October 12, 1971 – Iran holds extravagant celebrations for the founding of the 2,500-year old Persian Empire
From October 12–16, 1971, Iran led by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi held elaborate celebrations for the founding of the Persian Empire, the festivities being officially called “The 2,500th Year of Foundation of Imperial State of Iran”. The event aimed to present the country’s ancient civilization and history, and highlight the advances made in the modern age. The celebrations, along with other government actions, were considered anti-Islamic by the clergy and many Iranians, and would lead to the anti-royalist backlash in the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
(Taken from Iranian Revolution – Wars of the 20th Century – Volume 4)
Meanwhile in Iran,the Shah continued to carry out secular programs that alienated most of thepopulation. In October 1971, tocommemorate 25 centuries since the founding of the Persian Empire, the Shahorganized a lavish program of activities in Persepolis, capital of the First PersianEmpire. Then in March 1976, the Shahannounced that Iranhenceforth would adopt the “imperial” calendar (based on the reign of Persianking Cyrus the Great) to replace the Islamic calendar. These acts, considered anti-Islamic by theclergy and many Iranians, would form part of the anti-royalist backlash in thecoming revolution.
Another paradox in a deeply conservative Muslim country wasthe government’s hosting the Shiraz-Persepolis Festival of Arts from 1967 to1977, which was meant to showcase the various forms of music, dance, drama,poetry, and film from western and eastern countries, including traditionalPersian and Iranian Shiite cultures. Thefestival’s extravagance and especially some of the avant-garde westernperformances (which were already controversial by European standards) wereoutright sacrilegious in a country where Islam was the state religion. It would be in 1977, one year before thestart of the revolution, that Ayatollah Khomeini spoke out against the artsfestival, even decrying the clerics in Tehran for not speaking out against theperformances.
Also by 1977, Iran’s decade-long period of strongeconomic growth had ended, and the country faced financial problems because ofan oil glut in the world market. Iran’soil revenues dropped sharply, forcing a cut in oil production and a rise inunemployment. Inflation and commoditiesshortages were met by the government imposing austerity measures, which in turnwere resisted by the general population.
Background of theIranian Revolution Under the Shah, Irandeveloped close political, military, and economic ties with the United States, was firmly West-aligned andanti-communist, and received military and economic aid, as well as purchasedvast amounts of weapons and military hardware from the United States. The Shah built a powerful military, at itspeak the fifth largest in the world, not only as a deterrent against the SovietUnion but just as important, as a counter against the Arab countries(particularly Iraq), Iran’s traditional rival for supremacy in the Persian Gulfregion. Local opposition and dissentwere stifled by SAVAK (Organization of Intelligence and National Security;Persian: Sāzemān-e Ettelā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar), Iran’s CIA-trained intelligence andsecurity agency that was ruthlessly effective and transformed the country intoa police state.
Iran, theworld’s fourth largest oil producer, achieved phenomenal economic growth in the1960s and 1970s and more particularly after the 1973 oil crisis when world oilprices jumped four-fold, generating huge profits for Iran that allowed its government toembark on massive infrastructure construction projects as well as socialprograms such as health care and education. And in a country where society was both strongly traditionalist andreligious (99% of the population is Muslim), the Shah led a government that wasboth secular and western-oriented, and implemented programs and policies thatsought to develop the country based on western technology and some aspects ofwestern culture. Iran’s push to westernize andsecularize would be major factors in the coming revolution. The initial signs of what ultimately became afull-blown uprising took place sometime in 1977.
At the core of the Shiite form of Islam in Iran is the ulama (Islamicscholars) led by ayatollahs (the top clerics) in a religious hierarchy thatincludes other orders of preachers, prayer leaders, and cleric authorities thatadministered the 9,000 mosques around the country. Traditionally, the ulama was apolitical anddid not interfere with state policies, but occasionally offered counsel or itsopinions on government matters and policies.
In January 1963, the Shah launched sweeping major social andeconomic reforms aimed at shedding off the country’s feudal, traditionalistculture and to modernize society. Theseambitious reforms, known as the “White Revolution”, included programs thatadvanced health care and education, and the labor and business sectors. The centerpiece of these reforms, however,was agrarian reform, where the government broke up the vast agriculturelandholdings owned by the landed few and distributed the divided parcels tolandless peasants who formed the great majority of the rural population. While land reform achieved some measure ofsuccess with about 50% of peasants acquiring land, the program failed to winover the rural population as the Shah intended; instead, the deeply religiouspeasants remained loyal to the clergy. Agrarian reform also antagonized the clergy, as most clerics belonged towealthy landowning families who now were deprived of their lands.
Much of the clergy did not openly oppose these reforms,except for some clerics in Qomled by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who in January 22, 1963 denounced the Shahfor implementing the White Revolution; this would mark the start of a longantagonism that would culminate in the clash between secularism and religionfifteen years later. The clerics alsoopposed other aspects of the White Revolution, including extending votingrights to women and allowing non-Muslims to hold government office, as well asbecause the reforms would reduce the cleric’s influence in education and familylaw. The Shah responded to AyatollahKhomeini’s attacks by rebuking the religious establishment as beingold-fashioned and inward-looking, which drew outrage from even moderateclerics. Then on June 3, 1963, AyatollahKhomeini launched personal attacks on the Shah, calling the latter “a wretched,miserable man” and likening the monarch to the “tyrant” Yazid I (an Islamiccaliph of the 7th century). The governmentresponded two days later, on June 5, 1963, by arresting and jailing the cleric.
Ayatollah Khomeini’s arrest sparked strong protests thatdegenerated into riots in Tehran, Qom, Shiraz,and other cities. By the third day, theviolence had been quelled, but not before a disputed number of protesters werekilled, i.e. government cites 32 fatalities, the opposition gives 15,000, andother sources indicate hundreds.
Ayatollah Khomeini was released a few months later. Then on October 26, 1964, he again denouncedthe government, this time for the Iranian parliament’s recent approval of theso-called “Capitulation” Bill, which stipulated that U.S.military and civilian personnel in Iran, if charged with committingcriminal offenses, could not be prosecuted in Iranian courts. To Ayatollah Khomeini, the law was evidencethat the Shah and the Iranian government were subservient to the United States. The ayatollah again was arrested andimprisoned; government and military leaders deliberated on his fate, whichincluded execution (but rejected out of concerns that it might incite moreunrest), and finally decided to exile the cleric. In November 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini wasforced to leave the country; he eventually settled in Najaf, Iraq,where he lived for the next 14 years.
While in exile, the cleric refined his absolutist version ofthe Islamic concept of the “Wilayat al Faqih” (Guardianship of theJurisprudent), which stipulates that an Islamic country’s highest spiritual andpolitical authority must rest with the best-qualified member (jurisprudent) ofthe Shiite clergy, who imposes Sharia (Islamic) Law and ensures that statepolicies and decrees conform with this law. The cleric formerly had accepted the Shah and the monarchy in theoriginal concept of Wilayat al Faqih; later, however, he viewed all forms ofroyalty incompatible with Islamic rule. In fact, the ayatollah would later reject all other (European) forms ofgovernment, specifically citing democracy and communism, and famously declaredthat an Islamic government is “neither east nor west”.
Ayatollah Khomeini’s political vision of clerical rule wasdisseminated in religious circles and mosques throughout Iran from audio recordings thatwere smuggled into the country by his followers and which was tolerated orlargely ignored by Iranian government authorities. In the later years of his exile, however, thecleric had become somewhat forgotten in Iran, particularly among theyounger age groups.
