Brian McDonald: If Poland’s an economic miracle, what does that make Russia?
By Brian McDonald, Substack, 6/1/25
Brian McDonald is Irish and a long time Russia-based journalist. Writing about politics, sports and culture.
In the current Western discourse about Eastern European transformation, one hears Poland invoked like a hymn. It is, undeniably, a triumph. From the grey fatigue of post-communist inertia, Poland has emerged into something striking: a country that is modern, stable, and punching above its demographic weight. In nominal GDP terms alone, it has multiplied its national output fivefold since 2000, lifted living standards, integrated into the EU, rebuilt its infrastructure and created global firms. It is a remarkable success story.
But there is a strange silence—one that is becoming harder to ignore. Because if Poland’s economic rise is described as “nothing short of a miracle (Michael A. Arouet on X),” then what language is left to describe Russia’s trajectory over the same period? From a nominal GDP of $259 billion in 2000 to over $2.2 trillion in 2024, Russia’s nominal economic expansion dwarfs Poland’s in both absolute and relative terms. And in purchasing power parity (PPP), the gap is even starker: Russia has risen from $1.1 trillion in 2000 to over $5.2 trillion today, while Poland’s economy grew from around $420 billion to $1.6 trillion.
And even those numbers may understate the case. World Economics, using alternative methodologies that adjust for the informal economy and outdated GDP base year calculations, estimates Russia’s true PPP GDP in 2024 at over $7.5 trillion — roughly 26% higher than the World Bank’s official figure. Their model factors in a shadow economy that accounts for at least 26% of all economic activity, and potentially much more. Other studies, such as the Shadow Economy Index by Sauka and Putnins, estimated the informal sector at nearly 45% of GDP as recently as 2018.
This suggests that much of Russia’s economic life — from envelope wages to unregistered businesses — operates off the books. It’s messy, opaque, and far from ideal. But it also means the country’s real productive activity is significantly higher than what’s recorded. In nominal terms, Russia may look like a mid-size economy. In practice, it behaves more like a large one hiding behind a bureaucratic veil.
None of this is to diminish Poland’s achievement. Quite the opposite. Its progress is the product of hard work, strategic policy choices, and—crucially—European integration. Massive inflows of EU funds, combined with a committed and mobile population, created conditions for a genuine leap forward. But when commentators cite Poland as living proof of the virtues of EU membership, free markets, and entrepreneurial spirit, they often imply—or outright assert—that it is Poland’s embrace of Brussels that made the difference.
And here is where the silence creeps in. Because Russia, by any reasonable measure, has posted greater economic growth than Poland over the past two decades—despite facing every headwind Poland was spared. No EU funds. No single market access. No structural aid. And, since 2014, the most sustained regime of Western sanctions applied to any major economy in modern times.
Yes, Russia has immense natural resources. So do many nations. The trick is not having oil and gas—it is utilizing them while building a functioning economy beneath. Few expected Russia to make it work. Many predicted collapse (just Google the subject). But in a country often dismissed as a gas station with nukes, there has been something far more complicated, and inconvenient for some, happening: genuine, sustained growth.
This is not a paean to Russia, nor a denial of its flaws. Corruption, capital flight, inequality—all real and enduring. But what grates is the refusal to even acknowledge its economic performance in the same breath as Poland’s. It’s as if certain analysts fear that recognising this would somehow weaken their preferred narrative: that Brussels brings prosperity, and turning from it brings ruin.
But the numbers are not guided by political preferences. They are arithmetic. Poland’s growth deserves praise. But Russia’s deserves recognition too—especially when it has come through geopolitical frostbite, financial exclusion, and institutional hostility. That doesn’t make Russia a model. It makes it an inconvenient outlier.
There is no need for rivalry here. Poland’s rise is not Russia’s loss. Nor should Russia’s survival under duress be read as proof of sainthood. But the lopsidedness in how their stories are told—and what is omitted—reveals more about the storytellers than the countries themselves.
Eastern Europe is not a morality tale for outsiders to exploit. It is a region of hundreds of millions of real people, of histories and choices. And while Poland’s road to prosperity may have gone through Brussels, it doesn’t follow that every path must.
To acknowledge this is not to diminish Poland. It is to finally speak about the region with the honesty it deserves.
