About Syria, Don’t Get Your Hopes Up

The request line is open! Responding to Ex-Global Super-Regulator on Lunch Break, here are some thoughts on Syria.

The big picture: it was a shitshow, it is a shitshow, and it will continue to be a shitshow. Just under new management.

Reading the stories of the assault through Aleppo, then Hama, then Homs, and finally Damascus, I thought of the scenes in Lawrence of Arabia in which the Arab irregulars rampaged past a collapsing regular army and took Damascus on 1 October 1918, which soon plunged into tribal bickering and chaos under their rule.

If anything, the ethnic, sectarian, and ideological divisions of the 2024 conquerers are more extreme and latent with violence than the tribal divisions of 1918. Thus, the current euphoria over the fall of the truly odious Assad will prove as fleeting as the euphoria over the fall of the odious Khaddafy. Libya’s recent history is therefore a useful reference in evaluating Syria’s likely future. (The main difference is that Libya has relatively large amounts of oil to fight over).

There are numerous armed groups in Syria with wildly conflicting agendas. The group that has gotten the most attention, HTS, is widely portrayed as a Turkish proxy, but this is wrong. Turkey’s player in the game (a game with a very complex scorecard, even with which you might not be able to identify all the players) is the Syrian National Army, but it was not aimed primarily at the Assad regime. Instead, it (and hence Erdogan) has launched its main effort against the Kurdish (YPG) forces in northeastern Syria. The Kurds were instrumental in the defeat of ISIS–with a considerable assist from the US. Meaning that Turkey’s proxies are attacking US proxies.

Won’t that be fun. What the rump US administration will do is unknown, and that is presumably why Erdogan is in such a hurry, trying to change the facts on the ground before Trump takes office.

So post-Assad Syria is at least a 3-sided conflict, akin to the climatic scene of The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (minus any Good character a la Clint):

Probably more in fact because the Jihadi and Jihadi-adjacent HTS is itself a coalition of many Islamist groups who could well fall out. And because it would not be surprising if Assad regime elements go underground a la Saddamites post-2003 and wage a guerrilla/terror war. And because Iran will almost certainly attempt to employ Hezbollah elements to retain a shred of influence in the country.

A quick take on the losers and winners.

Losers:

Iran. Clearly the biggest loser, and the worst in a string of defeats in the last year. Assad’s Syria was the essential logistical lynchpin and staging area for Iranian support to Hezbollah. That’s basically gone, leaving an already reeling Hezbollah to wither on the vine. Further, Israel has moved rapidly to destroy Syrian military infrastructure (which Iran used) and to seize “buffer zones” that will make it difficult for Iran to utilize even smuggling operations to sustain Hezbollah. In retrospect, October 7 may look like Pearl Harbor. A seeming smashing surprise attack that set off a chain of events that ended ultimately in defeat. Hezbollah. For the same reasons as Iran.Russia. His regime’s collapse makes Assad’s other major patron looks like a giant with clay feet. Russian troops in the interior are bugging out to the coast: the serpentine routes of some convoys looks like some mini-Xenophon Anabasis. As for the bases that these troops are fleeing to, they still remain in Russian hands although the anti-Assad forces have evidently surrounded them. These bases are so vital that I expect Russia will cut some deal with the victors to retain them. They are essential to supporting Russian operations in Africa. Moreover, without the naval base at Tartus Russia has no ability to support a presence in the Mediterranean, a prestige item for Russia. The Turkish Straits are closed to them so they can’t operate in the Med from Black Sea bases. Given that most of the Russian fleet now consists of short-legged frigates and the like, it’s not operationally feasible to show the flag in the Med from the Baltic or Arctic. (Not to mention if the Russians are forced out of Tartus, the frigates and patrol craft it has there now would have a hard time to get back to St. Petersburg. A winter voyage would be particularly fun!) So Russia will probably hang on with its fingernails, but its position will be tenuous and its reputation damaged further. Hamas. Another loser as a result of Iran’s emasculation.

Winners:

Israel. The biggest winner by far. Iran’s and Hezbollah’s losses are its gain. It has moved with remarkable speed to exploit the opportunity by (a) obliterating virtually all Syrian military assets (aircraft, ships, depots, arms production facilities) thereby depriving any successor state/statelets of them, and (b) establishing the aforementioned buffer zone east of the Golan Heights. Israel’s security situation in the north is better now than probably ever. The US, though the picture is far more mixed than for Israel. Although the Biden-Obama administration is likely to differ, Iran’s strategic defeat is a gain for the US. (Biden-Obama’s approach to Iran is one of the most baffling and stupid foreign policies in American history). As noted above, a conflict with Turkey over the Kurds looms. A jihadi regime in Syria (or more realistically, parts of Syria) is not ideal, and may be worse from a realpolitik perspective than an Assad regime. The greatest benefit to the US would be a serious retrenchment by Iran, which would reduce the strategic risks for the US in the Middle East (given that Iran is the main source of those risks).Other Arab regimes, especially in the Gulf. Again due to the Iranian losses. Some are saying the Saudis and Qatar will be the big winner because Assad’s fall will permit the building of a gas pipeline through Syria (and Jordan) to Turkey and then Europe. This would exacerbate Russian losses and be a win for the Gulfies, but I think it is an unlikely outcome. The chaos that is likely to reign for years in Syria will make this pipeline as chimerical as the oft-vaunted claims about pipelines through Afghanistan.

TBD:

Turkey. Again, it’s main interest is not in Syria per se, but in the Kurds. I expect the US will prevent Erdogan from achieving the destruction of the Kurds that he seeks, so it is likely that Turkey will not achieve the victory it seeks. Many in Turkey greeted the news of Assad’s fall by saying: “Great! Now all the Syrians can go home!” Unlikely, for reasons I discuss shortly.Lebanon. The weakening of Hezbollah should be a great boon to Lebanon. But it’s Lebanon. The Syrian people. Assad’s regime was monstrous. The country has been devastated. (I think GNP has fallen by something like 90 percent). But the likelihood of continued strife means that Syrians are unlikely to harvest the fruits of peace. And being ruled by Islamists will not be fun times–especially for minorities like Christians and Alawites. So contrary to the hopes of the Turks (and the Europeans who have also found Syrian immigrants to be pestilential) I doubt there will be a flood of people back to Syria, and indeed there might be another exodus. Ukraine. Ukrainians are crowing over Putin’s humiliation. But how Putin will react is unclear. Having lost and made to look ineffectual in Syria he may decide to amplify his efforts in Ukraine. And will logistic complications lead him to redeploy assets from Africa to Ukraine? Who knows?

So that’s my hot take on Syria. The basic takeaway is that it is the end of a regime but not the end of wars in Syria. And that from a geopolitical perspective it redounds to the benefit of all those at odds with Iran.