Back to Key West: The Army must own air base defense, not chase Air Force missions

The 1948 Key West Agreement resolved postwar interservice rivalries by assigning clear roles: The Army is responsible for land combat, including ground-based air defense to protect troops and bases, while the Air Force handles air superiority, strategic bombing, and deep strikes. Refined by the 1956 Wilson Memorandum, this framework aimed to eliminate redundancy and boost efficiency.

With the Army kicking off its “Army Transformation Initiative” with big changes, now is the perfect time for an updated version of the Key West Agreement to be hashed out. And among other key issues, such as who controls space assets, a final decision should result in the Army abandoning its push for long-range strike systems, such as the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), and the vague, undefined in joint doctrine “Air Littoral” concept, which directly encroaches on Air Force functions.

Instead, the Army must prioritize its critical air base defense mission to ensure joint readiness against hypersonic missiles and small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS), thereby freeing the underfunded Air Force to secure air dominance.

The Army’s Long-Range Precision Fires program, developing hypersonic weapons and LRHW, targets enemy air defenses and command nodes —missions the Air Force has executed since 1948. Former Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville pitched these types of capabilities as cost-effective, citing Gulf War Apache strikes as historic evidence. Yet this overlooks the Air Force’s decisive F-117 missions and the extensive employment of Navy Tomahawk missiles, which, combined with other air campaign elements, crushed Iraqi defenses and defeated Saddam’s military.

Prior to the mid-2000s, the US Army integrated short-range air defense (SHORAD) to protect maneuver forces from low-altitude threats. However, as US Army Air Defense Artillery Capt. Leopoldo Negrete explained two years ago, the absence of significant fixed-wing or rotary-wing threats during operations in Afghanistan and Iraq shifted the Army’s focus to point-defense systems like the Patriot, reducing air defense support for mobile ground units.

The Army’s encroachment on Air Force missions at the expense of air defense is a strategic error that wastes money, particularly against China’s DF-26 missiles, which have a 4,000-kilometer range and are capable of targeting Guam. Further, China’s 2024 exercises showcased drone swarms threatening airfields, underscoring the need for a robust Army air defense presence to protect bases like Andersen Air Force Base. Beyond China, the conflict in Ukraine highlights the potential threat posed by Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missiles and Orlan-10 drones, which have been used in Ukraine for swarm attacks. Ukraine’s 10,000 drone types and thousands lost monthly highlight the scale of modern air threats.

The Army’s Patriot and THAAD systems are critical for joint base protection, but funding lags as deep-strike programs dominate. Shifting air defense to the Air Force would strain its budget, which has been below 25 percent of the Department of Defense total since 1992, with over $50 billion in annual pass-throughs for programs completely outside the Air Force budget. As David Deptula and Mark Gunzinger note, adding ground defense would divert funds from B-21 bombers, F-35 fighters, and E-7 aircraft, all of which are needed to recapitalize the Air Force and secure future air superiority for joint force operations.

This is not to say that long-range strike systems like LRHW do not have a role to play in layered deterrence, complementing the Air Force’s and Navy’s capabilities. LRHW 400-mile range enables rapid, land-based strikes in contested areas, such as the Pacific, supporting joint operations without relying solely on air or sea platforms that could be employed elsewhere to exploit their inherent mobility and flexibility.

However, Army deep-strike systems lack the Air Force’s stealth and flexibility, and fixed-site missiles are vulnerable to preemptive strikes. The Army should continue to explore these long-range strike capabilities, but should not pursue them at the expense of its core Key West air base defense mission.

Underfunding base defense capabilities such as Patriot, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and other emerging air defense systems risks leaving joint bases vulnerable, undermining the platforms—Air Force jets and Navy ships—that LRHW purports to complement. Nor should these programs be transferred to the Air Force, as such programs would overburden the Air Force’s already-strained budget and dilute its rightful focus on air superiority.

Anti-Doctrinal Distraction: The Air Littoral

Another aspect that needs to be sorted out between the services is the Army’s “Air Littoral” concept, which aims to achieve dominance in low-altitude airspace (from the surface to several thousand feet) for Army aviation and small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS). This redundant, fabricated “subdomain,” supposedly dominated by “drones,” blurs lines with Air Force roles like air superiority and close air support, risking confusion with naval “littoral” terminology. Lacking doctrinal clarity—and not an approved term in the U.S. military—it diverts resources from air defense.

Proponents argue that it reflects the complexity of multi-domain warfare, as seen in Ukraine’s frustrating air and ground operations. However, air superiority, accomplished through defended airfields, solves the stalemate unfolding between Ukraine and Russia. Desert Storm showcased joint strength through specialization: Army ground forces, Air Force air dominance, and Navy sea control. Unnecessary overlap fosters friction, not synergy.

The Army’s cancellation of a $2 billion reconnaissance helicopter and rapid buy of 600 Coyote counter-UAS systems show it’s learning from Ukraine, as George noted in 2024: “Aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed.” The air littoral notion, while acknowledging UAS threats, is entirely unnecessary, as established doctrine already addresses the issue of control over low-altitude airspace. The Army would be better served focusing on securing air bases in the Pacific, and allowing codified airspace management procedures to counter sUAS threats in the air, by exception.

Some argue that deep-strike and air littoral roles enhance Army relevance in multi-domain warfare. However, that overlooks the fact that the Army excels in several key missions it undertakes — indeed, the service is vital to how the US conducts integrated operations. No one doubts that the US Army is ready to stand up and defend its country in any way possible. 

But not duplicating missions already assigned to other services will allow the Army to focus on its important core competencies. The Army’s strength lies in ground-based defense, complemented by new long-range strike capabilities, such as the LRHW. Programs like Directed Energy Maneuver-SHORAD lasers and Patriot can counter evolving aerial threats, protecting both maneuver forces and airbases. By focusing on service-specific discrete roles rather than pursuing duplicative new capabilities, the Army can remain relevant as a critical enabler to the joint force of the future.

The Army must return to its Key West roots: prioritize air base defense while sustaining long-range strike development as a complementary capability. By fully funding Patriot, THAAD, SHORAD, and other emerging air defense and counter-UAS capabilities, the Army could shield joint forces, thereby allowing the Air Force to focus on its core competency — air dominance.

As stated in Congressional testimony by David Deptula, Dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, “A dollar spent on duplicative capability comes at the expense of essential capacity or capability elsewhere.”

Congress and the Pentagon should redirect funds from Army long-range fires to air defense, codify roles (Army for primarily ground-based air defense and some complementary long-range strike capability, Air Force for aerial dominance), and stop the redundancies inherent in Army mission overreach that undermine the entire concept of jointness. The strength of joint operations resides in the separateness of the service capabilities.

With China and Russia advancing, an updated Key West roles and missions agreement optimizes joint force operations in the Pacific.

Lt. Col. Grant “SWAT” Georgulis, USAF, is a Master Air Battle Manager and currently assigned as the Deputy Chief of C2 Inspections as part of the Headquarters NORAD and U.S. NORTHCOM Inspector General team. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the United States Air Force.