Army issues Safety of Use Message for polymer rifle magazines

Military.com has a Matt Cox article up titled "In Reversal, Army Bans High Performance Rifle Mags."  In short, the Army's Tank-Automotive Life Cycle Management Command (TACOM) has issued a Safety of Use Message specifically directing the force not to use un-approved rifle magazines, including the popular Magpul PMAG.  There are a few errors in the article related to ignorance of the subject which I'll correct, as this article allows me to highlight some common misperceptions about equipment development and the military supply system.

First, though, a disclaimer: I don't have any specific knowledge of the rationale behind the release of this particular Safety of Use Message.  I can and will make some informed speculation based on prior history of working in the rifle business, but my information is dated and may or may not match whatever current reasoning is.  We'll all have to wait for TACOM or PEO-Soldier to respond to Military.com's queries to see if more details are forthcoming.  Until then, some corrections ...

To begin, the article's title is eye-catching but misleading.  Since the Army never approved the use of the specific magazines in question (the Magpul PMAGs), it could never have reversed itself by banning the magazines.  The authorized, qualified accessories the Army has for each of its weapons are listed in the weapon's user manual (known colloquially as the "Dash 10", for the "-10 suffix at the end of the item number).  The TACOM statement in the article actually references this.  Just because a product exists does not mean that it is safe and certified for use with a weapon (and, conversely, just because a product is not listed does not mean that it is unsafe or unsuitable, just that it has not been tested and qualified).  Since the PMAG is not listed in the -10, it is not approved for use -- despite being commercialy available.

What, then, about the fact that the magazine was assigned a National Stock Number (NSN), which allows it to be ordered through military supply channels?  In point of fact, it is a common misconception that NSNs equate to approved, qualified products.  Multiple agencies use and assigne NSNs, not just the Army -- in fact the majority assigned to commercial products used in the defense sector are assigned by the Defense Logistics Agency.  Getting an NSN assigned to an item is a relatively simple process, and it lends the appearance that an item is qualified, but it means nothing more than that the item can be purchased.  

All of the services use the NSN system to buy parts and equipment, as do many other government agencies.  In many cases a product can be approved by one Federal agency for use, while not being approved by another agency for similar use.  This is quite common in the government small arms business, as every service plus SOCOM has its own separate small arms development and procurement arm, as does the Coast Guard, the CIA, and several Department of Justice organizations like the FBI.  Given different requirements, different uses, and different procuring agencies it is very easy for it to appear that an item is intended for all uses when in reality it may only be intended for a specific niche application. (For example, I know of one lubricating product that obtained an NSN as a "general purpose oil" -- like a 3-in-1 product for lubricating squeaky hinges -- whose manufacturer then marketed it to troops as a weapon lubricant, using the fact that the product had an NSN to encourage troops to order it, even though the product was never qualified for weapon use.  Units just saw the NSN and assumed the product was qualified.)

In many ways, the situation is like aftermarket parts support in the auto industry.  The vehicle OEM selects and qualifies certain components that they use on the vehicle, which will typically be referenced int he vehicle maintenance manual with a specific part number.  This does not stop the aftermarket from producing a large variety of products to perform the same or similar tasks, with different tradeoffs, and listing them for sale with their own part numbers.  The OEM does not go out and qualify every aftermarket shock absorber on their vehicle, and those aftermarket parts could be better or worse than the OEM component.  The difference, of course, is one of risk -- one would hope that aftermarket weapon parts in war time perform at least as well as the "OEM" component.

When in doubt, troops are supposed to be trained to use their technical manuals as reference -- but they are suceptible to marketing, just like civilian customers.  Army units have their own credit cards, and often buy products directly from companies or through Government Service Adminstration catalogs -- I suspect that most of the PMAGs in service were not "issued", per se, but were direct-purchased by individual units.  There's a preception that there's some big bureaucracy that controls everything a unit gets supplied; that may have been true in World War II but that is not the case any more.  It's also possible that rapid acquisition authorities like the Rapid Equipping Force bought a small number for units on an experimental basis, but REF products are just that -- rapid equipping -- and until transitioned are not supported as "qualified" items.

The article references use of the product by the 75th Ranger Regiment, among others -- and I personally witnessed multiple soldiers from different units using PMAGs during my last deployment to Afghanistan.  That does not mean that the items were issued or formally supported -- and in fact, rifle magazines are only issued with the initial issue of a weapon; subsequent replacements are up to the unit to use the supply system, and they can just as easily choose to buy a different type of magazine from a different source rather than use approved channels.  They aren't supposed to, particularly for weapon parts, but it does happen as there is frankly minimal oversight of small unit purchases. In the Rangers' case, they are able to draw on SOCOM equipment that regular Army units are not autorized.  It is possible (though doubtful) that the PMAG is qualified for SOCOM use as part of the SOPMOD program; because of the multiple small arms development agencies and the byzantine ways that safety certifications work it's quite common for Army SOF units to be allowed to use a piece of equipment that regular Army units can't.

Does this mean the Magpul product is bad?  Not necessarily -- until we known the details behind the SOUM, it may only mean that the PMAG has not been appropriately qualified for use, so the Army doesn't know for a fact that the product is good or bad, and is erring on the side of caution by releasing the SOUM.

In fact, I know the Army assessed very similar products to PMAG on at least one occasion, back in the 2003-2004 timeframe.  When I first joined the Infantry Center's Small Arms Division in 2004, part of my initial inbrief at the ARDEC at Picatinny included the work they were doing on an improved rifle magazines -- the magazine design the Cox article claims was developed after the 2007 "dust test", but which in fact had been around for at least three years at that point.  ARDEC was also doing an assessment of multiple polymer magazine designs (in part because the XM8 program used a polymer mag; in part because they were just looking at better options).  The assessment then was that there were not any suitable polymer magazines available; all of the ones that had been tested tended to break in drop testing, particularly in cold temperature drop testing.  Now, I don't know for certain that PMAG has this flaw, but if it does it could be cause for concern during Afghan winters.  

Magazine maintenance was a common problem in units I later visited -- most would keep using worn and damaged magazines far past the point where they should have been replaced, some times through ignorance, sometimes through lack of maintenance discipline. 

(On the "official" improved magazine -- this is accurately referenced in the Cox article as the "improved follower", which is tan in color, replacing an older green design.  The fact that the follower design contributed to weapon misfeeds had been known since at least 2003, and had surfaced during some extended lubricant testing that was going on at the time -- testing that also resulted in a separate SOUM directing units to replace their weapon extractor springs with the so-called "golden" extractor spring from the M4A1.  The old follower -- the follower for the uninitiated is the platform in the magazine that the bullet rides on that is pushed upward by a spring within the magazine -- had unequal length legs riding in the magazine guide grooves, and the shorter front leg could cause uneven feeding and even jam in place.  The new design, tinted tan to be able to tell it apart, had equal length legs that did not suffer from this failure mode.  We provided a number of prototypes to the Infantry Training Brigade at Ft Benning in the fall of 2004 for some informal feedback, reasoning that those weapons got a lot of use, and the feedback was positive.  Why the magazines took five years to subsequently get to the field -- I was involved in getting tens of thousands of improved magazines pushed out from where they were languishing at Bagram during my tour there, simply because units did not know the improved product was on hand to requisition -- is anyone's guess.  Personally, I'd speculate that other distractions *cough*XM8*cough* in the 2004-2006 timeframe kept PEO Soldier from aggressively pursuing M4-related improvements, but I do not know that for a fact.  Like any weapon-related component, safety qualification always takes more time and money than you would think.)

So what is the impact of the SOUM?  A Safety of Use Message is one of the ways the Life Cycle Management Commands use to communicate materiel or maintenance issues to the field -- the other very common method being a Maintenance Advisory Message, or MAM.  A SOUM carries significant weight because it requires commanders to both take action (which could be mean anything from conducting an inspection to replacing a part) and then subsequently reply back through the chain of command that the required action has taken place.  Other communication methods are more routine and channel their confirmation through maintenance channels rather than command channels.  Why exactly the choice of a SOUM requires further explanation from the issuing agency -- it would typically be the program manager's call, so via PEO Soldier or the PM for Soldier Weapons -- but the use of the SOUM indicates the desire to get unit commander's involved rather than leave the issue for the supply and maintenance system.  It is a significant decision to issue a SOUM -- it's not a decision TACOM would make lightly.

Hopefully this article provides a bit more background on the processes surrounding this particular problem.  I wish I could answer the key question -- does this action remove an important capability from the hands of soldiers? -- but that is data only the government can provide.  Knowing the weight that is put behind making the decision to issue a SOUM, I suspect, but cannot confirm, that there's some significant data supporting the decision.