From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table

The Russo-Ukrainian War grinds on, with Russia making extremely marginal territorial gains at exorbitant human and materiel cost. But the Russians are inflicting heavy casualties on Ukraine as well. And for the first time in, well, forever, there appears to be at least a glimmer of a possibility of some sort of negotiated settlement. I’ll first discuss the military situation, then the political/diplomatic one, as the last is contingent on the first.

As I’ve written often before, the tactical aspects of the Russian campaign are beyond grotesque. The indiscriminate waste of lives for meager gains and the brutal treatment of Russian soldiers (who now include female criminals released from prisons) transcend even the worst historical precedents, at least in Europe. The senseless slaughters, the callousness of the officers, and the material deprivation the soldiers suffer go far, far beyond the conditions that caused the French army to mutiny in 1917. But no such thing appears in prospect in the Russian army. National mindset/character does matter.

This last week I saw two articles that present an interesting contrast. A WSJ article describes Ukraine’s (very belated) efforts to fortify. Appealing to Clauswitz and the experience of the American Civil War, Naval War College professor James Holmes argues that fixed defensive lines are futile, and hence the odds of victory favor Russia.

On balance, I think the pro-fortification side has the best of the argument. This is primarily because the technological considerations overwhelm the abstract advantage of the attacker identified by Clauswitz, and the inappositeness of the ACW analogy.

“The Offensive” is one of the Clauswitzian principles of war. Indeed, it is usually given pride of place. As Holmes emphasizes, the attacker can choose where to attack and can concentrate his forces, whereas the defender does not know where the attack will come, and must spread out his forces. This imbalance of concentration is most acute when the battlefront is large, as is the case in Ukraine. Hence, Holmes concludes, the advantage lies heavily with Russia.

However, technological conditions can decisively shift the advantage to the defender, even given his ignorance of where a blow will fall. Of course, the Western Front in WWI is the primary example of this.

In that conflict, the extreme limitations on the pace of an advance, the vulnerability of the attackers to fires, and the distance that an attacker could advance dictated by the reliance on infantry (and later, the primitive armor) combined to make breakthroughs almost impossible to achieve. Firepower (artillery and machine guns) attrited an attacking infantry force heavily before it made contact. Even if it was able to take a line of trenches, or even two, exhaustion brought them to a halt. Primitive communications prevented coordination of adjacent units, and made it almost impossible to bring up reserves to the right place to continue an initially successful assault. So at best, an attacker could dent but never break an enemy’s lines.

Even operational surprises, like Verdun in 1916 or the Kaiserschlacht in Flanders and Artois in 1918 eventually petered out far short of their objectives. Only where troop and fortification density was much lower, as on the Eastern Front in say the Gorlice–Tarnów offensive in Poland in 1915, or the Brusilov Offensive in 1916, or Romania in 1916, was it possible for foot and horse-drawn forces to make sustained advances over long distances. And even the first two of those culminated short of achieving victory.

Conditions similar to the Western Front prevail in Ukraine, and indeed, many factors are even more disadvantageous to the attacker. First anti-tank missiles, and then drones and deep strike munitions, have made it impossible for armored and motorized forces to advance to contact without suffering near annihilation. Drones, and especially satellite and electronic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets provided by the US, make operational and tactical surprise almost impossible. Artillery is more precise and more deadly.

So foot soldiers must advance under continuous enemy observation and fire at a walking pace, and suffer catastrophically as a result.

The only thing that has allowed Russia to advance as much as it has, little though that be and at what cost, is the fact that Ukrainian lines are very thinly manned. Fortifications are the best way to compensate for that lack of manpower.

Since the outset of the war Ukraine as eschewed the construction of dense fortifications throughout the front–something I have criticized since the outset. Indeed, the Ukrainian resistance to fortification persisted even after its 2023 “offensive” failed because it could not penetrate the Surovkin Lines. One should learn from one’s enemy: Ukraine hasn’t.

This is just one item, albeit an important one, in the bill of particulars against Syrsky and Zelensky and their operational conduct of the war.

(As for the ACW analogy, Holmes overlooks the fact that the Union offensive stalled for 10 months at Richmond-Petersburg due to Confederate fortifications there. Also, the Federal’s multiple simultaneous attacks were conducted at the strategic level, a totally different situation from the operational level -situation in Ukraine. Thus, at the operational level–e.g., Petersburg-Richmond–the fortified defensive prevailed despite a huge numerical imbalance between the two sides. That’s a better analogy for eastern Ukraine today).

Is it too late for Ukraine to fortify as it should have years ago? Perhaps. And regardless, until it does, the Russians will continue to advance meter by meter in the bite and hold fashion they’ve employed for the past three campaign season, because Putin has clearly shown he is willing to pay the price that approach entails.

Which brings us to the political/diplomatic situation. Putin has agreed to meet Trump, who is attempting to broker some form of cessation of the conflict. Trump promises to meet Zelensky immediately afterwards.

Now of course, both sides have made irreconcilable demands. Putin demands complete control over Ukraine’s eastern provinces (which they have almost, but not completely, captured). Zelensky says not one bit of Ukrainian soil will pass to Russia.

But of course they are going to say that. The question is how willing–and able–they are to adhere to those positions. This depends crucially on their assessments of what will happen if the war drags on.

Putin has consistently expressed bravado and a certainty of victory. He has wagered that the disproportionate populations and economies of the two combatants give him a decisive advantage. He claims the Russian economy has withstood sanctions, and can withstand anything more the west throws at him.

The reality is somewhat different. The rate of losses is not sustainable. This will be especially true if, finally throwing up his hands at Putin’s obstinacy, Trump increases the flow of military equipment to Ukraine. As for the economy, it has become extremely unbalanced, with likely unsustainable expenditures on the war. Russia’s fiscal situation is extremely parlous. The civilian economy is suffering, and although the aforementioned national character may cause Russians to bear these privations more stoically than other nationalities would, war weariness will inevitably grow (as it did in Russia in 1917). Russian industry, particularly its oil refining industry–a vital prop to the war effort and the economy generally–has suffered considerable damage from Ukrainian drone strikes.

Russia and those who believe in the inevitability of Russian victory point to GDP figures. Even overlooking the dubious nature of official Russian statistics (not that US official statistics are that great these days), hyperactive military production combined with a suffocating civilian economy cannot go on forever. The example of War Socialism under Ludendorff and Hindenberg in WWI Germany comes to mind. It achieved prodigies, then collapsed in social chaos.

For his part, Zelensky has to consider the fraught military situation. Yes, Ukraine is holding on, but the personnel issues in particular are also not sustainable.

The war of attrition has continued because each side thinks it can hold out one more day and one soldier longer. As long as they continue to think that way, Trump will not succeed.

It ultimately comes down to what leverage Trump has. The very fact that Putin is willing to meet suggests that he has some with the Russian. The meeting has come to pass only after an exasperated Trump threatened to impose far more draconian sanctions on Russia, most notably efforts to throttle oil sales to India and China. That Trump is deadly serious about this is demonstrated by the fact that relations with India have been severely ruptured due to Modi’s refusal to accede to Trump’s demands.

If the conditions of the Russian economy and fisc are as shaky as I believe, Putin has to be seriously concerned that Trump getting serious about sanctions would collapse his ability to sustain the war.

Trump obviously has much more leverage over Zelensky. Ukraine survives at the sufferance of the US.

So I conclude that Trump has considerable leverage over both sides, and that this makes a deal possible, if not highly likely. Putin has to know that the US will bear little cost from imposing large costs on Russia, and again, the hardball with India (“oh, you don’t like 25 percent tariffs? Well, here’s 50 percent then, asshole”) demonstrates that Trump is deadly serious now, whereas I don’t think Putin thought he was prior to now. Unless Putin is living in Dictator Dreamland (which is not inconceivable) he knows that his current strategy and tactics are not sustainable for very long, especially if the US ramps up military support for Ukraine. And further, he has to know that every human and materiel casualty in Ukraine weakens him against whom he claims is his real enemy–Nato.

So although I don’t believe that Trump will achieve a miracle next week, or even in the following weeks, I think that next Friday could well represent the beginning of the end. And what will that end look like?

Well, with neither side getting what they are demanding now. Putin will have de facto control over most of eastern Ukraine, and perhaps de jure control over some of it, but he will not have de jure control over all of it as he is demanding. Which means that Ukraine will make territorial concessions. That is, as is the case in every conflict not ended by unconditional surrender, each side will find the outcome distateful.

And what follows? A hot peace/frozen conflict. Korea redux, perhaps.