Milevski observed,
battles make up the raw material of warfare but do not necessarily equal the
whole of war. Hit-and-run attacks, sabotage, targeted killings, battle
avoidance, and raw attrition are not chivalrous but also inflict important
physical and psychological losses. The story of guerrilla warfare is mostly
(but not always) a story of erosion. The victor is often the one still left standing.

While guerrillas can sometimes win through strategies of
erosion, so can governments. Destruction of enemy resources, safe havens, and
population control as a means of restricting enemy movements are all ways
governments impose cumulative material, psychological, and political costs on
insurgents. Through controversial, intelligence-based leadership targeting, the
use of "pseudo-gangs,"
and informers are all part of the toolbox governments and their allies use to
gain some measure of control over
the adversary. And control -- gained either through erosion or decisive warfare -- is
crucial to success in COIN. The public are not just spectators to warfare in
COIN, and control is one of the various means governments and insurgents use to
gain support and legitimacy.

Perception, Legitimacy, and Politics

"Legitimacy" should not necessarily be understood solely as
a synonym for "consent of the governed." Rather, legitimacy can have a variety
of meanings among various audiences. But one side's staying power is crucial to
local perception of legitimacy. Gray's most important point is that success in
COIN is not likely if prior or parallel nation-building is a
precondition for victory. Analogies to nation-building in Europe and Asia miss
the point: many of the most successful efforts occurred after a great deal of
bloodletting to gain physical control. Control enables police to create order,
tax collectors to receive revenues, and institutions to be built. And even then
the outcome is not guaranteed. The Union military overawed the South but prewar
political and cultural institutions reasserted themselves with malicious energy
during Reconstruction.

COIN efforts can be crippled by bad politics, but COIN also
suffers when physical control cannot be exercised. While military effects can
sometimes gain political decision, it does not follow that political work can
always compensate for military failures. Tactics must serve strategy, but the
converse is that strategy without sound tactics is also dangerous. One Afghan
example that Gray repeatedly returns to is the failure to destroy the enemy
sanctuary in Pakistan. Strategic defeat of insurgents is impossible without
tactical actions to neutralize the major source of their political power: the
perception they can and will outlast their American adversaries in a war of
attrition.

Perceptions in Afghanistan rest on material realities. The
Taliban are unlikely to perceive themselves to be defeated if they can
regenerate their power in secure sanctuaries. And as Foust suggests,
Afghans are unlikely to be convinced of government staying power if the Taliban
can consistently mount terrorist operations around the pinnacle of Afghan and
Coalition political power in Kabul. It is true that defeat in the battle of
perception can raise the cost of coercion. But good works do not guarantee
cooperation, and accidental cultural gaffes and collateral damage do not
inherently lead to conflict. In fact, sometimes the opposite can occur in both
cases. Why? The behavior of populations in war is motivated by a variety of
factors that include political mobilization, sectarian and family loyalties,
safety, and material interest. Outside forces must deal with these motivating forces but should not assume they can
easily alter them.

The challenge, as in any other kind of war, is to use force
in a manner that enhances rather than detracts from control. This does not mean
assuming that the population is the center of gravity. Taking the human terrain
into account is simply smart politics, something armies and their political
masters should always be cognizant of. Insurgents are successful when they use
existing political forces to their advantage, but governments can also do so
even in when they are unable to obtain consent. Israeli military and civilian
intelligence efforts rest in large part on extensive
exploitation of political and social friction between Palestinians.
Consequently, a popular uprising defeated Hosni Mubarak because he lost control
of Egyptian elite politics.

Finally, as Gray notes, if tactical setbacks cannot be tactically rectified, the problem is the
policy or strategy rather than cultural awareness or COIN deficits. If a
general or a politician cannot solve the problem caused by a "strategic"
corporal, it is not primarily the enlisted man's fault that the war effort
collapsed. In Somalia, the tactical disaster of Mogadishu
would not have mattered if the war had greater support in American domestic
politics. Once the war shifted from a humanitarian operation into military
operations, a gaping hole in the "strategy
bridge" left the entire structure vulnerable to fog and friction and enemy
adaptation.

Conclusion

Gray's essay is first and foremost a plea for COIN theorists
to consider the canon of strategic literature and human experience beyond Iraq
and Afghanistan. We ought to carefully reflect on his words before we find
ourselves encountering the same problems on new military frontiers. Strategic
theory will not guarantee victory, but it can help us shed illusions about what
force and persuasion can and cannot achieve.

Adam Elkus is a PhD student at American University. He
blogs at    Abu Muquwama , CTOVision   and Information Dissemination on
strategy, technology and international politics.