Comrades, we're in a defensive arms race with Russia -- but that isn't a bad thing

By Brig. Gen. Kevin
Ryan (US Army, Ret.)

Best Defense kommissar
of old school Russian affairs

It appears that Russia and the United
States are about to embark on what may be the most peaceful and productive arms
race in history -- a defensive arms race.

Russia, the U.S., and NATO have been
unable to come to agreement over U.S. missile defense plans for Europe. 
Russia views the deployment of U.S. interceptors there as the first step to an
eventual capability to negate Russia's only remaining deterrent to an attack by
the West -- its nuclear offensive weapons.  Russia has basically three
responses it can choose: increase its offensive forces, increase its defensive
forces, or do nothing.  

On Nov. 29th, President Dmitry
Medvedev announced that the Russian made Voronezh-DM radar warning station was
moving to immediate combat readiness.  It will detect incoming missiles
targeted against Russia's exclave of Kaliningrad.  "I expect that
this step will be seen by our partners as the first signal of the readiness of
our country to make an adequate response to the threats which the (Western)
missile shield poses for our strategic nuclear forces," Medvedev said.

Russian leaders have previously
promised to improve the survivability of their offensive nuclear missile force
as a means of ensuring that they would retain an effective nuclear deterrent,
and that will likely happen.  But recent events and announcements indicate
that Russia is also investing money in its own increased missile
defenses.  The Ministry of Defense is creating a new branch of service,
the Aerospace Defense Force, which will unite defensive forces stretching from
space-based platforms to land based systems, all intended to protect against
external attacks, first and foremost U.S. strategic nuclear attacks.  This
is an unexpected development given that most observers, and even some Russian
military leaders, predicted Russia would not follow America's lead in spending
billions on expensive missile defense technologies. [[BREAK]]

The new aerospace forces are the
Ministry of Defense's third priority according to a recent briefing by Russia's
Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov.  But according to some
security experts, the aerospace forces are really the ministry's first
priority, because they will receive the majority of the defense ministry's
modernization funds over the next decade.   So, this development has
a budget and people assigned: a good indication that it will actually happen.

Medvedev thinks a Russian defensive
system will be viewed as a threat by the US and NATO, forcing concessions from
them on their defensive plans.  But rather than forcing the U.S. and NATO to
constrain their plans, such a move might actually remove any reluctance to
deploy their systems.  If Russia can equalize the strategic balance by expanding
its own defenses, then the U.S. and NATO do not have to consider limiting
theirs. 

A defensive arms race like the one
unfolding is not a threat to the U.S. or NATO or Russia.  Instead, the
development of a more robust missile defense system in Russia will make Russia
a better partner in any future joint missile defense system with NATO.  It
will also generate more jobs in Russia and help strengthen a military that has
been habitually underfunded and abused by the leadership.  The best part is
that, like U.S. missile defenses, Russian defensive forces cannot attack an
enemy.  They only protect. 

It is true that Medvedev has also said
he will deploy Iskander surface to surface missiles that could destroy U.S./NATO
missile interceptors that target Russian ICBMs, but this is a meaningless
threat if the U.S. and NATO are sincere in their promise that our defensive
interceptors are not aimed at those Russian ICBMs. 

The missile defense situation is not a
volatile one, but it has thus far been a missed opportunity for improved
cooperation on nuclear and security interests.  Neither side is able or
willing to retreat from their current positions on deployments, threat
assessments, or cooperation.  However, Russian leaders realize that U.S.
missile defenses, especially for the next few years, do not yet threaten
Russia's strategic deterrent, and U.S. leaders realize that Russia is not likely
to increase its offensive nuclear power over the same period.  The result
will be a stable situation in which the U.S. can continue its missile defense
deployments and Russia can build its new defensive forces.  In both cases,
domestic budget considerations will probably keep the pace of deployment
slow. 

Sometime after Feb. 2013, when both
countries have decided their new presidents for the next few years, we can
revisit the missile defense cooperation situation and perhaps find more common
ground. 

Retired Army Brigadier General Kevin
Ryan is Executive Director for Research at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer
Center. He served as U.S. Defense Attaché to Moscow and Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.