Some reflections on the Vietnam War after visiting where my battalion was cut off and surrounded near Hue during Tet '68

By Charles Krohn

Best Defense department
of Vietnam War analysis

I found the place where we buried 11
U.S. soldiers in February 1968, improving chances of my battalion escaping
encirclement undetected. Despite expectations of some traumatic
flashbacks, I found the experience more provocative than distressful.



I thought about our dead soldiers and former comrades, but my sorrow hasn't
changed from then until now. Time and distance seem irrelevant.



Reflecting later at the hotel in Hue
with the Red Flag flying in the background from the Citadel, I thought about
how much the Vietnam I knew during Tet '68 changed physically. Maybe it
changed other ways as well, or perhaps I was too unsophisticated then
to see the Vietnamese as I do now. One thing's for sure: The nuances
have changed completely. Not only are there no Americans on the roads, in the
air or in the fields, doing what Americans do, the Vietnamese seem
perfectly in control of their own destinies. Maybe they were then too, but
we were too driven to notice. Accomplishing the mission was everything.



This makes me think about the American Way of War -- maybe best expressed as "you
move over, we're taking over." Despite our good intentions, sometimes I think
our various invasions are unwise, unproductive, and indecisive. If we had
provided material assistance, I suspect the South Vietnamese would have made a
good showing of themselves without our fighting the fight for them or looking
over their shoulder to make sure they were following our doctrine, rather than
their indigenous impulses.



Portraying the Ia Drang fight as a success for our side and an NVA failure may
be one of the greatest mistakes in the history of warfare. But it set the pace,
for better or worse. Westmoreland was wrong about pinning his hopes for victory
on body counts and attrition, because the end result was to strengthen the
North Vietnamese while sapping the strength of our allies in the South. Simply
put, I ride with Sorley when he makes the argument that Westy's strategy
dragged us backward in time. The only thing to celebrate about the battle
at Ia Drang was valor.



Given Westmoreland's strategy, our response to Tet '68 was predictable, and
perhaps the choices were few, but the die was already cast.

Even now we are trying to influence outcomes in Afghanistan by sending in
more trainers. Is this effective or does Afghanistan merely accept our
presence to leverage the resources we provide in hopes of stabilizing Karzai's
government in Kabul? 

Looking back, I think the way we entered the Vietnam War was horribly flawed
by hubris, perhaps a defining American quality, and perhaps connected to notions of
exceptionalism. Surely the way Ambassador Bremer tried to manage the fiasco in
Iraq adds weight to this argument. 



Perhaps we invaded Iraq with an insufficient force because size does matter
when one country invades another, especially with plans to rebuild the nation.
But there's something to be said for objectivity and proportionality after the
shock of invasion fades.



Looking around me now, I see the Vietnamese building their country with energy
unparalleled in my experience. I doubt Ho Chi Minh had any influence over
the destiny of the country, other than to unite it. My private wish is that I had
the historical depth to compare the final outcome of our civil war with
theirs. 

Charles A. Krohn is the author of  The Lost Battalion of Tet . Now retired to Panama
City Beach, Florida, he
served in Iraq in 2003-2004 as public affairs adviser to the director of the
Infrastructure Reconstruction Program, and later as public affairs officer for
the American Battle Monuments Commission.