Walter Kretchik's history of Army doctrine

You've got to be pretty wonky to look forward to an evening of
reading a history of U.S. Army doctrine, so I am coming out with my hands up to
confess: When my copy of Walter
Kretchik's book arrived in the mail, I couldn't wait to dig in. (For those
scratching their heads, my pocket definition of military doctrine is: How a
military thinks about what it does.)

When I put it down, I was not so happy. Kretchik's argument
is that "the American Army has been far more adaptive and innovative than
scholars have acknowledged." I wasn't persuaded.  

This book is not a narrative history of how each version of
the manual came to be. It doesn't explore the clashes over doctrine, nor even
much the personalities involved. I found it more a once-over-lightly trot
through what the changes to each edition of 100-5, as the Army's capstone
manual was known for years. I think I learned more from Robert Doughty's history
of the evolution of Army tactical doctrine from the end of World War II to
the end of the Vietnam War.

Even so, the book is useful as an overview for people trying
to track how Army doctrine has changed over the centuries, and especially since
the Vietnam War. It usefully summarizes the contents of each edition of the
Army's operations manual, highlighting differences and changes. 

Bottom line: This one is only for the hard-core
fan of American ground forces doctrine. The rest of youse who are only
occasional doctrinal dippers would be better off sticking to the
selected papers of General DePuy.