Europe and the Myth of the “Russian Nemesis”. The Genesis of Russophobia

By Dr. F. Andrew Wolf, Jr., Global Research, 9/30/25

F. Andrew Wolf, Jr. is director of The Fulcrum Institute, a new organization of current and former scholars, which engages in research and commentary, focusing on political and cultural issues on both sides of the Atlantic. After service in the USAF (Lt.Col.-Intel) Dr. Wolf obtained a PhD-philosophy (Wales), MA-theology (Univ. S. Africa), MTh-philosophical theology (TCU-Brite Div.). He taught philosophy, humanities and theology in the US and S. Africa before retiring from university. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

The past several weeks has witnessed tensions between EU political elites and the Kremlin escalating, needlessly. A contrived drone incident in Poland, Estonian airspace allegedly being violated by Russian planes, and East European politicians urging NATO to shoot down Russian aircraft — it all points to a deliberate attempt to provoke Moscow and garner Washington’s attention.

But this sudden propensity toward provocation says less about Moscow and more about EU insecurity. With US security guarantees steadily declining, the bloc’s governments are grasping at an old but favorite retreat: the myth of the “Russian threat.”

It is a conjured story that has lingered in European consciousness for more than five centuries, and it speaks clearly to Western Europe’s insecurity – rather than any Russian territorial ambitions.

There are reasons why the EU’s desperate posturing is laced with deceit. Washington’s inclination towards underwriting European security is diminishing. Western media suggests that US officials have told their European counterparts that direct military aid to Eastern Europe may soon be scaled back. Political elites in the Baltics and some former Soviet republics view this as an untenable situation. Hence, the group’s foreign policy initiatives are routinely directed towards provoking a response from Russia, hoping to extract security guarantees and military resources from the US.

Furthermore, and this is the fallacy of the EU position, the latter has no alternative strategy. Without US acquiescence, it cannot conceive of a foreign policy beyond merely provoking the Russian “Bear.” Reintroducing Russia as its “existential” nemesis provides a convenient way to gain Washington’s attention – and money if possible.

The irony is glaring: Russia has no interest in the territory of its smaller neighbors, because it is not in its best interest to do so. The Baltics, Poland, and Finland engaging for decades in anti-Russian rhetoric notwithstanding, Moscow seeks no revenge or a reckoning — again, because it’s not in its interest to so engage. Their relevance in world affairs is negligible. But for the political elites, clinging to the myth of Russian aggression has become the only recourse they, shortsightedly, believe is available to them. 

The Genesis of Russophobia

The roots of this myth lie in neither the Cold War nor the 19th century “Great Game” rivalry between empires; rather, its emergence can be traced to the rather cowardly insecurity of Baltic barons and the opportunism of German knights in Livonia and Prussia.

In the late 15th century, Polish monarchs considered sending German knights to fight the expanding Ottoman Empire. The idea was horrifying to them. For centuries, they had lived comfortably in the Baltics while merely skirmishing with Russian militias. The Ottoman Turks was altogether different. The memory of Nicopolis was still a vivid memory – Ottoman forces executed virtually all captured knights.

Unwilling to face a real threat and a formidable enemy, the Livonian and Prussian knights initiated a propaganda campaign. The goal was to persuade the balance of Europe that Russia was an enemy as dangerous, and perhaps even more so, than the Ottomans. The strategy succeeded: Rome granted indulgences and support, ensuring the knights could remain at home, while still enjoying the prestige of crusaders fighting a “holy war.”

The myth was born: a confluence of fear, opportunism, and financial gain. Eventually, Western Europe (particularly France and Britain) absorbed the deception into a broader scheme of Russophobia – a blend of contempt and anxiety over a vast empire they could neither conquer nor ignore. And in the 20th century England’s academics, especially through its Rhodes Scholar program, indoctrinated generations of America’s best and brightest who became influential in advising presidents and secretaries of state in US foreign policy. Russophobia crossed the Atlantic.

Reflections of the Past

Today, history repeats itself. Once more, Russia’s neighbors (anxious and insecure) seek protection from an Atlantic suzerain preoccupied with larger challenges. Five centuries ago, the Ottomans consumed Europe’s attention; today, it is China – the true strategic rival of the United States.

Little has changed, however, with European elites. They cannot imagine a political identity without playing the role of “victim.” Their economies and influence are far too insignificant, so they inflate the specter of Russian aggression in a futile attempt to remain relevant to Washington and Brussels.

Russia’s foreign minister Sergei Lavrov told the United Nations this week that Moscow has no intention of attacking Europe or NATO countries. Moscow has not the desire and certainly not the need to “invade” the Baltics or Poland. In the 15th century, Ivan III was concerned with issues of trade, economic relations, and Orthodox Christian Church leadership — not with conquest for the sake of territorial gain. Today, Russia’s aims are equally pragmatic: stability, sovereignty, and relations built around trade.

Poland vs the Rest of Europe

The contrast with Poland is instructive. In the 15th century, Poland agitated for war with Russia. In the 21st, it has chosen a more cautious course, focusing on steady economic growth and avoiding reckless entanglements. Unlike the Baltics, Warsaw has built a measure of gravitas in European politics. That success has made it a target of envy in Berlin, Paris, and London, who would prefer Poland to be dragged into open confrontation with Moscow.

But Poland’s refusal to adopt the euro (much like Britain and the northern countries) has made it resilient, mitigating the leverage of German and French economic dominance. And Washington is equally reluctant to risk a “European entanglement” that would distract from its priorities in the Pacific. 

What History Teaches

The myth of the Russian threat was not born of Russian ambition but of broader European insecurity and avarice. European elites in the 21st century perpetuate the deception to distract their own populations from witnessing their own weakness and irrelevance.

What began as propaganda in Cologne in the 16th century still shapes West European discourse, today. But deceit cannot alter reality once it is recognized for what it is – a “lie.” Russia seeks not conflict — only to secure its interests. Europe and Britain understand this – it just doesn’t fit their political agendas.

It is self-defeating for the EU to cling to invented peril; it distracts attention from the real domestic challenges facing it. And in doing so, it risks repeating the same missteps that have dogged its politics for half a millennium – a reticence to deal with actual, rather than virtual, reality.