Fixing the Army (III): Time to figure out whether the brigade combat team works, simplify unit names, and shutter V Corps

Our "tired old soldier" now turns to his recommendations for
how to improve the operational Army. I've been enjoying the
comments he has provoked, especially in his Friday post.

By "Petronius Arbiter"

Best Defense department of Army affairs

Operational

Re-examine the BCT. Is
it effective? What does the exhaustive, intensive rigor and analysis performed
by the analysis agencies really say? Are 2 battalions effective or should we
add the third at the expense of fewer BCTs? Does the cavalry squadron have a
function it can perform? What is best for the Army? But, more significantly
what does the analysis say, not what do the Generals say or think without
analysis? Modular BCTs can facilitate the ability to deploy but can they
conduct the warfight in FSO?

Re-encumber the
divisions and the corps. It followed good military logic in a time when we had
to separate divisions, BCTs and Corps in order to meet the requirements to
deploy multiple headquarters to meet many real military needs. But, hopefully,
those requirements are in the past. Time to get divisional supervision again on
brigades and be able to bring to bear concentrations of fires, sustainment and
support.

Return to branch
specific maneuver
battalions. The Combined Arms Battalion is difficult (some would say
impossible), at best, to train and to support. Few, if any, commanders or
senior NCOs are versed or prepared to be responsible to train and understand
the multitude of weapons platforms or systems that exist in those
organizations. The problem starts here at the battalion level, not below. Here the
old phrase, "you never know what you don't know," comes to mind.

What does V Corps do
in Europe? Is it a Corps Hq or not? Somehow V Corps and USAREUR just seem to be
over supervision for 4 maneuver brigades that remain in Europe. Besides the center
of gravity of activity has moved from the Western/Eastern plains of Europe to
the Mediterranean a long time ago, and our military, not just the Army, just
has not seemed to adapt.

Restore unit
designations that make sense and are understandable. We know what an artillery
unit is and does. We don't understand what a Fires unit is and does. That goes
double for Maneuver Enhancement, Maneuver Support, Maneuver Sustainment,
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Sustainment, et al. There is no commonality in
like-type organizations that make it simple to know what one is or does.

Armor officers should
not command Infantry forces just the same as Infantry officers should not
command cavalry forces. Return Stryker Infantry battalions and brigades to
Infantry commanders. Stryker battalions and brigades are our Army's largest and
most complex formation of Infantry and as such should be commanded by
experienced Infantry commanders who understand and comprehend the variety of
weapons systems in those organizations. The issue is not that armor officers
aren't good, they just aren't experienced enough to maneuver the dismounted
force on the ground, or the weapons systems in an infantry organization. While
we are at it, we should re-educate ourselves that a Stryker organization is an
organization that provides mobility and some small firepower to a dismounted
organization. That is why they were created. For sure, the Stryker is not a
tank, or even a small tank. There will be a tendency of armor officers to treat
them as a tank and the outcome will not be good.