Threats and Warnings – Conclusion
One of the comments to my previous post quite accurately pointed out the fundamental problem in evaluating whether the threat/warning cycle is actually working – if it’s working well you may never know it, at least until threats are aborted and announcements are made. While that is quite true for discrete, operational threats, it may be possible to get a sense of whether or not the overall system is being “optimized” for a given period of time.
Optimization requires that all elements are working on the same priorities, that resources are allocated according to those priorities, that there are no known threats which are being neglected and that all parties are equally engaged. And “all parties” not only means the different agencies and services involved in intelligence collections and analysis, it includes the national political leadership that issues the directions that drive the resources and priorities. If that leadership is not issuing directions and personally engaging with the threats and warnings identified by the intelligence community exposures arise. One of the most contemporary and dramatic examples of disconnects in priorities and engagement can be found during the six months prior to the attacks on America in 2001.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB116/
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/opinion/the-bush-white-house-was-deaf-to-9-11-warnings.html
An easy enough failure to see in retrospect, however even at the time it would have been clear that there were some serous disconnects between the foreign policy priorities and objectives of the new Bush Administration and data that was being developed within segments of the intelligence community. That can be seen not only in the complaints of senior advisors such as Richard Clarke (the former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter–terrorism) but with indications in the public record. Those I found them in a mind numbing dive into a variety of 9/11 interviews as well as in contemporary committee testimony – the sort of thing nobody ever reads until something goes terribly wrong.
It is indeed possible to gain insight into any administration’s actual priorities on threats and national security. A starting point is to check the national security directives which are being issued (specifically those related to intelligence) – those essentially direct the intelligence communities as well as the security agencies as to where they should be focusing their resources. You can find a historical lists and even contemporary lists online; under the Trump Administration these directives are not referred to as National Security Presidential Memorandums and only one to date appears to deal directly with intelligence. :
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspm/index.html
That directive deals with “offensive” cyberwarfare. However there are no signs of directives for defensive cyberwarfare, for addressing social media warfare or any directives relating specifically to Russian political warfare or interference in American elections. Nor are there any specific memorandums dealing with intelligence community or agency threats to the actual mechanics of the elections process at either the state for federal level.
In terms of numbers of such directives, the Trump Administration’s engagement with the intelligence community can be compared to other administrations. President Reagan issued 9 intelligence related directives, President H.W. Bush 4, Clinton 2, George W. Bush 2 and President Obama 2. The titles of each are on record, even if the documents themselves are confidential. Obama’s two directives dealt with cyberwarfare and signals intelligence. He also supported and signed legislation to significantly increase the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence and among other things require “vulnerabilities” studies that would be reviewed with the President and forwarded to Congress.
With reference to this public record, it is also possible to get a feel for the existence of any “disconnects” between the Presidents’ priorities and the assessments of the national intelligence community. Those assessments show up both in extended written reports and in Congressional testimony.
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—SSCI.pdf
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA—Unclassified-SSCI.pdf
Readers can make their own assessments as to whether the current threats and warnings expressed by the intelligence community are in sync with the priorities and focus of President Trump and his administration. As to my own concerns, I’ll illustrate them out with a few references. I’ll leave you to read them and draw your own conclusions.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/intel-chiefs-testify-global-threats-cybersecurity-and-elections
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/04/trump-cybersecurity-leader-vulnerable-622813
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/in-cyberwar-there-are-no-rules-cybersecurity-war-defense/
And as a closing note, check out these recent news items, suggesting why you should perhaps be more worried than you were….and why President Trump might want to reconsider his priorities….
