The cadre: Thinking outside the box about how rotation affects operations

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By
Andrew Person

Best
Defense department of personnel-as-policy affairs

After
over a decade spent fighting in Afghanistan, American officers are still having
their first cups of tea with key Afghan leaders in government, tribes, and
villages. As I argue in a piece I wrote for the Small Wars Journal titled "Getting Past the First Cup of Tea" (available on page 10 at this link), the Lazy Susan
style rotation of American leadership in Afghanistan makes our mission
impossible.

What
would an alternative model look like? If the U.S. had established a
permanent cadre of military leaders on the ground in Afghanistan from the
outset, with the understanding that they would serve there for the duration of
the war, these leaders could have built the personal relationships and
knowledge required to effectively wage a counterinsurgency campaign. Viewing the past ten years of the war with 20/20 hindsight, it seems clear that
such an approach would have dramatically improved our chances of success.

A
permanent cadre of American leaders would enjoy a number of advantages over
officers serving on year-long rotations through Afghanistan. Those who have
waged counterinsurgency in Afghanistan know that every village and valley has
its own cast of characters whom it would take years to truly understand. The cadre
could come to understand this complex and foreign human terrain. To hand over
security responsibility to the Afghan government, you have to know who can be
trusted to use their power wisely and effectively. And if you're building up a
security force or constructing a road without the intimate understanding of how
such actions are impacting the human terrain, you can't really know whether
such actions are advancing or undermining your mission. This knowledge takes
years to develop, and thus most American leaders rotating on a yearly basis
have not achieved a sufficient familiarity with the human terrain to
effectively execute their mission.

It
takes trust for an Afghan to risk Taliban retribution by working with U.S.
forces -- a trust that is nearly impossible to establish over the course of a
year-long tour. Over the years, Afghan leaders could come to know and trust the
permanent cadre. A deeper relationship of trust would open up communication
between Americans and Afghans, improving intelligence sharing and helping
Americans protect Afghan villages from Taliban reprisals. Further,
Afghans would know that cheating or lying to permanent cadre could risk poisoning
a valuable relationship over the long term. As it is now, some duplicitous
Afghans have a fresh crop of Americans to tee-off on every year.

The
men and women who volunteer to serve in such a permanent cadre would by
definition be an exceptional and unusual breed. They would have few commitments
back home and could immerse themselves completely in the mission. The cadre
would develop strong language skills and not be dependent on contracted
translators. They would not worry about getting back to base to Skype with
their loved ones and wouldn't be marking time until their year-long rotation is
over. Unlike the current system, there would be no incentive to kick problems
down the road.

Now,
on to the mechanics of how the permanent leadership cadre would function. The
cadre would have a loose internal hierarchical structure with the highest
echelon reporting directly to the top military commander in Afghanistan. It
would have absolute command over military operations in Afghanistan, down to the
battalion level. No U.S. entity -- special operations and CIA included -- could
operate in the cadre's area of responsibility without its complete knowledge
and approval. 

Battalions
would fall in under the cadre's command for year-long rotations. A
non-cadre garrison commander would train and equip battalions to ready them for
battle and a change of command would be carried out upon approved inspection in
Afghanistan. The cadre would have authority to hire and fire company,
platoon, and squad leadership and could send an entire battalion back to
garrison if not up to standard. Platoon and company leadership would compete
to take the limited number of cadre positions that opened up.

While
on patrol, the cadre would enjoy easy access to a variety of key combat
enablers which would demonstrate their authority to the Afghans with whom they
work. An AC-130 gunship would escort every night patrol. A-10s would
escort day patrols. The cadre would have helicopter gunships available on any
moment's notice. It would have lift at all times. If there were not
enough lift to satisfy the cadre's demand, then the U.S. commander in Afghanistan
would immediately proceed to Congress to testify that more damn helicopters are
needed in Afghanistan. These enablers are expensive but they're worth the
price. When Afghans see them, they would know that cadre members can come and
go as they please on a moment's notice, and that they can call massive fire
support to come raining in from the sky. The cadre would be the
personification of American power.

Could
America really find men and women interested in such a brutally long
assignment? By offering certain incentives we could attract a number of
military leaders for such duty. Members of the cadre would have the peace
of mind knowing they never have to command in a garrison environment and never
have to do a battalion fun run or worry about where their PT reflector belt is.
Cadre leadership could be shielded from paperwork and random one-star generals
"circulating the battlefield." The cadre could be offered generous
compensation based on this general rule of thumb: Double the pay of any general
in garrison who can't pass a PT test. A special IG for overpaid and overweight
Pentagon Generals could monitor and enforce the rule. Of course, the cadre
would be offered periodic vacations from theater to rest and recover.

The
draw of prestige and power would also attract volunteers for the cadre. It's
remarkable what young men go through to earn a ranger tab or join the Navy
SEALs. A cadre post could conceivably grow to become much more coveted by
ambitious and dedicated young leaders.

There
are countless details required to implement such a proposal that I have yet to
consider, particularly how this structure would work with an international
force. The risk of cadre leaders going off the rails Colonel
Kurtz-style must be acknowledged and mitigated. But one fact is abundantly
clear to anyone who has ever served in Afghanistan: The annual rotation of
leaders in Afghanistan is fatal to our mission. If we ever try to do this
again, we should give serious consideration to an alternative model.

J. Andrew Person served as a U.S. Army
officer and paratrooper from 2001-2006, including year-long tours in Iraq and
Afghanistan. He is now a fellow with the Truman National Security Project and
works on Capitol Hill. This essay is intended as a thoughtful piece and has
no connection to his day job.