Another path to airpower: Creating the militia U.S. Air Force of the 21st century

By Luke Ahmann

Best Defense
guest skywalker

The United States Air Force recently
announced its new policy for strategic guidance, given the constrained
resources available: their answer is to trade size for quality. The
current AF is unaffordable. The new AF will be "smaller but superb."1 This sounds good
on paper, but the reality is that a smaller AF may not be able to meet the
surge requirements dictated by unpredictable future threats.

Another solution is to create a more cost
effective AF. Instead of trading size for quality, why not create the most robust, quality AF
that the nation can afford? Why not create a force "capable of deterring and
defeating aggression...in one region even when...committed to a large-scale
operation elsewhere," as defined by the January 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance?2 A return to the militia construct historically founded in our Constitution promises to provide the nation an ability to create such a force.

The Reserve Component (RC) of the AF has
"been transformed, both practically and philosophically, from a strategic force
of last resort to and operational reserve that provides full-spectrum
capability to the nation."3 The RC is an integral
piece of our nation's AF, as we prepare the force of the future, it must be an
integral part of the solution.

The AF will say that a recent RAND study
determined that a full time force is cheaper than a part time force. Really? Cost analysis is only as valid as the assumptions put into them: Change the assumptions, and you change the outcome. Cost studies alone
are typically operating on the margin and lack the macro vision for a true
total force of the future. Absent from the discussion is the long term
value, as well as the ability to "shelf" unneeded surge capability should it be
needed in the future.

The RC provides long term value and an
ability to maintain surge capacity at a fraction of the cost of active
forces. The RC is able to operate and maintain aircraft at 70 percent of the
cost of its active counterparts.4 Recent studies show that RC units cost 25-33 percent less than comparable active units.5 A RC airman
costs, on average, only 38 percent of an active airman.6 The RC can
operate and maintain aircraft AND employ airmen more cost effectively. Creating
a smaller active force, while simultaneously shrinking the portion of the force
in the RC (as currently proposed by the AF), does not take advantage of our nation's militia construct that can provide more capacity for the same cost.
A heavier reliance on the RC does.

The primary arguments against expanding the RC and shrinking the
active forces are that: (1) the RC cannot maintain readiness, and (2) the
RC is not as accessible as the active force. These
are red herrings. Within the AF, the RC is trained and evaluated
to the same standard as active counterparts, yields similar results in
operational inspections, and performs seamlessly in combat. Additionally, the
RC maintains more operational experience in technical fields due to lower
turnover rates. Accessibility of RC is not a structural problem, but a
funding problem. Approximately 70 percent of the RC is part time. In order
to employ them in a full-time status, the AF must pay them. In order to
pay them, the AF must re-allocate a portion of the baseline budget away from
the active force and toward the use of the RC.

The AF has it wrong: It does not have
to trade size for quality. The preceding decade has developed a RC within
the AF fully capable of producing quality air and space power at a reduced
cost. The RC costs less, and therefore, the American taxpayer can protect
the trillions of dollars invested in AF people and equipment by shifting more
toward the RC. Implementing AF proposals to shrink the RC does not take
advantage of the proven cost effective militia construct founded in our nation's heritage. What is best for our nation's AF? An affordable AF
that can execute the mission. Expanding the RC provides such a force.

1. USAF
Force Structure Changes: Sustaining Readiness and Modernizing the Total
Force, February 2012, page 1

2. Sustaining
U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012

3. Comprehensive
Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component, Volume I, 5 April 2011,
page 1

4. FY11
Budget Rollout Brief, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100201-054.pdf

5. LtCol
Mark Valentine, Call up the
Reserves

6. FY11
Budget Rollout Brief, http://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100201-054.pdf

Luke Ahmann has served in both active and
reserve components of the US Air Force, most recently as an F-16 Fighter
Squadron Commander. He is currently a national security fellow at the
Harvard Kennedy School. He holds a BS from the United States Air Force
Academy and an MBA from Bentley University.