Logical Objections to Theism (my chpt in Companion Guide to Atheism and Philosophy)

 

(From A Companion Guide to Atheism and Philosophy - Graham Oppy, Wiley Blackwell, 2019)

Abstract: This chapter looks at a range of objections to theism that one might class as 'logical'. Some of these objections aim to show that theism involves an internal logical contradiction. Others aim to show that theism is at least logically incompatible with other beliefs to which the theist is also typically committed. Also included are objections grounded in the thought that theism is nonsensical or meaningless. The chapter provides both an overview of this broad terrain, including a map of possible responses to different kinds of objection, and then a number of examples

 

Introduction

 

This essay is in two parts. In Part One, I map out several varieties of logical objection to theism, provide some illustrations, and then set out a number of response strategies that may be employed by theists in defence of their belief. In Part Two, I examine in more detail some of the best-known examples of logical objections to theism, including (i) objections associated with the doctrines of divine simplicity, divine personhood, and divine foreknowledge, (ii) the logical problem of evil, and (iii) some verificationist and falsificationist objections.

 

PART ONE: A MAP OF THE TERRAIN

 

By theism I mean belief in an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being. Of course, these are not the only attributes associated with God. Many insist that God is, in some sense, simple. Many also require that God be a person - an agent who acts (in creating the universe ex nihilo, for example) and with whom one might enter into a personal relationship.

 

There are a variety of arguments that I think might reasonably be included under the title 'logical objections to theism'. I will categorise them as internal, external, and nonsense objections.

 

Internal objections

 

If someone claims to have discovered in the rainforests of Brazil a triangle possessing not three but four sides, mathematicians won't mount an expensive expedition to confirm whether or not that object exists. We can know, from the comfort of our armchairs, that there is no such thing. A triangle is, by definition, three-sided. To assert that there exists a triangle that is not three-sided is therefore to involve yourself in a straightforward logical contradiction, and contradictions cannot be true            Life is often a kind of death
            The ordinary is extraordinary

Such sentences are interpretable in all sorts of ways and can easily appear profound. In George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, two of the three slogans of the Party have a similarly contradictory character:

            War is peace
            Freedom is slavery
            Ignorance is strength

 

If you are an aspiring guru, the attraction of making such contradictory remarks is two-fold. First, they make your audience do the intellectual labour for you. You can sit back, adopt a sage-like expression, and let your disciples figure out what you mean. Secondly, such remarks are interpretable in numerous ways. This gives you enormous wiggle room if someone dares challenge you (for you can imply your critic is a crude, overly-literal thinker who has failed properly to grasp the true meaning of your remark).

 

The thought that contradiction is a sign of profundity often crops in religious contexts. Non-believers usually take what look like straightforward contradictions within a religious doctrine to indicate falsehood. The faithful, on the other hand, may take those very same contradictions to indicate genuine insight. Indeed, religious folk will sometimes make a point of appearing to contradict themselves, saying things like 'God is, and yet he is not', 'God is one, and yet he is many', and 'God is good, and yet he is not.'

 

There's no denying that seemingly contradictory remarks can sometimes express something profound. No doubt we can find some kind of truth even in Orwell's poisonous examples. However, given the formulaic way in which contradiction can be used to generate the illusion of depth and profundity - that's to say, to generate pseudo-profundity - it's wise not to be too easily impressed.

 

Responses to nonsense objections

 

Responses to nonsense objections include:

 

(i) rejecting the criterion of nonsense/meaningfulness on which theism comes out as nonsense/meaningless,

 

and:

 

(ii) maintaining that, whether or not the proposed criterion of nonsense/meaninglessness is correct, theism meets it.

 

In response to Ayer's verificationist challenge to the meaningfulness of God talk, then, theists may challenge the principle of verification on which Ayer relies, and/or insist that theism is in fact verifiable in the required sense. As we will see, both kinds of responses to Ayer's challenge have been made.

 

PART TWO: SPECIFIC EXAMPLES

 

As promised, I now turn to some examples of logical objections to theism. What follows is merely a selection. There are many more such objections.

 

Divine simplicity

 

God is widely supposed to be, in a certain sense, simple. The doctrine of divine simplicity is characterised neatly by Eleanor Stump (1997: 250) as involving four claims:

 

1. God cannot possess spatial or temporal parts.

2. God cannot have any intrinsic accidental properties.

3. There cannot be any real distinction between one essential property and another in God's nature.

4. There cannot be a real distinction between essence and existence in God.

 

The first condition is straightforward, and rules out God being extended in space in the way that, for example, physical objects are. God's simplicity is also widely supposed to require that God be eternal rather than temporal. If God were spread out across time, then he would have temporal parts, with one part occurring before another.

 

The second claim involves a familiar philosophical distinction between essential properties - roughly, those an entity must possess - and accidental properties - those an entity possesses but might have lacked or might come to lack. Physical objects are widely thought to have both essential and accidental properties. For example, it's widely supposed that it's essential to this table that it be made of wood - a table not made of wood would not be this very table. However, it's not essential to this table that it be painted red, or be in my living room - these are merely accidental properties of the table. Some properties of my table are also merely extrinsic - they can be changed without a change in the object (being in my living room is an extrinsic property of this table, it can be relocated without any change to it). Other properties are intrinsic - a change in the property involves a change in the object (a change in the length of one table leg would involve an intrinsic change in the table). The doctrine of divine simplicity requires that all God's intrinsic properties be essential to him. So, while it may not be essential to God that he possess the extrinsic property of currently being thought about by me (presumably, God might easily have lacked that particular property), the property of omnipotence, being intrinsic to God, is essential to him.

 

The third claim requires that all God's essential properties be identical. So, for example, God's essential properties of omnipotence, omniscience and perfect goodness must, in truth, be one and the same property: a single property that, say, we are merely conceptualising or thinking about in different ways.

 

The fourth claim exploits another philosophical distinction - between essence and existence. The essential properties of thing typically do not include existence. For example, this table's essential properties do not include existence - the table might not have existed and it will one day cease to exist. God's essence, on the other hand, includes existence. Indeed, given the third claim, his property of existence must be identical with his other essential properties - of omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, and so on. God's essence is existence.

 

The doctrine of divine simplicity might be thought logically inconsistent with other doctrines regarding God, such as the doctrine of the Trinity. How can God be both a simple being and yet triune? And how can God, who lacks spatial and temporal parts, be Jesus, who had spatial and temporal parts (arms and legs, and a birth and death, for example)?

 

Further, the claim that God is simple has also been accused of being logically contradictory per se.  One of the more obvious objections runs as follows: surely, we can logically separate out God's properties of omniscience, omnipotence and omni-benevolence from him as their logical possessor. But then God is himself logically and ontologically complex, not simple.

 

However, there is a long theistic tradition that insists that God's omni-properties are not, in fact, logically distinct properties of him, in the way that, say, my height and my weight are logically distinct properties of me. God does not merely possess his omni-properties, he is numerically identical with them. God and his omnipotence are one and the same thing; God and his omniscience are one and the same thing, and so on. But then and, given the transitivity of identity (if a is identical with b and b with c, then a is identical with c) then all these omni- properties are also identical with each other. Hence God is, after all, logically simple.

 

Perhaps more problematic is the following external objection: God, while simple, is also is widely supposed by theists to share at least some properties with his creation. For example, God possesses knowledge and power, but then so do I (even if not to the maximum, as God does). The difficulty is: if power is a property that God and I share, then surely God cannot be identical with that property. And so God's possession of that property - power - does entail that he have some logical complexity after all: we can logically distinguish God from some property of his. It might seem that the only way we can salvage the doctrine of divine simplicity is by denying any commonality between God and his creation.

 

One response to this external objection is to insist that while God is indeed perfectly powerful, and I too am powerful to some limited degree, it doesn't follow that there is, then, some property - power - that we share. Miller (1996) argues that perfect power is not power. Perfect power is a kind of limit, as is zero power. And zero power is not power. Similarly, the lower limit in the case of speed - zero mph - is not a speed. Miller suggests that perfect power should not be thought of as maximum amount of power (what he calls a 'limit simpliciter') but as a 'limit case' like zero power or zero speed.

 

Graham Oppy (2003) outlines a different response to this external objection, suggesting that in correctly describing individuals aand b as being F, it does not follow that there exists some single corresponding property in the world joint possession of which by a and b makes both 'a is F' and 'b is F' true. For the predicate 'is F' may not pick out an objectively existing property. Suppose, for example, that 'is F' is defined like so: something is F if and only if it possesses either property G or property H. Suppose both a and b are F. It doesn't follow there is one property they share - for it may be that ais F by virtue of being G and b is F by virtue of being H. But then similarly, while both God and I are powerful, God may be powerful by virtue of his possessing (or being identical with) a property P1, while I am powerful by virtue of my possessing some other property P2. In which case, while we can both be correctly described as 'powerful', there need be no property we share.

 

That concludes my brief sampling of the many internal and external logical objections that might be raised in connection with the doctrine of divine simplicity. But note there is also the potential for a form of nonsense objection to be raised against the doctrine. For example, in his Philosophical Investigations (1998) Ludwig Wittgenstein attacks the notion of absolute logical simplicity, which played a crucial role in his earlier philosophy (Book I, sections 45-48). Our talk of what is 'simple' and 'composite' has its home in settings in which we describe, for example, a chessboard as a complex made up of squares. But is each chess square simple? Within the context of the game of chess, perhaps. However, in other contexts each square might be thought of as made up of two rectangles, or of a larger shape from which another has been subtracted. A chess square's cream colour might also be seen as a composite of yellow and white. Each chess square is bounded by four straight lines. And each of those lines might in turn be viewed as a combination of mathematical points. Conversely, a mathematical point might be seen as the intersection of two lines. Talk of 'simple' and 'composite' is highly diverse and has its home in such varied linguistic contexts. Wittgenstein thought that to abstract away from all such linguistic contexts or 'language games' and try to apply the terms 'simple' and 'composite' in an absoluteway - to talk about a thing or things that are simple, period - is to end up talking nonsense:

 

But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?  -- What are the simple constituent parts of a chair?  -- The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? -- 'Simple' means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair'. (Philosophical Investigations, I, section 47)

 

It's arguable that the attempt to define God as being absolutely'simple' involves a similar drift into nonsense.

 

Divine foreknowledge

 

The classic problem of divine foreknowledge is an externalobjection. The objection is that the divine attribute of omniscience is logically incompatible with the theist's further belief that God has imbued human beings with free will - that's to say: the freedom to act as they freely choose, without their action being compelled or determined by anything outside themselves. The Jewish philosopher Maimonides (1135-1204) produced a classic statement of the objection:

 

Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that [that] man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect…(1996: 99-100)

 

The suggestion seems to be that, if God knows Tom will do x tomorrow, then necessarily, Tom will do x tomorrow. But then Tom lacks the freedom to do otherwise. Whether or not Tom performs some future action x is never up to him - it is determined by factors outside himself: by what God knows he will do.

 

There is also an internal objection to theism generated by divine foreknowledge. If God, being omniscient, knew yesterday that he will do x tomorrow, then God can't do anything other than x tomorrow. But if God can't do other than x tomorrow, then he is not omnipotent: his power is limited by his own foreknowledge.

 

But have we really identified a problem regarding divine foreknowledge? After all, we also have (admittedly fallible) knowledge of what will happen in the future. I might know, for example, that Ted will go to the shops tomorrow. But it is a necessary condition of knowing that P that P is true. Hence my knowing Ted will go to the shops tomorrow entails that Ted will indeed go to the shops. So does my knowledge of what Ted will do tomorrow entail he lacks the freedom to do otherwise?

 

Actually, this problem of foreknowledge has a solution. What is necessary is the conditional(if-then) statement that if I know that P, then P. It does not follow that if I know that P, then necessarily P, i.e. that it is a necessary truth that P, that things could not have been otherwise. More generally:

 

            Necessarily: If x, then y

 

does not entail

 

            If x, then necessarily: y.

 

Compare: necessarily, if Tom is a bachelor, then Tom is unmarried. That conditional is a necessary truth. But of course it does not follow that if Tom is a bachelor, then it's a necessary truth that Tom is unmarried - that Tom lacks the freedom to get married.

 

Similarly then, while it's a necessary truth that if I know Ted will go to the shops tomorrow, then Ted will go to the shops tomorrow, it doesn't follow that my knowledge of what Ted will do entails Ted lacks the freedom to do otherwise.

 

So have we solved the problem of divine foreknowledge? If my knowing that Ted will go to the shops tomorrow is consistent with Tom's having the freedom to do otherwise, why shouldn't God's knowing what Ted will do tomorrow be consistent with Ted's freedom to do otherwise?

 

If there is still a problem regarding divineforeknowledge, it seems that will be because there's something special about God's foreknowledge. Of course there are differences between human foreknowledge and God's foreknowledge. In particular, unlike us, God is infallible about what will happen in the future. So does God's infallibility entail that, if God knows Ted will go to the shops tomorrow, then necessarily Ted will go to the shops tomorrow - that Ted lacks the freedom to do otherwise?

 

It seems not. God's infallibility requires:

 

            Necessarily: if God believes that P, then P.

 

So, necessarily: if God infallibly believes Ted will go to the shops tomorrow, then Ted will go to the shops tomorrow. However, it does not follow that if God infallibly believes Ted will go to the shops tomorrow, then necessarily Ted will go to the shops - that Ted lacks the freedom to do otherwise. Again, that inference involves an illicit slide from: Necessarily: If x, then y, to: If x, then necessarily: y.

 

Of course, if Ted knows today that God believes he, Ted, will go to the shops tomorrow, then Ted might, given his freewill, choose not to go to the shops and so render God fallible. Now obviously, given that necessarily, God is infallible, Ted must lack the ability to make God fallible. But does this in turn require that Ted lack freewill?

 

No. Whenever Ted thinks he knows what God believes Ted will do tomorrow, and Ted acts to make God's belief false, it turns out Ted's just mistaken about what God believed Ted would freely choose to do.

 

However, while God's infallible belief that Ted will go to the shops tomorrow does not seem to be incompatible with Ted having the freedom to do otherwise, perhaps, if we also add into the mix (i) the suggestion that God knew yesterday what Ted will do tomorrow, and (ii) a further necessity - that the past is unalterable - then a successful argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with free will might constructed. Some more sophisticated versions of the problem of divine foreknowledge take this form. Here's one example (let T be: Ted will go to the shops tomorrow)

I assume for the purposes of this essay that contradictions cannot be true, though note that some, including Graham Priest, argue that some contradictions can be true (and, simultaneously, false). See Priest (2006).

Note the argument is not that the evil we observe provides good evidenceagainst the existence of God, making the existence of God less probable. That is the evidential problem of evil. See the chapter in this volume 'Evidential Objections to Theism'.

Of course, in suggesting that the theist can solve the logical problem of evil by dropping any one of the three classical omni-attributes, I am assuming those omni-attributes are logically independent, which is contentious. If omnipotence logically requires omniscience, say, then the theist does nothave the option of dropping omniscience alone. They would have to drop omnipotence too.

This example is adapted from one provided by Linda Zagzebski in her entry to Stanford Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on 'Foreknowledge and Freewill': https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fr...

Note that, for technical reasons, the authors prefer to characterise omnipotence in terms of performing tasks, but in terms of bringing about certain states of affairs.

Note that in later developments of the argument, Schellenberg switches from talk of inculpable belief to talk of non-resistant belief, acknowledging that one might somehow be culpable - be to blame - for ones failure to believe in God even if one is not aiming deliberately to shut the door on any relationship with God that might be on offer. It is the latter 'resistant' form of non-belief that Schellenberg maintains is incompatible with the existence of a perfectly loving God. (2015: 54-55)

Schellenberg has suggested to me in correspondence that his (2015) volume presents an argument that belief in perfectly loving god is incompatiblewith belief in non-resistant believers, whereas elsewhere - e.g. in his (1993) book and in his (2004) paper - he argues only that it is actually false that God would permit non-resistant non-belief or that non-resistant non-belief provides at least evidence against the existence of a perfectly loving god.

 

They may use 'God' as a label for something they first encounter through a glass darkly, as it were (Paul uses the phrase in Corinthians: 1 Cor. 13, 12). Thus the subject matter of their belief - the God they 'have in mind' - can remain a constant, even while the beliefs they hold about the subject matter may undergo considerable revision. Compare: suppose I introduce 'Tim' as a label for him - that person I now see dimly through a mist; it's still Tim I have in mind when I later admit that much of what I first believed about Tim (based on his misty appearance) was incorrect.

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