October 24, 1962 – Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Union condemns the United States for imposing a naval “quarantine” of Cuba
On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy announced in anationwide television broadcast to the American people the presence of nuclearmissiles in Cuba. He also warned Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchevthat using the missiles against any country in the Western Hemisphere would beequivalent to an attack against the United States,and which would force the U.S. Armed Forces to retaliate against the Soviet Union. President Kennedy then called on the Soviet Unionto remove the missiles. He alsoannounced a naval “quarantine” of offensive weapons into Cuba, i.e. the U.S. Navy wouldseize offensive weapons before they reached the island. The quarantine was to prevent Soviet shipsfrom bringing more nuclear missiles to Cuba. President Kennedy chose to use the word“quarantine” instead of “naval blockade” since the latter was an act of warunder international law. Some 300 U.S.Navy ships were tasked to enforce the quarantine. The United States Armed Forces worldwide (exceptin Europe) were placed on a higher state ofreadiness.
On October 23, 1962 the United States gained the approval ofthe Organization of American States (OAS), which voted 20–0 (with Cuba notparticipating) to endorse the naval quarantine; a number of OAS membercountries pledged to provide soldiers, ships, logistical support, and navalbases for the quarantine.
The Soviets reacted strongly against the naval quarantine,with Premier Khrushchev, on October 24, calling it a violation of internationallaw and declaring that the blockade was an “act of aggression” that would leadto war and that Russian warships would ignore the American “piracy”. The Soviet leader declared that the“armaments…in Cuba,regardless of classification…are solely for defensive purposes…to secure Cubaagainst the attack of an aggressor.” Escorted by submarines, Soviet freighters bound for Cuba appeared determined to ignorethe quarantine. However, PremierKhrushchev soon ordered the cargo ships to change course or turn back. The next day, Adlai Stevenson, U.S Ambassadorto the United Nations, presented the U-2 aerial photographic evidence of thenuclear missiles to the UN Security Council. Stevenson asked Valerian Zorin, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, aboutthe missiles, but the latter refused to confirm or deny their deployment.

(Taken from Cuban Missile Crisis – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 2)
In August 1962, U.S.reconnaissance flights over Cubadetected the presence of powerful Soviet aircraft: 39 MiG-21 fighter aircraftand 22 nuclear weapons-capable Ilyushin Il-28 light bombers. More disturbing was the discovery of the S-75Dvina surface-to-air missile batteries, which were known to be contingent tothe deployment of nuclear missiles. Bylate August, the U.S.government and Congress had raised the possibility that the Soviets wereintroducing nuclear missiles in Cuba.
By mid-September, the nuclear missiles had reached Cubaby Soviet vessels that also carried regular cargoes of conventionalweapons. About 40,000 Soviet soldiersposing as tourists also arrived to form part of Cuba’sdefense for the missiles and against a U.S. invasion. By October 1962, the Soviet Armed Forces in Cubapossessed 1,300 artillery pieces, 700 regular anti-aircraft guns, 350 tanks,and 150 planes.
The process of transporting the missiles overland from Cubanports to their designated launching sites required using very large trucks,which consequently were spotted by the local residents because the oversizedtransports, with their loads of canvas-draped long cylindrical objects, hadgreat difficulty maneuvering through Cuban roads. Reports of these sightings soon reached theCuban exiles in Miami, and through them, the U.S.government.
The weight of circumstantial evidence reaching the United States prompted the Kennedyadministration to increase air reconnaissance missions over Cuba. On October 14, 1962, a U-2 spy plane tookhundreds of photographs which, after being filtered and analyzed by the CIA, revealedthe construction in San Cristobal, Pinar del Rio Province (Map 23) of a Sovietnuclear missile site for MRBMs that were capable of striking within a range of2,000 kilometers, including Washington, D.C. and the whole southeastern UnitedStates.
On October 16, 1962, President Kennedy was informed of thefindings; he formed a panel consisting of members of the National SecurityCouncil, or NSC (the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, Secretaryof Defense, Chairman of the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff, amongothers) and advisers. This panel wouldlater (October 22, 1962) be officially established as the ExComm (ExecutiveCommittee) of the NSC and tasked to formulate the United States’ appropriate response to the Soviet missile deploymentin Cuba.
The military members of ExComm believed that the missileschanged the strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union, but President Kennedy andDefense Secretary Robert McNamara disagreed, saying that the Russians alreadypossessed ICBMS and nuclear submarines that could target the United States, with or without the missiles in Cuba. However, all ExComm members agreed that themissiles changed the political balance and would damage the credibility ofPresident Kennedy with the American people, his western allies, and theinternational community, as it would appear that the United States was incapable of standing up to the Soviet Union.
The military members of ExComm advocated a militarysolution, including air strikes to destroy the missiles before they becameready, and a full-scale invasion of Cuba. President Kennedy demurred, believing thatAmerican military action might provoke the Soviets to invade West Berlin ordestroy the American Jupiter missiles in Turkey; in turn, NATO would beforced to respond, thereby escalating the conflict into a full-blown war. West Berlin, administered jointly by the United States, Britain,and France, was locatedwithin the territory of East Germany and long desired by the Soviet and EastGerman governments to be merged with East Berlin, East Germany’scapital.
ExComm unanimously agreed that the missiles must be removed.President Kennedy authorized the military to prepare for war, although hewanted to explore non-combat options first. The armed forces were placed on alert status, with 250,000 troopstransferred to Florida and Georgia; three battalions were sent toGuantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cubato reinforce the existing forces there. In the following days, more U-2 flights, including low-level aerialreconnaissance, showed that three other missile sites were being establishedand nearly completed, two of which were for IRBMs which, with a flight radiusof 4,800 kilometers, could target all of the continental United States, exceptAlaska, Oregon and Washington states.
On October 18, 1962, ExComm decided to pursue one of twooptions: an air strike or a naval blockade. The U.S. Air Force could not guarantee that American air strikes woulddestroy all the missiles, however, thereby pushing most of the ExComm membersto go for a naval blockade, which also was President Kennedy’s first option.
Without revealing that he was aware of the missiledeployments, President Kennedy met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko,who assured the American president that only Soviet defensive weapons werebeing delivered to Cuba. Many Soviet pronouncements leading up to thedelivery of the missiles had been aimed to assure the United States that no Soviet offensive weaponswould reach Cuba. Fidel Castro, without mentioning themissiles, declared that Cubahad the right to defend itself from foreign, i.e. American, aggression.