Coronavirus and Philosophy: Omniscient, Omnipotent and Omnibenevolent God

The coronavirus pandemic is currently being analyzed from various empirical scientific points of view, especially biological, psychological, social and scientific. However, philosophical analysis can or should be useful for anyone who has come across this virus directly or indirectly and who has been forced to look at his or her behavior in ways he or she is not used to. As the Buddha once said, we are what we think, and therefore, by changing our thoughts, we can change ourselves in all the meanings of this word. From a philosophical point of view, Covid-19 can make everyone rethink some of the deepest issues ranging from theoretical (metaphysical) to practical (moral and political). Before thinking about these issues, we must also recall that the empirical sciences study what exists, and philosophy – what could (or must) exist and what could not. From a practical point of view, which may be relevant to the Coronavirus pandemic, philosophy distinguishes what we can change from what we cannot, what we have influence over from what we do not.

Coronavirus and Philosophy of Religion

In particular nowadays, the classical argument against the existence of God can be formulated in the following way:

P_1. The Coronavirus pandemic occurs.

P_2. If there were an omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent God, then no Coronavirus pandemic would occur.

C. There is no omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent God.

What does it mean to be omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent? The omniscient thing knows everything, more correctly, a thing is omniscient when: everything that is true, it knows to be true (there cannot be anything that he doesn’t know), and everything it believes to be true is true (there cannot be any mistaken that he believes). The omnibenevolent thing wants the best, more correctly, a thing is omnibenevolent when: for each of us, it wants us to be better off rather than worse off, and given a choice between the world being better or worse, it always wants the world to be better. The omnipotent thing has unlimited power, more correctly, a thing is omnipotent when: everything that it wants to be case is the case and If it were to want anything to be the case, then it would be the case. Given all three of these attributes, it is reasonable to think that if God is omniscient, he should have known that the Coronavirus pandemic will happen. If God is also omnipotent, he cannot want this to happen, and being omnipotent, he must have prevented it. But he did not, therefore it is reasonable to think that there is no omniscient, omnipotent and omnipotent God.

There may be versions of objections to this argument, which claims that ‘terrible things cause good things to happen.’ Therefore, God wanted Covid-19 to spread everywhere, because later it will lead to more good things, maybe people will understand the meaning of life more correctly, they will be more sensitive to help each other, or something else.

The problem is that this objection is not so convincing for a reasonable agnostic. It may sound illogical for him. If God is truly omnipotent he would not be constrained by physical possibilities. If God is truly omnipotent and he wanted, for example, people should understand the meaning of life more correctly, and they should be more sensitive toward each other, God wouldn’t be constrained by practical means of doing it. He could have, if he were truly omnipotent, just designed them in such a way that they have a mental inclination for what God wants of them now.

It can be stated that direct intervention with a mental inclination would violate the principle of a person’s free will, which, in turn, could cast doubt on the moral responsibility that can assume this person as an agent of free will. A change in mental states under the biological or psychological threat of Covid-19 may not seem to be a matter of free will. Logically, the argument can be constructed in the following way:

Let three moments of time be ordered such that t_1 < t_2 < t_3:

P_1. Suppose that God infallibly believes at time t_1 that a person will have the desired mental inclination at t_3 under the threat of Covid-19.

P_2. The proposition God infallibly believes at t_1 that a person will have the desired mental inclination at t_3 under the threat of Covid-19 is accidentally necessary at t_2. (from the principle of the necessity of the past)

P_3. God believes at t_1 that a person will have the desired mental inclination at t_3 under threat of Covid-19 entails this person will have the desired mental inclination at t_3 under the threat of Covid-19. (from the definition of infallibility)

P_4. Thus, the proposition a person will have the desired mental inclination at t_3 under the threat of Covid-19 is accidentally necessary at t_2. (2-4)

P_5. If the proposition a person will have the desired mental inclination at t_3 under the threat of Covid-19 is accidentally necessary at t_2, it is true that this person cannot do otherwise than have the desired mental inclination at t_3 under threat of Covid-19.

P_6. If when a person does an act he cannot do otherwise, he does not do it freely. (principle of alternative possibilities)

C. Therefore, a person does not have the desired mental inclination under the threat of Covid-19 freely.

The notion of ‘accidental necessity’ means that the past is ‘necessary’ in the sense of being beyond anyone’s control. Before a person has the desired mental inclination, he can make ‘a person will have the desired mental inclination at t_3’ true (by doing in the same way that is stated in this proposition) or make this proposition false (by not doing in the same way that is stated in this proposition). After he has done in the same way that is stated in the proposition, the proposition is true and no one, even God can make it false. The necessity is ‘accidental’, because the same proposition may have it at one time and lack it at another. If we assume that a person is free, the proposition about this person lacks accidental necessity prior to t_3, but has such necessity subsequent to t_3.