The Service Academies: Either Toughen Them Back Up or Close Them Down

As someone who experienced Plebe Summer and Plebe Year at the Naval Academy, and the close relative of someone who did 18 years earlier when both were much tougher, I can say with confidence that those currently in charge of evaluating it, and the programs of the other service academies, are clueless idiots. Why? Consider this:

“The training environment and overall climate at the academies are undermining their ability to prevent harmful behavior,” Elizabeth Foster, executive director of the Pentagon’s Office of Force Resiliency, said Thursday. “Unless some of these more structural and foundational issues are addressed within the training environment, these problems are going to persist.”

What are the “structural and foundational issues”? This:

Each of the service academies uses some form of a “Fourth Class System” where second- or third-year cadets or midshipmen are the primary trainers for incoming freshmen, sometimes referred to as “new cadets” or plebes. But the Pentagon researchers said the older students don’t have the maturity or experience to act as suitable mentors.

And this:

“The peer leadership structure is actually creating unhealthy power dynamics that lead to hazing that further exacerbates this risk,” said Andra Tharp, senior prevention adviser for the Defense Department’s Office of Force Resiliency.

The active-duty military officers assigned to the individual cadet or midshipmen units were often seen more as disciplinarians than mentors, the Pentagon researchers said.

“They didn’t know when or how to prioritize a cadet or midshipman’s well-being over discipline,” Ms. Tharp said

Talk about people unclear on the concept. The system at the academies has nothing to do with “mentorship.” It is about training officers and leaders. The system is set up for learning-by-doing. When you are a plebe, you are learning to take orders, to observe military discipline, and to structure your life in a military environment that is completely alien to the environment in which you grew up. You are also learning to lead by watching others–and in many cases, learning from their mistakes.

And the “hazing”–which is a shadow now of what it was 46 years ago which was already a shadow of what it had been in my uncle’s day–also has a purpose. Several purposes. It helps identify who really wants to be there. It melts the snowflakes who can’t hack it. It provides a jarring separation from your civilian life–which is essential. It tests and develops your ability to think and act under pressure. It reveals and develops your toughness–especially mental toughness.

When you enter the 3rd class (a “Youngster” at Navy, sophomore in the civilian world) you get very modest leadership responsibilities over some plebes. 2d Class, a little more leadership responsibility. 1st Class, a lot more; and among the 1st Class mids/cadets, there is a hierarchy with ranks, with those holding higher ranks having more leadership responsibility. The 1st Class Mids assigned to Plebe Summer duty have a lot of responsibility and influence.

But it is very much learning by doing. And yes, there are good leaders and bad. There are assholes and sadists. There are also some very good ones. And they get to learn and practice leadership before being thrown into active duty where they will have much greater responsibilities. Some learn from their mistakes and get better. Some don’t.

As an extreme example of bad leaders–and bad humans with rank and responsibility–my bête noire in my 2 years at Navy was a guy named Scott Pickles. Yes–real name. He was always trying to bust my balls. I emphasize “trying” because I was repeatedly able to evade his traps, like the time he thought he had caught me red handed wearing civvies in Annapolis, and I pointed him to the reg saying that those with a leave address inside the 7 mile limit (measured from the Chapel Dome) could wear civvies, and telling him to look at my leave chit–which indicated a leave address at St. John’s College across the street from the Academy (where a high school friend attended and in whose room I crashed).

But he evidently had some complex about me, and a few of my buddies, and was always trying to screw with us. (I have theories why.) He was a failure as a leader, and the system at Navy gave him an opportunity to learn and overcome, but he didn’t.

His failure wasn’t due to the system. It was him. His personality. I always thought he was a werido and indeed a sicko, and years later I thought it was a tragedy that my roommate didn’t carry through on his threat to throw Pickles out our 4th story window when the latter threw a tantrum when inspecting our room. Why a tragedy? Because he killed his wife and 3 kids in their sleep after failing as a lawyer. (His outrageous and disgusting acts are why I do not hesitate calling him out by name.)

So yeah. A sicko. If the system failed, it was for not recognizing that he was a sicko.

And that’s the flaw I see in the system. Once you get past 3rd class year, if you keep up your grades and don’t get demerits, they turn you loose on the fleet (or the Army or AF) even if you’ve proved to be a bad human being with toxic leadership traits. Conditioning commissioning on a realistic appraisal of leadership performance, rather than rubber stamping a Scott Pickles with a 2.5 GPA, would turn the alleged liabilities of the system into an asset. You can’t pass “Wires”–you’re gone. The same should hold for demonstrated unfitness for leadership–which the system gives every opportunity to demonstrate.

That would turn the alleged flaws identified by the Pentagon minders into a real strength.

I would also say that being exposed to bad leaders at an academy is valuable training in itself. You will come across bad leaders as an officer. Knowing how to identify them and deal with them is a skill in itself.

And yes, company officers (the commissioned officers referred to in the last quoted paragraph) are in charge of discipline. You can’t realistically “mentor” 100+ mids/cadets, let alone be their therapist and ensure their “well-being.” And again, in the force, your superiors are not going to be your caretaker either: you have to learn a lot of self-reliance, and it’s far better to do that at an academy than when you have a billet that could require sending people to die. Further, the commissioned officers are not supposed to pre-empt the learning-by-doing leadership system.

The very fact that the Pentagon has an Office of Force Resiliency fretting about plebes getting yelled at tells you a lot about today’s US military.

The ostensible reason for these criticisms of the academies is “a ‘disturbing and unacceptable’ recent rise in reported sexual attacks and sexual harassment at the nation’s leading service academies.” The Pentagon fretters claim that this is due to the nature of the training system.

I will definitely not minimize the severity of sexual assault. But I have to say that this assertion of a causal link is almost wholly unsubstantiated, at least based on this article. Women have been at the academies since 1976-7. If anything, the environment was more “toxic” (by the fretters’ definition) then than now–as I can personally attest. So how could the system cause a “recent rise” in such (reported) incidents? When a background condition remains the same or gets better, it is not plausible to attribute changes in other variables to it.

I therefore think that the fretters have totally misdiagnosed the problem, and hence are recommending a quack cure.

I am also curious about how recent is recent. Like, did it coincide with COVID, when life at the academies was much more restrictive, mids/cadets were in much more constant contact than before, normal stress relieving activities–and fun activities–were almost eliminated, and life in general (for everyone, not just academy students) was highly stressful?

Also, what is the control group here? I recollect that there are also claims of increasing rates of reported sexual assault and harassment at civilian colleges and universities, which could reflect a higher incidence, or a greater willingness to report, or both. Are the academies outliers relative to these? Or is this reflective of broader social trends, unrelated to venerable academy training regimens?

Look. I obviously didn’t find a career as a naval officer attractive–I punched out of the Academy after my 3rd class year, despite the attempt of the Superintendent (a 3 star admiral and Medal of Honor winner, William P. Lawrence) to talk me out of it. I put up with the Mickey Mouse, but I understood the point. I learned from it. The Office of Force Resiliency, not so much.

I actually think the choice is binary. Either retain the existing system (and even revert to the way it was years ago, rather than softening it more than it has been softened already), or closing the academies altogether. I think a strong case can be made for the latter option. That case is all the stronger if the fretters get their way. The system they envisage is basically ROTC with uniforms 24/7, at a vastly higher cost. What’s the point of that?