The US-ROK test case: Can visas and rules unlock American shipbuilding?

In 1890, Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote, “Whoever rules the waves rules the world.” His ideas quickly shaped US foreign policy and inspired leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt, who embraced naval expansion as the key to American power projection.

Today, America faces its most significant great-power challenge since the end of the Cold War, and it is playing out on the seas. China has absorbed Mahan’s lessons with ruthless efficiency. A state-backed shipbuilding base, expansive merchant fleet, and rapidly growing navy now operate as one. China has become the world’s top shipbuilder, controls one of the largest shipping companies, and commands the largest navy by number of ships. Massive subsidies, approaching $100 billion, have helped Beijing capture more than half of the global shipbuilding market and secure influence over port and shipyard infrastructure worldwide.

China’s surge has left the United States facing a shipbuilding challenge it can’t solve on its own. That is why South Korea’s “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again” proposal could mark a turning point in the alliance.

In 2025 tariff negotiations, Seoul pledged $150 billion to revitalize America’s maritime sector. The package includes upgrading US shipyards, training American workers, easing Navy maintenance backlogs, and co‑producing vessels in US yards. Korea’s shipbuilders are global leaders in modular construction and on-time delivery, and this proposal would bring the capital and expertise into American facilities to reinforce rather than replace US industry.

If Washington can clear workforce and legal obstacles that stand in the way of progress, this infusion could provide the industrial foundation needed to meet China’s scale with allied strength. However, as recent events have painfully made clear, changes are going to have to come, both for rules around workforce and for legal restrictions on working with foreign partners.

Workforce Issues In The Spotlight:

On the workforce side, America does not have a clear pathway for the skilled foreign specialists who install equipment, commission lines, and train crews. The ICE raid in early September that detained more than 300 South Korean technicians in Georgia underscored how fragile the current patchwork approach has become. Without these specialists, schedules slip, and the workforce struggles to build the skills needed to deliver on time.

Recent events show these obstacles are not abstract. After the Georgia raid, South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung said companies would be “very hesitant” to expand in the United States without a predictable visa channel. The following day a chartered Korean Air flight carried many of the detained technicians back to Seoul, a vivid image of capital and know-how leaving American soil.

Following this high-profile incident, however, there is reason for cautious optimism. The American Chamber of Commerce in Korea hosted a Sept. 29 business roundtable, where US Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said in a video message: “Investment from Korean companies in absolutely key to President Trump’s vision for our country. Our commitment is to make this process easier, so that both Korea and the US can prosper together.”

A day later, the two countries held a working-group talk about improving the visa system. That session, convened in Washington, produced concrete outcomes: the two governments agreed to establish a dedicated “Korean Investor Desk” at the US Embassy in Seoul to help companies navigate visa issues, and reaffirmed that Korean firms may continue using the B-1 business visa and ESTA program for equipment installation and servicing. As the US State Department put it in its official readout, “The United States strongly supports investment that drives American reindustrialization, strengthens the U.S.–ROK alliance, and enhances shared prosperity.”

These are important first steps that show momentum, but administrative fixes alone will not provide lasting certainty. The Partner with Korea Act (H.R. 4687), introduced in July by Rep. Young Kim (R-Calif.) and Sydney Kamlager-Dove (D-Calif.), would create 15,000 visas for highly skilled Korean specialists with strict safeguards to ensure they do not displace American workers. Similar visa categories exist under US trade agreements with Australia, making this a tested model.

The working group can shape the near-term administrative lane, while the Partner with Korea Act can lock in a durable, capped channel so South Korean training teams arrive on schedule and leave once the work is done.

Legalities Blocking Partnerships

On the legal side, the Byrnes–Tollefson Amendment (10 U.S.C. § 8679) and the Jones Act shape what foreign partners can do. One forbids building US Navy hulls in yards overseas, another requires that ships moving cargo between US ports be built in America.

Neither prevents allied firms from investing in US facilities, but both create a level of uncertainty about where cooperation ends and where American control must remain.

However, Korean officials have shown that this can be managed. At a Washington forum hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Korean Defense Acquisition Minister Seok Jong-gun outlined options: components supplied from Korea for U.S. use, blocks built abroad but assembled in American yards, and partially outfitted hulls completed in the United States. He stressed that decisions in Washington are needed to determine how the Byrnes-Tollefson Amendment and the Jones Act will apply.

The rapid moves by companies such as HD Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), from its merger with Hyundai Mipo  to  an MOU with Huntington Ingalls Industries, show that Korean industry is prepared to invest. Together these steps show that the legal questions are not fixed barriers but solvable issues, provided both governments set clear rules and allow allied capital and expertise to flow into American yards.

History will not wait. More than a century after Mahan, the contest is again decided in shipyards and on the sea. South Korea is signaling a desire to help its loyal ally, with money, machinery, and skill. If the U.S. wants the advantage, it must align rules with reality and let proven teams train American workers in American yards, with clear legal parameters for co-production.

The outcome is what matters: ships delivered on time and on budget, supported by allied capital and expertise already moving into place. With the inaugural US–R.O.K. visa working group meeting concluded, and a dedicated Korean Investor Desk set to launch, the window to act is open.

Jeffrey M. Voth is an engineering and technology executive focused on strengthening the US defense industrial base and allied cooperation. For over two decades, he has worked on US-ROK partnerships, including the KDX-III program.