David Hume, Ibn Khaldun, on Cult of the Leader (and a comment on Hume on race)

I have mentioned parties from affection as a kind of real parties, beside those from interest and principle. By parties from affection, I understand those which are founded on the different attachments of men towards particular families and persons, whom they desire to rule over them. These factions are often very violent; though, I must own, it may seem unaccountable, that men should attach themselves so strongly to persons, with whom they are no wise acquainted, whom perhaps they never saw, and from whom they never received, nor can ever hope for any favour. Yet this we often find to be the case, and even with men, who, on other occasions, discover no great generosity of spirit, nor are found to be easily transported by friendship beyond their own interest. We are apt to think the relation between us and our sovereign very close and intimate. The splendour of majesty and power bestows an importance on the fortunes even of a single person. And when a man���s good-nature does not give him this imaginary interest, his ill-nature will, from spite and opposition to persons whose sentiments are different from his own.--David Hume "Of Parties In General" 

In chapter 2 of The Liberal Archipelago: A Theory of Diversity and Freedom (2003), Chandran Kukathas draws on Hume's essay, "Of Parties in General," to offer an account of the fundamental motives of human nature rooted in a distinction among interest, affection, and principle. For Kukathas principle is key because in his account of liberalism conscience, and so freedom(s) of association, are central to living a life of integrity. (The intended contrast is with liberalism(s) that privileges justice and/or autonomy.) Since I didn't quite recall Hume linking principle to conscience (he doesn't), I decided to re-read Hume's essay. What follows is unmoored from Kukathas' discussion.

Before I get to the paragraph quoted at the top of the post -- it's the closing one in Hume's essay --, I want to call attention to a different paragraph. It is pertinent to the recent, renewed interest in Hume's racism. It is a paragraph that is devoted to illustrating Hume's idea that "Men have such a propensity to divide into personal factions, that the smallest appearance of real difference will produce them." Some of these appearances are  "trivial" (such as "colour of livery" and another "in horse races"). Hume goes on to offer more such examples, including ones that "have begun upon a real difference, continue even after that difference is lost." He then turns to the following example:  

The civil wars which arose some few years ago in Morocco, between the blacks and whites, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a pleasant difference. We laugh at them; but I believe, were things rightly examined, we afford much more occasion of ridicule to the Moors. For, what are all the wars of religion, which have prevailed in this polite and knowing part of the world? They are certainly more absurd than the Moorish civil wars. The difference of complexion is a sensible and a real difference: But the controversy about an article of faith, which is utterly absurd and unintelligible, is not a difference in sentiment, but in a few phrases and expressions, which one party accepts of, without understanding them; and the other refuses in the same manner.

Now, a racialized civic war is, in some sense ridiculous. But Hume's point is that European religious wars are far more ridiculous than an ethnic civic war. And the reason for Hume's point is that European civil wars are, at bottom, rooted in disputes over unintelligible disagreements; whereas for Hume differences in skin color "is a sensible and a real difference."

Now, it is not entirely clear if form Hume there is a further implied contrast between "polite and knowing part of the world," that is civilization, and barbarism here (recall). The reason for my hesitation is that (a) it is possible to read Hume's "polite and knowing part of the world," as dripping with satire (given that people are killing each other over unintelligible principles) and (b) it is possible that here Hume thinks the Moroccan Moors are just as civilized as the Europeans. But on (b) there is evidence to think not because in a companion piece, "Of the Refinement in the Arts," Hume treats "Moor or Tartar," as the barbarous contrast to "civilized" (a word he uses here) "French or English."  So, it seems, then, that Hume think that when 'barbarians' have ethnic warfare this is more intelligible than when civilized have religious warfare.*

Ethnic differences are, then, for Hume real enough. And, in fact, Hume uses the Moorish civil war as an example of a real difference giving rise to differences of affections.+ (I don't think there is historical connection between the current conflict between Morocco and Polisario Front; but happy to be corrected.) And affection can itself be the effect of social differences that have had political significance ("they contract an affection to the persons with whom they are united, and an animosity against their antagonists"). So, affection is a social mechanism that facilitates group loyalty in possibly existing social group(s).**

Of course, some politically salient social groups are themselves rooted in affection, that is attachment to a person or family. Hume here is in the territory usually (recall this post) associated with Ibn Khaldun's discussion of 'Asabiyyah or 'asabiyya (Arabic: ���������������, ���) or group feeling. Humean affection is one of the mechanisms (like sympathy) that generates or facilitates or reinforces group feeling. 

The reason I mention Ibn Khaldun is that he anticipates Hume in noting that in political life, affection as a form of group loyalty presupposes a form of self-subordination that is not obviously rooted in self-interest or even shared principles/conscience and often cannot be truly explained by these. It is clear that Hume thinks that affection may itself be caused by a kind of aesthetic ('splendour') or dramatic identification of the sort we have with Dramatis personae on a stage or a screen. (I think Ibn Khaldun would agree, although he has a tendency to emphasize more the significance of blood-lines/houses.)

Now, crucially, as Hume notes in the passage quoted at the top of this post, Hume is explicit that such attachments, we might call them personality-cults, are generally, or more likely, accompanied by violence. That is to say, if affection is the main source of group loyalty/cohesion, then on Hume's account violence is a more natural byproduct (because un-tempered by interest or principle). I wouldn't be surprised if Hume were thinking of blood feuds among clans. And this points to the other context or reason in which or why affection can turn violent is that in already polarized contexts affection amplifies contrasting life-styles ("spite and opposition to persons whose sentiments are different from his own.")

Now, Hume's own broader interest in his discussion here may well be due to his concern for lingering affection for the Stuarts among Tories and Scottish Highlanders. (This is clear from earlier versions of a companion essay, "Of The Parties Of Great Britain.") So I don't want to suggest his discussion is completely disinterested.

Okay, let me wrap up. One might have thought that as parliamentary regimes evolve and become more democratic with a broader franchise that affection reduces in significance. This is especially so once one is accustomed to see political parties either as aggregation of interests (as Madison and rational choice theory encourages) or as rooted in principle/ideology as (recall; and here) Burke has emphasized. But it is notable that even in the age of mass democracy, and open primaries, democratic political parties themselves give rise to family dynasties (Kennedy, Bush, Gore, Trudeau, Gandhi, etc.). It is an empirical question, that my comparative colleagues may be able answer, to what degree affection increases/decreases with more democratic primaries and selection mechanisms. What Hume alerts us to, is that personality-cults -- I know I have an oblique eye on the news -- may have fewer internal checks on turning violent not just in virtue of the nature of leadership, but also, and perhaps especially, in virtue of the form of identification and self-subordination (and spite toward others) of the followers.

 

 

 

*There is another tricky question lurking here. As is well known Hume has a very dismal picture of the possible intelligence of "negroes." It is unclear to what degree Hume treats "black" Moors as negroes or not.

+To what degree Hume is presupposing familiarity in his readers with the nature and fate of the so-called 'black guard' I leave aside here.

**My alertness to this strain in Hume is due to reading Avital Hazony's excellent dissertation-in-progress on Humean loyalty. To the best of my knowledge she has not engaged with this essay (yet).