Summary of Gödel’s Argument for Immortality

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Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) was the foremost logician of the twentieth-century. He is best known for his incompleteness theorems and contributions to set theory, changing the course of mathematics, logic and computer science. In addition he advanced an argument for personal immortality which I reconstruct—in order to give it the best chance of success—as follows:

1) If the world is rationally organized, then human life must also be rational (since humans are a part of the world);
2) Science gives us reason to believe the world is rationally organized;
thus
3) Human life must be rationally organized.
4) But without personal immortality, human life wouldn’t be rational (since our potential for personal development and interpersonal relationships would be thwarted by death); thus
5) Humans must be personally immortal so that they can fulfill their potential (in the afterlife).

Or to put it somewhat differently,

1)We have good reasons to think the world makes sense (is intelligible);
2)Human life is part of the world; thus
3)We have good reasons to think human life makes sense (is intelligible);
4)But human life only makes sense if there is personal immortality; thus
5)We have good reasons to believe in personal immortality.

Here is some of this in Gödel’s own words,

If the world is rationally organised and has meaning, then it [personal immortality] must be the case. For what sort of a meaning would it have to bring about a being (the human being) with such a wide field of possibilities for personal development and relationships to others, only then to let him achieve not even 1/1,000th of it?

So, among other things, it is the world’s shortcomings—including pain and suffering—that demands immortality for life to be rational and meaningful. For Gödel, it is the next world that liberates us from our earthly limitations. Otherwise we cannot actualize the potentials that a rational existence demands.

My Reflections

First let me say that it is always easier to tear down arguments instead of building them up. A professor in graduate school once told me that philosophers make arguments and then other philosophers, like vultures, swoop in and destroy them—a good way to get published.

Next Gödel’s phrase below “rationally organized and has meaning” is problematic. It seems that human lives and the world may be scientifically rational or intelligible but that doesn’t imply that their lives are meaningful. It seems easy enough to imagine a scientifically intelligible world in which human lives are meaningless. So I’m not sure about the relationship between the rational and the meaningful.

Surprisingly though I agree with a lot of Gödel’s argument. I have argued elsewhere that either personal or universal immortality is necessary for complete meaning. So I agree that a fully rational/meaningful individual life and cosmic life demand that something is eternal. The problem is that we have good reasons to think that both the individual and cosmic life are not eternal. For this and many other reasons reality may just not be rationally or meaningfully organized.

Finally, let me just say that the idea that we survive death, broadly speaking, is highly unlikely,

Modern science generally ignores this supposed evidence for an afterlife for multiple reasons. First, the idea of an immortal soul plays no explanatory or predictive role in the scientific study of human beings. Second, overwhelming evidence supports the view that consciousness ceases when brain functioning does. If ghosts, souls, or disembodied spirits exist, then some of the most basic ideas of modern science are mistaken—which is very unlikely.

So while personal immortality based on supernatural considerations is logically possible, it’s easy to see that it isn’t very plausible. In the end, wishful thinking best explains belief in immortality, not reason and evidence. Therefore, I live under the assumption that my consciousness depends on a functioning brain, and when my brain ceases to functions so will I. When I die, I doubt that I’ll move to a better neighborhood.

But as always, I could be mistaken.