July 28, 1942 – World War II: Stalin issues the infamous “Not one step back!” order
On July 25, 1942, German ArmyGroup A crossed the lower Don and then spread out and advanced south in a120-mile front from the Sea of Azov to Zymlianskaya, meeting only lightresistance from rear guards of the Soviet Southern Front. By this time, the Red Army had become waryfrom again being caught up in the Wehrmacht’s encirclement strategy that hadannihilated many Soviet armies in the previous year.
In late July 1942, theGermans cut the rail line linking the Caucasus to central Russia, which soalarmed Stalin that he issued Order 227, which contained the famous “Not onestep back!” command to Soviet forces to hold all current frontlines, and whichlater contributed to the outcome in the battle for Stalingrad.
(Taken from Invasion of the Soviet Union – Wars of the 20th Century – World War II in Europe: Vol. 6)
However, in southern Russia,German Army Group A made rapid progress, taking Salsk on July 31, Stavropol onAugust 5, and Maikop on August 9, by then reaching the northern foothills ofthe Caucasus Mountains, some 300 miles fromits starting point in just two weeks. German commandos reached Groznyone day earlier, but were unable to prevent the retreating Red Army fromdestroying the oil installations, which German engineers later estimated wouldtake one year to return to service. Mount Elbrus,the 18,000-foot highest peak of the Caucasus,also was reached, this “stunt” as Hitler called it so infuriating him that hethreatened to court martial the commander of the German 1st MountainDivision who had authorized the climb.
By early September 1942, theGerman 11th and 17th Armies and Romanian 3rdArmy, advancing along the Black Sea coast, had captured the Taman Peninsulaand the Soviet naval bases there, including Novorossiyk, but attempts toadvance further south to Tuapse met increasingly strong resistance. In the east, German 1st PanzerArmy took Elista on August 13 and Mozdok on August 25. But operations aimed at Astrakhanin the east and Groznyand its oil fields in the south failed to make major progress. Nalchik wastaken on October 28 and Alagir on November 5, marking the farthest Germanadvances in the Caucasus.
All through its drive to the Caucasus, German Army Group A had experienced severelogistical difficulties from the rail and road supply systems, and sometimeswere forced to abandon its equipment and resource-heavy tanks to continue theadvance. The Luftwaffe often took on theresponsibility of delivering much needed petroleum and supplies to the mostadvanced units. But German planessupporting the Caucasus campaign soon were redeployed in the increasinglyfierce battle for Stalingrad. The Soviet Air Force brought in 800 bombers,and with the Luftwaffe withdrawing from the Caucasus,this allowed the Soviet planes to gain control of the sky. Furthermore, by November 1942, snow had beganto fall and temperatures dropped, signaling the approach of winter, whichpractically ended the prospect of the Axis crossing the remaining 700-miledistance of the Caucasus to oil-rich Baku at the other end against Sovietforces that were dug in along the mountain passes.
By November 1942, Hitlerconceded that the campaign to capture Baku couldnot be achieved before winter set in, and as he and the German High Commandwere by now fully engrossed in the Stalingradbattle, on November 22, he ordered German Army Group A to dig in and hold itslines. Earlier in October 1942, Hitlerordered the destruction of the Grozny and Baku oil facilities, thatif he could not acquire them, then they should likewise be denied to theSoviets. The Grozny oil fields were destroyed by Germanair raids. However, Baku was notattacked, because of strong Soviet air defenses in its oil installations andbecause of the great distance involved, i.e. German bombers could only reachBaku using the most direct (and predictable) route, and thus were vulnerable toSoviet anti-aircraft fire.
Battle of Stalingrad Meanwhile to the north, German ArmyGroup B, tasked with capturing Stalingrad and securing the Volga, began itsadvance to the Don River on July 23,1942. The German advance was stalled byfierce resistance, as the delays of the previous weeks had allowed the Sovietsto fortify their defenses. By then, theGerman intent was clear to Stalin and the Soviet High Command, which thenreorganized Red Army forces in the Stalingradsector and rushed reinforcements to the defense of the Don. Not only was German Army Group B delayed bythe Soviets that had began to launch counter-attacks in the Axis’ northernflank (which were held by Italian and Hungarian armies), but also byover-extended supply lines and poor road conditions.
On August 10, 1942, German 6thArmy had moved to the west bank of the Don, although strong Soviet resistancepersisted in the north. On August 22,German forces established bridgeheads across the Don, which was crossed thenext day, with panzers and mobile spearheads advancing across the remaining 36miles of flat plains to Stalingrad. On August 23, German 14th PanzerDivision reached the Volga River north of Stalingradand fought off Soviet counter-attacks, while the Luftwaffe began a bombingblitz of the city that would continue through to the height of the battle, whenmost of the buildings would be destroyed and the city turned to rubble.
On August 29, 1942, twoSoviet armies (the 62nd and 64th) barely escaped beingencircled by the German 4th Panzer Army and armored units of German6th Army, both escaping to Stalingrad and ensuring that the battlefor the city would be long, bloody, and difficult.
On September 12, 1942, Germanforces entered Stalingrad, starting what wouldbe a four-month long battle. Frommid-September to early November, the Germans, confident of victory, launchedthree major attacks to overwhelm all resistance, which gradually pushed backthe Soviets east toward the banks of the Volga.
By contrast, the Sovietssuffered from low morale, but were compelled to fight, since they had no optionto retreat beyond the Volga because ofStalin’s “Not one step back!” order. Stalin also (initially) refused to allow civilians to be evacuated,stating that “soldiers fight better for an alive city than for a deadone”. He would later allow civilianevacuation after being advised by his top generals.
Soviet artillery from acrossthe Volga and cross-river attempts to bring inRed Army reinforcements were suppressed by the Luftwaffe, which controlled thesky over the battlefield. Even then,Soviet troops and supplies continued to reach Stalingrad,enough to keep up resistance. The ruinsof the city turned into a great defensive asset, as Soviet troops cleverly usedthe rubble and battered buildings as concealed strong points, traps, andkilling zones. To negate the Germans’air superiority, Red Army units were ordered to keep the fighting lines closeto the Germans, to deter the Luftwaffe from attacking and inadvertently causingfriendly fire casualties to its own forces.
The battle for Stalingrad turned into one of history’s fiercest,harshest, and bloodiest struggles for survival, the intense close-quartercombat being fought building-to-building and floor-to-floor, and in cellars andbasements, and even in the sewers. Surprise encounters in such close distances sometimes turned intohand-to-hand combat using knives and bayonets.
By mid-November 1942, theGermans controlled 90% of the city, and had pushed back the Soviets to a smallpocket with four shallow bridgeheads some 200 yards from the Volga. By then, most of German 6th Armywas locked in combat in the city, while its outer flanks had become dangerouslyvulnerable, as they were protected only by the weak armies of its Axispartners, the Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians. Two weeks earlier, Hitler, believingStalingrad’s capture was assured, redeployed a large part of the Luftwaffe tothe fighting in North Africa.
