Cronin reviews a new RAND report on the possibility of a U.S. conflict with China

It is always nice to see a
RAND document that actually come to some conclusions, however tentative.
Maybe they are outgrowing the motto, "RAND -- Providing an intellectual hospice
for the conventional wisdom."

By Patrick Cronin

President, Best Defense Academy of Frenemy-American
Relations

China
appears well on its way to becoming America's next peer competitor. Over the
next twenty years, a modernizing People's Liberation Army will challenge
regional militaries and better keep foreign powers out of its near seas. As a
result, according to a new RAND report, the
U.S. Armed Forces will "become increasingly dependent on escalatory options for
defense and retaliatory capabilities for deterrence."

In "Conflict with
China: Conflict, Consequences and Strategies for Deterrence," James
Dobbins, David Gompert, David Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell consider triggers for
U.S.-China conflict and their operational and strategic implications.

The paper first examines "occasions for conflict" and
includes situations involving the Korean
Peninsula, Taiwan,
cyberspace, the South China Sea, Japan,
and India.
The scenarios, all judged to be plausible if unlikely, are listed in descending
order of probability, with conflict over North Korea thought to contain
"significant potential" for escalation.

Similar hazards entail the other potential confrontations
considered by the authors. Thus, the discussion on cyberspace suggests how
China's putative success in stealing others' electrons could precipitate
kinetic action. For instance, a Chinese attempt to disrupt U.S. communications and intelligence could
catalyze attacks on satellites and a blockade on China's vital sea lines of
communication. The latter refers to an abiding Chinese concern over its
so-called "Malacca dilemma," a reference to how closure of the critical Malacca Strait
joining the Indian and Pacific oceans might cripple resource-dependent China. Such a
scenario could well be casualty-free and yet bring about monumental economic
loss and regional upheaval.

The 25-page report's sheer economy of verbiage is one of its
strengths. While the authors no doubt could have amplified on the scenarios -- from
the East China Sea to the Indian Ocean or Iran to Pakistan -- an exhaustive
review of potential conflicts would have added little to the conclusions. Their
main interest is to think through operational implications of current trends.  [[BREAK]]

And
the impact on future military operations is sobering. A reduced ability to
project power to defend allies and partners in East Asia
would drive our military procurement in the direction of "enhanced weapons,
ranges, geography, and targets" to ensure the survivability of our platforms
and bases. Further, we would need improved means of eliminating critical "Chinese
forces, launchers, sensors, and other capabilities," even eventually "Chinese
satellites and computer networks."

Chinese
military gains appear to target the Achilles' heel of U.S. modern networked battle
systems, and it is a logical deduction to assume a comparable set of Chinese
capabilities could be similarly put at risk. But looking ahead that may be as
good as it gets, as the authors assume an almost inexorable Chinese ability to
further close the qualitative military gap with America. "Barring unforeseen
technological developments that assure survivability for U.S. forces and C4ISR," they write, "it will not
be possible or affordable for the United States to buck these
trends."

This
will leave the United States
with a bleak choice between escalation (and deterrence based on Chinese fear of
escalation) and acquiescence to a rising China. Escalation is inherently
risky and could lead to nuclear war, and the latter cedes American power and
hands to China
precisely what it may wish to achieve with its growing military might.

The
throwback to bipolar strategic logic will seem anachronistic to some but is
arguably a helpful refresher on just what a rising China will mean with respect to our
military preponderance in the Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately, especially
without a renewal of the American economy in the years ahead, the United States'
options for dealing with these challenges are somewhat underwhelming.

The
authors focus on three ideas: economic interdependence, building partnership
capacity, and drawing China
into more cooperative security endeavors. All of these are unobjectionable and
sound general activities to be undertaken. The high degree of economic
interdependence is certainly a barrier to conflict. As one leading Chinese
scholar recently told me, "We are not worried about military tensions provided China stays on
track to become your largest trading power." But it would have been useful if
authors had also considered how such strong economic ties could make it seem
safer to conduct a balance of power competition, as geopolitics and
globalization coexist.

The
second notion of building partnership capacity is worthwhile. However, it also
has serious limits, because every nation in the region wishes to avoid
offending a rising China
that is also its largest or second largest trading partner. It is easier for Vietnam
to buy Russian Kilo-class submarines
than front-line American hardware. Similarly, note that U.S. military transfers to the Philippines have thus far been limited to a
1960s-era Hamilton
class Coast Guard cutter). As with pressure on U.S.
arms sales to Taiwan, China may well believe that over time it can
demand reduced U.S.
military cooperation with its neighbors.

The
authors also call for modifying the U.S.-China strategic relationship. That is
fine, too, but before one does that, it's worth reflecting on whether any
coherent framework exists and, if so, whether that framework is genuinely
shared across policy elites even within the current administration. It is here
that the authors' call for persuading China to buy-into a more cooperative relationship
in the region is sensible if not all that compelling (and ultimately the test
is whether such reasoning is compelling to the Chinese, not other Americans). At
a minimum, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that China will embrace our pivot to Asia if only we
invite China
to join in more multilateral security ventures. Chinese leaders are simply apt
to see any strengthening of America's role in the region as antithetical to
their national interests. As my colleague Robert Kaplan has written, the
Indo-Pacific region is witnessing a triumph of realism.

In
sum, the idea of mutual economic assured destruction, investing in partners,
and cooperative security are at best necessary but insufficient elements of a
strategy. They hardly seem a substitute for the kinds of new forces and
operational adaptations implied in the report's analysis. Economic cooperation
alone is insufficient to bar the outbreak of hostilities. So, we can agree with
the authors that while the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China should not be exaggerated,
neither should it be summarily dismissed. The distillation of the authors'
thinking incorporated into this useful paper should be a starting point for
deeper analysis.