With Cameos by I.J. Good and Carnap; Felix Oppenheim vs Leo Strauss, pt 2.

(C) Non-Cognitivism and Value-Commitments. Non-cognitivism does not maintain that value-words, even in the intrinsic sense, are meaningless, but only that they have normative, evaluative, directive, rather than cognitive meaning. Natural law theorists are therefore mistaken when they claim, as e.g., Leo Strauss does, that the denial of natural law implies "the prohibition against value judgments in social science," (p. 50) [note to: Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), p. 52.]

....

(d) Non-Cognitivism and Rational Choice. Some natural law theorists have reacted to this as follows: admittedly, non-cognitivism does not deny cognitive status to extrinsic value-judgments or to other empirical statements but only to intrinsic value-judgments. Admittedly also, the denial of natural law neither precludes value-commitments nor entails any particular normative system. However, if valuations are but the expression of subjective value-feelings, all preferences are therefore capricious, all choices irrational, and all behavior irresponsible. Thus, according to Leo Strauss, the denial of natural law implies that

we cannot have any knowledge regarding the ultimate principles of our choices, i.e. regarding their soundness or unsoundness; our ultimate principles have no other support than our arbitrary and hence blind preferences.... We cannot live any more as responsible beings. [Note to: Leo Strauss, op. cit., pp. 4, 6.]

And John Wild criticizes the "extreme irrationalism" of the

noncognitive or emotive theory of ethics which reduces the whole phenomenon of obligation to the subjective compulsion of raw appetite or desire.

To deny the natural law thesis is not to deny that the criteria of rationality are applicable to choosing and acting as well as to thinking. Conversely, rational decision-making does not presuppose that intrinsic value-judgments have cognitive status. It would be paradoxical indeed, if rational behavior depended on belief in a mistaken epistemological theory.

To make a rational choice," the decision-maker must predict the consequences of each of the alternative courses of action open to him in a given situation. His decision will be rational provided these anticipations are based on the total evidence available to him. Such predictions are, of course, true only with a certain degree of probability, and a decision may be rational, yet unsuccessful, and vice versa. -Felix E. Oppenheim,  "The Natural Law Thesis: Affirmation or Denial?." American Political Science Review 51.1 (1957): p. 52

This post originates in my interest in finding critical engagements with Leo Strauss within analytic philosophy in the post-WWII era (triggered by (recall here; here; here; especially this one; and here) an invite by Sander Verhaegh). So, following up on a recent post (recall) I am interested in Felix Oppenheim's criticism of Leo Strauss. To the best of my knowledge, Oppenheim was one of the few and probably most prominent political philosophers working within analytic philosophy (alongside, perhaps, Margaret Macdonald and Thomas Dewar Weldon) in the 1940s and 50s. (Oppenheim lived until 2011, and his distinguished career continued well beyond these years.)

As I noted, in 1955 Oppenheim criticized Strauss for claiming that relativism about values leads to nihilism. Oppenheim and Strauss agree that in Oppenheim's relativism, the principles of our actions our bases on ungrounded preferences. (The ground for Strauss has to be something like the PSR.) And, Strauss argues (down a rather quick slippery slope), in virtue of these preferences lacking a proper ground, we cannot truly believe in them -- they become, as it were, random for ourselves, and so when we act on them we are, in a sense, play-acting or inauthentic, and -- more important -- we "cannot live...as responsible beings."

In 1955, Oppenheim understands Strauss' criticism as a psychological thesis. And so he refutes it by way of empirical-historical evidence. This also shows he is unconcerned by it because he understand his own moral relativism as an epistemological thesis.

Even if one is utterly unmoved by Strauss's argument (which is expressed rather concisely), it's pretty clear that Oppenheim has misjudged it. Strauss' claim is not a contribution to psychology, but existential. And the fact that that Strauss thinks our preferences lack ground means that for him they are fundamentally unexplained from the perspective of rationality. (This is why I initially guessed he is relying on the PSR here for argumentative purposes.)* So, Strauss's position is much more related to epistemology than Oppenheim allows.

I suspect Oppenheim himself felt something akin to the problem I have just diagnosed because in his 1957 APSR article, he returns to the debate with Strauss and quoted (in redacted form) the same passages as he did in 1955. But he offers a new response.

The response is basically Humean in character, although (following the authority of  I. J. Good: 1967) I think Oppenheim's terminology is ultimately derived from Carnap's 1947 ("On the Application of Inductive Logic.") Judging by Oppenheim's (1950) "Rational Choice" (published in JPhil), Carnap's 1950 book, Logical Foundations of Probability (which incorporates material from the 1947 article) was his source (see p. 343, note 3  in Oppenheim 1950). And, in fact, in the passage quoted from his 1957 APSR article above, Oppenheim is basically drawing on his own account of rational choice (e.g., "To arrive at a rational decision, it is sufficient to make warranted predictions about the significant effects of one's significant alternative potential actions." It's in his discussion of warrant that Oppenheim (1950) reflects on Carnap's account of total evidence, which he modifies slightly for his own purposes.)

I am going to ignore how compelling Oppenheim's view of rational choice is. Although it's notable  how thin the view is; there is no requirement here of internal consistency at a time or over time. It's not even obvious we're dealing with a species of instrumental rationality (because the predictions are in no way connected to the arbitrary preferences or principles on which choices are founded). Having said that, and glancing at his 1950 article, I am assuming that Oppenheimer is assuming a kind of instrumental rationality here, and that he intends to be describing how preferences can be satisfied in light of evidence and knowledge. 

What's important for present purposes about Oppenheim's new response to Strauss is that he blocks the claim that choices founded on ungrounded preferences are arbitrary altogether. They are now constrained by evidence and how it relates to genuine possibilities and one's knowledge of these (since they are based on predictions). In addition, these actions can be intelligible in an important way because a spectator (who becomes privy to the evidence and knowledge used) may well predict and perhaps even understand the choices made. In fact, this is really Oppenheim's point. He wants (looking ahead to his book Dimensions of Freedom) to provide conceptual tools for empirical science. And he understands his position as "an extrinsic value-judgment, namely the empirical hypothesis: whenever you want to bring about the state of affairs which, under the circumstances, will be most valuable (or least disvaluable) to you, apply the rules of rational decision-making." (53)

The Straussian rejoinder is not hard to guess. Such predictable choices or instrumental rationality in the serves of ungrounded or arbitrary ends may well exhibit a species of madness/sociopathy or evil. (That's to say the nihilism charge has not been blocked.) So, I doubt that a Straussian would be very impressed by  Oppenheimer's follow up. This is not to claim that a position like Oppenheimer's cannot be salvaged, but that's for another occassion.

PS You may wonder why I am ignoring the first quoted passage,  (C), above. To the best of my knowledge Oppenheim quotes Strauss out of context. In context Strauss is criticizing Weber's account of the separation of facts and values. 

 

*I put it like that because I actually hold that Strauss is himself a kind of skeptic.