Before you bury COIN, here are some thoughts to put in the time capsule with it

My old friend Marine Col. (ret.) Gary
Anderson writes from somewhere overseas that, "No poor dumb son of a bitch ever won a counterinsurgency by
sitting on his FOB. He won it by making the other poor dumb son of a bitch sit
on his FOB."

Meanwhile, here is a guest
column on COIN issues:

By "Ford Prefect"

Best Defense asylum for COIN
bitter-enders

I
know and respect Col.
Gian Gentile from our years teaching at USMA and afterwards.  I think
he's off on this -- just like the uber-COIN pundits of the 2004-2007 era were as
well. There were a few people (John
Nagl and some others come to mind) that were thinking about COIN in the
decade prior to 9/11 -- they were very few, and very far between.  Others
piled on the COIN train as it left the station, and tend to be the first to
jump off as soon as it stops.  Just an observation. 

COIN
should not be an organizational "design tool" to build the U.S. armed
forces around.  It is a method of conflict -- with its own doctrine, tactics
and strategy -- that is applied when it is needed.  Conventional, armored
ground warfare is much the same. As is sub-surface, surface, cyber, and so
on.  The key point is to maintain a cadre of competent NCOs and Officers capable
of doing those missions when needed.  How many Coast Guardsmen are
competent in ASW? My bet is less than 10. But if the Coasties ever get the
mission, those 10 guys/gals will be worth their weight in gold.   

COIN
is not "dead" -- it isn't something that can die.  It will exist
as long as you send your armed forces to deal with populations outside of
fighting their organized armies.  COIN isn't counter-terrorism; the former
is a military mission, the latter at its core a law enforcement mission. 
CT will continue on as long as terrorism is a tool of a weak adversary; the
same with COIN. 



The real question, I think, is how to we keep enough folks around to serve as a
cadre for those 'esoteric' missions (like COIN, but also including tactical
nuclear warfare, amphibious operations, mass airborne operations and so on)
while doing what the Nation expects the armed forces to do -- provide the 'common
defense' of the Republic.  Smart reorganization, with a clear
understanding of possible future missions, is the key, not dancing on the grave
of COIN.

"Ford
Prefect" is hitchhiking around Afghanistan. Or sitting in the cubicle to your
right. Feeling lucky, punk? Well
do ya?